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Chapter 1 
Narrative- The Broadest Element of Political Communication 
Political narrative is an abstract concept. Political parties or organizations never publish 
or explicitly communicate them. Rather, these groups implicitly hint at narratives that they build 
over time (Skworonek 1993). Political narratives are more or less explanations of the world and 
the political order. They attempt to communicate the general nature of politics and governance. 
They affirm policy attitudes and political commitments in light of values, held by individuals in 
the party or political movement they are coming from, that are posited to represent the most 
important, positive, and historically deeply held values of society. Narratives also commonly 
contain an appeal to membership by recruiting likeminded individuals. Those who agree with 
what the narrative represents are compelled to join the ranks. This type of call to join also 
provides a line of distinction. It allows the polis to identify a party with certain things, and not 
others. If they do not agree, members of the populace are free to choose other parties. Since the 
goal of a narrative is to compel the largest number of people possible to join a cause, broadness 
is a necessity. All together these factors seem to be necessary elements of narrative.  
Despite their practical intangibility, political narratives are palpable. They can be 
identified when trends in messaging are critically analyzed as a whole. This process is 
necessarily controversial because its product cannot be undisputedly proven to exist. Despite this 
shortcoming, an attempt at defining political narratives must be made to gain deeper 
understanding in many facets of political communication and, in this context, campaign 
communication. In this endeavor, the intellectual leap must be made at present in regards to the 
American Republican Party narrative that has been utilized, for all intents and purposes, since 
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1980. This narrative will serve as a basis of this work. In all, it seems that the Republican 
narrative that affirms the identity of the Party with respect to values can be summed up in a few 
sentences.  In abstraction, it follows something like this: “The Republican Party, its constituents 
and candidates, represent a few guiding principles. It believes in limited government. This comes 
from the conviction that the individual is at the center of American success. Individuals, 
including those not yet born, tend to be hardworking, virtuous, based on their traditional (read 
Judeo-Christian) values, and the creators of innovation in the economy and positive development 
in communities. This has been shown throughout American history in its points of growth. A 
government that is too large, invasive, or expensive in either of these realms unnecessarily 
burdens the individual, and thus discourages innovation and positive change. Thus, Republican 
government seeks to allow individuals to be free in the market and their community to encourage 
their success. The Party also represents pride in America. The party recognizes that America is a 
special place (read favored by God) of economic and social meaning. Thus, the Party, and its 
attached persons, have a deep commitment to America’s symbols (the flag, Pledge of Allegiance, 
the Constitution, etc.) and ideals (freedom, liberty, etc.). These concepts represent what it is to be 
American and are thus sources of great pride. The Party supports protecting these symbols and 
ideals both at home and abroad. At home, this means promoting certain legislation that limits 
government and encourages personal and economic growth. Abroad, this involves taking 
proactive steps to protect American interests, and acting decisively to help people aspiring to be 
free to reach their goal.” This, like all successful narratives, is necessarily broad. It seems to be 
able to explain the Republican position in most realms of political discourse. The economy, 
social issues like civil religion, abortion and free speech, and foreign policy are all covered in 
blanket terms by this narrative. It also has crucial appeals to historic and traditional values of the 
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American people. Comparative judgments of this narrative are also important, specifically in 
relation to a Democratic narrative. It has been argued that Democrats have no defined narrative. 
This will not be argued here, but there is near universal agreement that any Democratic narrative 
is far weaker than the modern Republican narrative described above. With a clearly established 
narrative that encompasses all political commitments, the Republican nominees for president 
stand as ideal case studies in observing how narrative shows itself, through complicated means, 
in campaign communication.   
Theme- A Narrower Realm In Political Communication 
Narrative has a very real impact on politics in the United States. Of most importance in 
this work, political narrative stands to inform broad campaign themes utilized by candidates for 
president during their general election campaigns. These broad themes vary for each candidate 
and can be numerous, but they are all essentially born of narrative. Candidates create themes by 
extracting sections of the narrative that they can spin in ways that fit their specific personal 
beliefs, convictions, résumés, electoral conditions, etc. Themes will explain aspects of the 
political world as the candidate sees it. Candidates create themes that, when they are compelling, 
are married to the narrative in important manners like history, values, and terms of identity. 
Compelling themes may also include the candidate’s personal story into their enumeration. Like 
narratives, themes are also implicitly drawn. Finding a candidate’s broad themes takes 
knowledge of the overall communicative effort of the campaign. In addition to positively 
reinforcing the candidate, themes can also subtract from the opposition candidate by utilizing the 
lines of distinction the narrative implicitly provides. Themes can go negative in this way by 
arguing that Democratic candidates do not embody the values that Republicans represent. 
Essentially, these broad themes are one level of greater specificity than the narrative they are 
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based on. For Republican presidential candidates, these themes represent their selection of parts 
of the narrative that they wish to enumerate in their own, more specific terms.  
Messaging Objectives and Constraints- The Next Step 
From these themes flows the next level of specificity in campaign communication. Here, 
this level will be referred to as “messaging objectives.” They are essentially topics that the 
campaign will focus upon. These messaging objectives are chosen early on based on the political 
climate, the themes available, and personal dispositions of important players. There are only 
three real realms in which messaging objectives exist: ideology, issues and character (Benoit 
2006, 28). Though somewhat related, and often confused, messaging objectives are conceptually 
separate from themes. Messaging objectives simply indicate an argument the campaign will try 
to make. In 2004 for example, the Bush campaign tried vigorously to show that George W Bush 
was a better wartime leader than John Kerry (Institute 2006). The selection of this as a 
messaging objective does not necessarily assert, as a theme would, any argument about the 
nature of the political world. Messaging objectives simply indicate major points of emphasis for 
campaign messaging. While messaging objectives certainly can, and if they are to be compelling 
should, be linked to theme, they are necessarily separate. Messaging objectives may be impacted 
by the current political order around the candidate. The campaign will want to borrow from 
common messaging objectives of politicians generally (Skworonek 1993, 4). Another guide to 
the selection of messaging objectives is the role a candidate will attempt to fulfill. If the 
candidate is running on a reconstructive basis, he will offer a break with the past and attempt to 
change policies and actions in a significant manner. If they are attempting to succeed an 
unsuccessful president from their party, candidates can take a role of disjunction. In this mode, 
they will offer a tweak of the current party policies. Candidates may also take on a messaging 
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objective of articulation if they are coming after a successful president of their own party. They 
will keep in the messaging objectives of the old order but attempt to innovate them. A 
preemptive messaging objective can be taken up when a candidate is in the party opposite of that 
in power. They will communicate that the country is headed in the wrong direction and that 
direction must be changed (Skworonek 1993, 39-43). Messaging objectives are enumerated 
throughout the campaign in all communication but are most often and obviously conveyed in 
events like stump speeches and convention acceptance speeches (Benoit 2006, 88). In these 
events, the candidate is attempting to build support in broad and overarching terms. The 
candidate also has time to speak and will not be cut off.  
The messaging objectives available to the campaign are constrained by several factors. 
The creativity and preference of campaign advisors and the candidate plays a key role in the 
early decision-making. Messaging objectives will not be chosen if people like the candidate, the 
campaign manager and heads of advertising and media relations are dead set against them. The 
media agenda and willingness has a similar effect. If the messaging objective will not play in the 
media, then it is not really worth it for the campaign to go in that direction. Moreover, if a 
messaging objective is gaining high amounts of media coverage, the campaign may emphasize it 
to a greater extent. Surveys of voters also carry significant weight in the selection of messaging 
objectives. Campaigns will choose messaging objectives that are salient to voters, that will 
impassion them. The opponent’s willingness to talk about the issues is a final constraint. Though 
the scholarship is not completely clear on this, it seems that this could have divergent effects. 
Maarek argues that without an opponent to respond to messaging objectives and cits of 
communiction, there is no point in conveying them (52). However, if an opponent does not 
respond, the campaign can continue to harp on an unresolved issue. The law and order 
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messaging objective (embodied in the prison furlough issue) in 1988 was continually ignored by 
the Dukakis campaign. This allowed the Bush camp to undermine him more and more over time.  
There are some potential dangers in messaging objective selection that seem to be 
meaningful. If the candidate is too aloof to the selection of messaging objectives, it may 
undermine his genuine qualities in expounding them. If the candidate seems disinterested in a 
major messaging objective, it will turn voters off. Candidates thus should hold the ultimate veto 
in messaging objective selection. Campaigns must also ensure that the number of messaging 
objectives is low and that they are harmonized. Voters need to be able to see that a candidate 
stands for a small collection of suggestions. If the messaging objectives are disjointed, then the 
candidate seems to stand for nothing at all (Maarek 2001, 53). Messaging objectives must also be 
framed properly, particularly to voters that could vote either way. Framing is executed by using 
logically equivalent words to make a policy seem different in a superficial way (Druckman 2004, 
671). Frames essentially serve as bridges between the elite who select the messaging objectives 
and the target populous. The campaign must use framing to compel voters to see messaging 
objectives in light of certain considerations that make the candidate more viable (Nelson et al 
1997, 227). If the campaign does not actively make sure the messaging objectives are understood 
in terms useful to the campaign, there is a risk that they can be construed in a deleterious way. 
Clearly this level of campaign communication is far more specific. Messaging objectives 
come in a variety of forms. Most importantly, they are not necessarily tied to themes, and by 
association the narrative. Messaging objectives are things that the campaign wants to sell to the 
electorate through repetition. Integration of themes that connect to the narrative will also be very 
helpful for the campaign in pitching these objectives. Themes are the best way to ensure that the 
enumeration of messaging objectives is compelling, If campaigns can tie its messaging 
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objectives to theme, thus the narrative, voters can see the arguments the campaign is making in 
broad terms of American identity, history and values.  
Strategy- A Constraint All Its Own 
Important to consider while formulating messaging objectives is the way that they fit into 
strategies that the campaign believes will give the candidate an edge in the election. There are 
several very general strategies that are important to consider when selecting and distributing 
messaging objectives and bits of communication. Different types of messaging objectives may 
be useful to executing each of these strategies successfully. The first broad strategy is to 
“increase the election day turnout of voters who prefer that candidate” (Benoit 2006, 51). This is 
otherwise known as mobilizing the base. This strategy focuses on getting every known supporter 
to the polls. This is one type of “maintenance communication” to keep supporters involved 
(Maarek 2001, 46). This can be accomplished through any number of messaging objectives and 
specific forms of communication. The campaign can acclaim their candidate to stress the 
importance that he be elected to lead the country. Attacking the opponent can also serve to 
mobilize the base. If the campaign can successfully argue, for example, that the election of the 
opponent would result in an inept person in office, or that a policy suggested would undermine 
the economy, then the base of support will mobilize. More broadly the campaign may cast the 
election in stark terms of direction for the country. If the base is convinced that the opponent is 
advocating for a deleterious turn to the country, those voters will come to the polls based on the 
high stakes communicated. The ability of the campaign to integrate themes into these messaging 
objectives will obviously vary. Candidate acclaims can be connected to theme if the campaign is 
skilled at utilizing theme. Character attacks are not well suited for thematic emphasis because of 
their very specific nature. Attacking candidate policy can be connected to theme in this 
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strategically significant way if the campaign can relate his policy to themes against Democratic 
values provided in the narrative’s lines of distinction.  
The campaign may also choose to go for purely undecided voters. This strategy will 
actually be what most campaigns focus on due to the relative ease of getting these voters and the 
common statistical necessity of doing so (Benoit 2006, 51). Most of the time, these independent 
voters are actually those least interested in politics. Thus convincing them to choose the desired 
candidate and to actually vote is a challenge. In messaging, it seems there is no set formula to 
getting these votes but a few strategies seem relevant. Focusing on messaging objectives of the 
economy has worked in the past because improving economic conditions is a bipartisan aim. 
Thus, if the campaign can convince the electorate that their candidate is better with the economy 
and focus on themes of their beliefs, they can capture many of these voters (Maarek 2001, 
46).Thematic integration will actually be important due to the low interest of these voters. If the 
messaging objective is understood by voters in broad terms of American identity, provided in the 
theme, it becomes much more compelling. Playing on character may also be important. Since 
these voters are generally disinterested in politics, they may not be interested in the issues. 
Further, some argue that people now choose a candidate based on how much they seem to feel 
the voter’s pain (Medhurst 1996, 23). Thus if the candidate can connect to these independent 
voters on a personal level, they may have success in capturing their votes. This will force the 
campaign to focus on and develop themes that include a personal story and fit them into the 
broader narrative in the areas of American success and values.  
Some part of campaign strategy may also revolve around capturing votes from the 
opponent’s party. Those with lukewarm support for their party’s candidate can actually 
constitute a sizable portion of voters ranging from 14 to 27% (Benoit 2006, 52). This is a 
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difficult task because people tend to vote within their party unless there is a compelling reason 
not to. Messaging objectives that focus on character may be effective here. If the opponent is cast 
as an unfit leader due to character defects, some may decide to vote outside of their party. As has 
been discussed it is difficult to integrate theme into this type of messaging objective. The 
opponent’s “vision for America” may also be helpful to capturing voters from his party. If he is 
to far on the fringe of his party, a play could be made by the campaign to get these voters to 
select their more moderate candidate. This will necessitate broad policy and past action 
messaging objectives. Thematic integration is possible in these types of messaging objectives.  
The campaign will also have to undertake strategy to prevent the defection of voters from 
their own party in order to nullify the strategy just described (Benoit 2006, 52). This is also a 
form of maintenance communication. In this strategy, the campaign may choose messaging 
objectives that enforce party images to remind lukewarm voters of their party commitments and 
the principles that entails. The connection with theme and narrative is clear in this type of 
messaging objective. The principles of the party come directly from the narrative and the theme 
the campaign chooses to expound on it. Also, if the candidate is too far on one end of the 
spectrum, they may move to more centrist messaging objectives. This will keep those close to 
the middle from jumping ship. These too must be tried to themes that argue the principles of the 
party. Along these lines they may want to cast the opponent as someone on the fringe of the 
opposite side of the spectrum. This will make the candidate seem like the more moderate 
candidate. In order to accomplish this, the campaign will have to focus again on themes of broad 
policy and will be well served by thematic integration.  
One final strategy that can be undertaken is to decrease the turnout of voters for the 
opposition. This is a controversial strategy because it discourages participation (Benoit 2006, 
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52). However, it can be effective, particularly for incumbents because presumably, the challenger 
must build a coalition and get the votes that an incumbent has already successfully assembled 
once. As long as the incumbent has not alienated his coalition, the success should hold if his 
opponent’s supporters are discouraged from voting. Not only is this strategy morally 
questionable, but also it is quite difficult to do. If the literature is correct, in order to discourage 
voter turnout, the mudslinging would have to be on a massive scale on both sides, and must not 
bear any regard for the truth. Even if this is done skillfully, it is difficult to ensure that the voters 
who do not vote will be those who would have voted for the opponent. As discussed, negative 
campaigning can have the effect of turning voters away from the polls on both sides and backfire 
on the candidate.  Overall, this strategy is both difficult and highly controversial. Character 
attacks will probably be the most effective means of discouraging turnout. These can not very 
easily be tied to themes as already discussed.  
Specific Communication- The End Products 
In order to utilize theme in enumerating messaging objectives that fulfill strategy, the 
campaign must use carefully crated bits of communication. These can take many forms. Each 
specific messaging effort will, in some way, touch upon a messaging objective. For example, in 
2004 Dick Cheney often argued that John Kerry’s election would make another terrorist attack 
more likely. Each of these messages embodied the larger messaging objective of the Bush 
campaign on national security. Long term, they wanted to create the belief that George Bush was 
better fit to keep the country safe (Mark 2006, 143). Though the Bush campaign did connect this 
messaging objective successfully to a theme, it must be noted that the connection was not 
intrinsic. The process of specific message creation includes numerous tangential dynamics and is 
thus extremely complex. It is important to note that messages can really only come in three 
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forms. Targeting voters is really the first consideration in creating messages. The process of 
campaigning is sometimes characterized as one of restriction (Didion 2001, 22). The 
organizations attempt to narrow the focus of messages to a certain group (large or very small) to 
increase their effectiveness. Some theories create a dichotomy to targeting. Broad swaths of 
targets may be directly appealed to in the hopes of making an impact on voter choice. The other 
type of target serves as a relay. The intention is to send them a message so that they will 
convince others to vote for the candidate (Maarek 2001, 42-3). Voters are segmented based on 
characteristics like race, gender, income level, religious affiliation, etc (Maarek 2001, 44). The 
campaign will also tend to focus on getting votes where they matter geographically. Bits of 
communication in Ohio will be greater developed and segmented than those in New York 
because it is a swing state. In fact, targeting sometimes occurs on a micro level in modern 
campaigns. Not only are advertisements chosen very specifically, but the places they appear are 
increasingly narrow. Some shows, like soap operas and those on the Lifetime Network, are used 
to display messages to women. Others, like those on ESPN or Spike TV, are selected to 
specifically target men (Mark 2006, 232). The tenants of framing will also help to govern 
targeting to some extent. It is rather agreed that those sophisticated on the issues are less likely to 
be persuaded by specific communication efforts than those that are less knowledgeable because 
the sophisticated voters already know the information being relayed (Nelson et al 1997, 227). 
This must be taken into careful consideration when campaigns are deciding on messages they 
will create. They are thus encouraged to go after voters that are less knowledgeable on the issues. 
Targeting calculations also hinge on the messaging objective the campaign is attempting to 
transmit and any themes that help to make the objective more compelling. Targeting of these 
specific bits of communication depends on the strategy that the campaign is attempting to fulfill. 
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Strategy plays a large role in governing the messaging objectives and implicated themes. All of 
this stands to have a big impact on the targets of specific communication. 	  
One major consideration in crafting specific communication is the medium of 
transmission. Television makes up the main sector of messaging. Thirty-second advertisements 
are the main method of messaging for a campaign. These are important because they give 
information to voters who may not go out of their way to get it. These messages can range in 
messaging objective and strategic aim, but they do have impacts on voters. News stories are also 
a method of television exposure. However, these are tricky because the candidate cannot 
completely control the messages the news will emit. Also the average sound byte for news 
stories is less than 10 seconds. This is hardly any time to explain an objective of messaging or 
connect it to a theme (Benoit 2006, 66-7). Debates are another important forum for television 
exposure. The messages here will contain more policy suggestions than other types of exposure. 
This is due to the fact that the candidate has time to talk and suggest specific policies based on 
the questions asked. There will also be more defenses in debates because the candidate will have 
to respond to whatever the opposition insinuates about his position (Benoit 2006, 88). Talk 
shows are a minor mode of candidate exposure. In these situations the messaging will likely be 
positive and based on character. These spots tend to soften the candidate up in the eyes of voters 
(Benoit 2006, 89). Nominating convention acceptance speeches are a one-time type of exposure 
that is nonetheless very important. These are extremely positive; acclaims make up more 75% of 
the speeches. The speeches are comprised of just over 50% policy topics (Benoit 2006, 82-4). 
This is a perfect time for candidates to pursue messaging objectives that connect to themes and 
are strategically significant. They have a lot of time to expound upon their messaging objectives 
as broad or as narrow as they like. They will be uninterrupted in their attempts to connect their 
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messaging objectives to broad themes, and by association the narrative. They can use all the 
powerful, emotional, value-driven aspects of the narrative and slightly more specific themes that 
the campaign has decided upon. Overall, television represents the most important medium of 
exposure in this period of study.  
The Internet and social media is the major growing medium of campaign communication. 
The Internet is useful because it contains all the different forms of media (video, text and 
pictures). It is also somewhat less expensive to transmit messages on the Internet. Furthermore, 
there is no filter on Internet communication. Journalists cannot temper or limit time of the 
message, allowing for more complex messages to be communicated. Candidates may also 
respond quicker on the Web. Targeting is also incredibly accurate. IP addresses provide location 
and access to web history allows specific tailoring of messages. The Internet is also the most 
interactive medium available (Benoit 2006, 79). Messaging on candidates’ actual websites is 
largely positive and covers policy more than character (Benoit 2006, 81). Social media has 
provided the most interactive mode of connectivity to voters. Constant streams of messaging can 
be conveyed on sites that millions visit multiple times per day. This media can expose those 
looking for information as well as those who are not. Active participants can like pages and visit 
sites. Those who are not active can be reached by paid advertisements on sites like Facebook and 
Twitter. All of this allows campaigns to incorporate themes into their messaging objectives on 
the Internet in a strategically significant manner if it is necessarily skilled. 
Direct mailers still serve an important purpose for messaging in campaigns. In this 
medium, targeting is pretty much an exact science. The addresses of registered voters are known 
so distribution of messages can be divided by the voter’s party and geography. This is a largely 
positive medium with 77% acclaims. It is also largely based on policy (Benoit 2006, 85).  
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Radio spots also still make up a major medium of political communication. This, like TV, 
gets messages to people not actively seeking it. This medium is one of the most freewheeling. 
Campaign messages on the radio are not subject to truth scrutiny present in television ads. Policy 
is focused on and there are more attacks than acclaims in radio messages. This is the only type of 
communication undertaken by the candidate-affiliated organizations that has this characteristic 
negativity (Benoit 2006, 89).  
There are several distinct types or phases of messaging. These each relate directly to 
themes and messaging objectives already established by the campaign. The first type builds an 
image of the candidate along with name and face recognition (Benoit 2006, 69). This will relate 
to a personal messaging objective that may be established by the campaign. It is one of the most 
time consuming and unpredictable types of messaging. The candidate must be sold in a way that 
matches his past credentials. The image, like the messaging objective must be quite simple and 
easy to identify with. Incumbents have a leg up in this area because pretty much all voters know 
them (Maarek 2001, 180). They will therefore look upon their past actions positively and 
encourage retrospective voting. In fact, incumbents generally acclaim and defend more than 
challengers (Benoit 2006, 110).  It is a slow process because the image must be reinforced over 
the course of a campaign. It is also subjective. Voters may see the selection of messages that 
those in the campaign believe will portray a certain image differently. The process is also 
relatively complex. The combination of all the messages that the campaign puts out regarding 
image may combine in the minds of voters in unexpected ways (Maarek 2001, 48-9). This is a 
multi-faceted process and not only has to do with speeches and words, but the candidates 
clothing and inflection, the crowd assembled, and the backdrop. Although the campaign tries to 
control this as much as possible over the course of enumerating a messaging objective over time, 
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total control is impossible. This type of communication allows for thematic integration only if 
the candidate has inserted himself into his theme. If he cannot become a part of his narrative-
based theme, the theme cannot be used.  
The second main type of messaging is known as non-specific “argument spots”.  These 
are arguments that tell voters what the candidate is all about. The broad themes and messaging 
objectives are obviously touched on very often here. These messages are mostly policy oriented 
and are acclaims. They may advocate lowering taxes or investing in education. Specific policy 
suggestions may be hinted at, and comprehensive plans of action given. This specificity 
notwithstanding, thematic integration is still possible. If the campaign is skilled enough, specific 
policies can be made immensely more compelling by connecting them to broad themes that 
capture aspects of the political world and societal progress that connect to messaging objectives 
(Benoit 2006, 69).  
The third type of message is that which attacks opponents. (Benoit 2006, 69). These can 
be policy based, ideologically based, or founded in character. If they are broad the campaign can 
cast the direction for the country that the opponent has advocated for in a negative light. This 
will allow for the use of themes that relate to the lines of distinction given in the narrative and fit 
into important messaging objectives. The messages can be more specific and attack the voting 
record of an opponent or their past policy actions. In terms of theme usage, this type of attack is 
tricky. If a campaign can utilize a theme against rival conceptions of government, based on lines 
of distinction given in the narrative, they may be able to ties these bits of communication to 
theme and messaging objective. Campaigns may choose to attack the character of an opponent 
saying that they are unfit for duty as president because of personality. In ’88, the Bush campaign 
even insinuated that Dukakis had mental health issues (Forbes). Character assaults prove to be 
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the hardest to connect to theme because they are ad hominem in nature. Themes are too broad to 
include the actual character of a political opponent. Messaging objectives however, may be 
enumerated in this type of communication. Negative messaging must be undertaken as a 
complete strategy to be successful. All mediums (speeches, mailers, debates, etc.) must be used 
to reinforce the negative messages (Mark 2006, 4). Like all messaging, the themes must be low 
in number and consistent. Too many topics of negativity will cloud the minds of voters. Attacks 
can have numerous benefits for campaigns. If done preemptively, they can keep the opponent on 
their heels and force them to respond rather than pursue their own messages and themes (Mark 
2006, 9). It can also play into strategies like discouraging voter turnout, mobilizing the base, or 
keeping the opponents supporters away from the polls. Negative messages also can come from 
non-affiliated organizations like PACs and 527 groups. Since these groups cannot officially 
support candidates they are dedicated to negative tactics. They are also generally less committed 
to bringing up truthful issues that the actual campaign (Mark 2006, 152).  
There is major disagreement over the use of negative messaging. Some claim that voters 
are generally turned off by attacks and will universally be driven from the polls by negative 
messaging (Benoit 2006, 69). However, others claim that the picture is more complicated. While 
it is true that some will be alienated by the negativity and stay away from the polls, some voters 
actually appreciate the issues being raised. The positive acclaims are not enough to truly inform 
voters. They need to hear what the candidate will not talk about (Mark 2006, 11). However, 
holders of this view do recognize the danger of straying too far from the truth. If the attack is not 
presented in a factual manner, it undermines the campaign’s legitimacy to deliver reliable 
communication (Mark 2006, 9). It seems that this is the case because negative campaigning has 
been shown to mobilize some voters while discouraging others (Benoit 2006, 69).  
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The final type of message that may be selected is future visions for America.  They 
indicate a pattern or general direction the candidate will set for the country if elected. These will 
involve high arching themes and are rhetorical in nature. The famous “Morning in America” ad 
from Reagan ’84 fits this profile. It lets the voter know that the country should head in the 
direction it is already set in because things are good and getting better. These types of messages 
are usually reserved for broad appeals to large swaths of the population. Thematic emphasis is 
clear here. Using theme makes these types of messages much more compelling. Messaging 
objectives may also be pursued in this type of communication  
Once all of these aspects are formulated, the messages must be disseminated. In addition 
to the selection of TV and radio spots, and the production of mail products, there is a tremendous 
amount of work that must be done in the field. Press attachés and media relations officials are 
key to the discrete relaying of messages. They work to manage the press in ways that will give 
the campaign the desired coverage. These people not only ensure that the media is where they 
want them, but they also orchestrate the release of information to the press. They must be close 
with members of the press and determine when and when not to allow them access. They often 
drop leaks to media outlets they feel will be friendly in their reporting (Maarek 2001, 201). 
These types of relationships constitute a major means of distributing specific communication that 
enumerates messaging objectives that may or may not utilize a theme. If done incorrectly, the 
message will be weakened or worse reported in a way that is undesirable to the transmission of 
the messaging objective. If access is not given at the appropriate time, the message is in danger 
of not being reported on at all.  
In a similar way, the general reporting of campaign events may affect messages. Thus, 
professionals in the campaign must make sure events go off without a hitch. The field offices 
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across the country are responsible for the setup and execution of campaign rallies and events. 
These people work with the traveling road crew in order to ensure that everything is set. This 
includes making sure the event is well attended and there are no technical issues. They also set 
up photo opportunities for the candidate (Maarek 2001, 205). These can take a ridiculous level of 
effort. For example in 1988 it took hours of setup for a Mike Dukakis photo opportunity of him 
throwing a baseball. All the setup was for about two minutes of tossing a baseball on an airport 
tarmac (Didion 2001, 37). This one photo opportunity to make the candidate more relatable took 
up a great amount of time and effort, but the campaign felt it was important to enumerating a 
messaging objective. It is events like this that show the process of delivering specific 
communication through campaign events that transmit messaging objectives that can be tied to 
theme.   
Identified Trends  
While avoiding case-by-case specificity, this chapter has outlined the general workings of 
campaigns and how campaign communication is crafted through a series of steps that increase in 
specificity. The literatures assessed here hold very important assertions about the consequences 
of these contemporary campaign practices. They range from impacts on the discourse, to changes 
in political parties. The first major growing trend in campaigns is that of spectacle. Campaigns 
nowadays tend to fit all activities into a theme the campaign is pursuing. They are a bit like a 
movie set. Everyone involved has a role to play and speaks according to a script (Didion 2001, 
28-30). This is largely fueled by media coverage. They portray the campaign as a horse race with 
every event being a major happening (Medhurst 1996, 37). In the electronic age, the time of 
sound byte, as discussed is tiny. Thus, campaigns must boil all messages down to tiny utterances. 
This has the tendency propose simple solutions for extremely complex issues (Mark 2006, 11). 
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This erodes true contemplative discourse of policy in campaigns. Candidates are not really 
explaining what their plans are, but are attempting to pursue messaging objectives and tie them 
to themes.  
Furthermore, the media is incredibly fast and constant in reporting due to the rise of the 
Internet and all day news stations. This forces campaigns to respond quickly. Hesitation can cast 
doubt in voters’ mind (Medhurst 1996, 43). This has further ramped up the trend of politicization 
of all actions. Because the candidate must respond to issues all the time, everything they say is a 
political statement (Medhurst 1996, 45). Off the cuff comments are reported as official positions. 
This has added to the spectacle and eroded the discourse further because the media are not 
always reporting on the established messaging objectives of the campaign, but simply what came 
to the candidate in the spur of the moment. This type of approach has a significant effect on the 
selection of talking points and messages and can often make campaign messages and candidates 
come across as more vicious and angry. This seems to have been the case when George Bush 
gave an extremely aggressive interview with Dan Rather in 1988. The campaign did not want 
any of his comments to be construed in a negative light so they took a very offensive tone. The 
media can also play into the in selection of advertisements. In 2004, the Bush campaign 
purposely distributed a controversial 9/11 advertisement in order to get free plays on news 
programs (Institute 2006, 109).  
Developments in campaigns have also led to changes in the role of political parties in 
election processes. While some argue that partisanship is up, it is not actual loyalty to the party 
establishment. It is more a commitment to polarized ideology. Policy today covers, or has been 
depicted as covering, more cultural territory. For example, with a rise in religious mobilization, 
issues like abortion and gay marriage cause more people to become highly mobilized along lines 
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that the parties have drawn (Brewer 2008, 4). In all it seems that traditional partisanship is down 
in presidential elections. The changes in conventions to a mere formality have structurally 
weakened the role of the party establishment. However, there are other developments that have 
further minimized the importance of parties even in general elections. Presidential politicians are 
necessarily bad partisans. Each candidate seeks to leave a lasting impact on politics that is 
outside of party ambitions (Skworonek 1993, 50). Support in campaigns is not drawn from 
parties, but is directed toward the polity at large (Skworonek 1993, 53). The media is helpful in 
explaining this as well. It does not take much for a campaign to get on the news. It is not 
extremely hard to book a spot for a television ad. Thus, campaigns do not need party structure to 
disseminate the messages they want to convey on a broad scale (Maarek 2001, 232). Also 
campaigns are now incredibly well funded. This means that they have their own means of 
producing and distributing messages, especially in light of the Internet and rise in technology. In 
this way, campaigns go over the heads of the party. They are relying on their own organizations 
and not party structure (Tulis 4).  
As described earlier, vote choice has become increasingly hinged on personal affect. 
Thus, rhetorical ability is extremely important in appealing to people personally (Tulis 177). This 
encourages candidates who are particularly flashy and independent minded. Ronald Reagan for 
example, had a much different personality than say, Chester Arthur. In 1992 George Bush’s 
dislike for rhetoric and thematic communication seems to have cost him dearly. The success of 
these flashy politicians furthers the trend because those watching understand that rhetoric and 
theme are what work. All of this stands to deformalize the process and discourse. Without having 
to use formal party channels and stressing personality, campaigns can define issues on their own 
Owens   
22 
and establish platforms and suggestions independently while doing so in a ways that 
oversimplifies issues.  
These trends seem troubling. Along with the rise of negative campaigning, the changes in 
the media, and the decrease of party importance seem to have deleterious effects on the 
discourse. Together, they encourage easily relatable and simple theme-driven that takes away 
from substantive discussion of the issues. Candidates are incentivized to play up issues that will 
simply play in the media and in the minds of voters, and downplay those that may be meaningful 
but are unimportant in these respects. These trends are also very difficult to break. As 
Skworonek puts it the “political universe” is becoming overcrowded due to the media and mass 
appeals where each voter is now entrusted with an excess of information (Skworonek 1993, 213). 
Thus, an ever-increasing number of minds must be changed to break the cycle. Skworonek warns 
that this signifies a waning of “political time” (213). The improbability of change is mounting 
and change may soon be impossible. This work will confirm these trends but also allow for 
evaluation of each campaign’s contribution to the trends over time.  
Outline of the Work to Come 
This work will follow a rather uniform structure throughout many of the chapters. The 
campaigns of Ronald Reagan in 1984 and George Bush in 1988 and 1994 will be broken down 
and analyzed qualitatively in chronological order with in depth analysis. The first bit of analysis 
will define the political climate present at campaign time. This includes changes in technology, 
the media, the economy, foreign affairs, incumbency etc. The players will be the next piece of 
analysis. As noted, the personalities and styles of, the candidate, management, and major figures 
in each campaign have profound impacts on all of the communication activities undertaken by 
campaigns. Next, the chapters will cover the themes that each campaign created and worked to 
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integrate. The work will then turn to the strategies of each campaign. Strategies undertaken will 
be governed largely by political climate and candidate personality. Strategy will then work in 
concert with personality and political climate to dictate the messaging objectives that the 
campaign will select. These will be the next point of emphasis in the proceeding three chapters. 
Several examples of specific bits of communication will next be given in each case to highlight 
the methods the campaign used to distribute these messages, including targets, messaging 
objectives pursued and relevant thematic integration. With this analytical work done, each 
chapter will conclude with global comments on the campaigns’ communication efforts. 
Summary will be made and lessons that can be taken will be suggested. The fifth chapter of this 
work will cover the Republican presidential candidates in each general election from 1996 to 
2012. Essentially this chapter will contain the same type of analysis as the previous three with 
less attention given to personality and specific communication. A concluding chapter will follow 
assessing the process described in this work and giving predictions for use of narrative in the 
upcoming 2016 presidential election.  
This work is unique in its comprehensiveness. Most of the literature above, and all the 
literature on campaigns, takes a piecemeal approach to analysis. Rather than track the use of 
narrative in campaigns through theme over time, previous works simply point to certain 
campaigns to highlight a certain point they are trying to make. This discounts important 
differences in political climate as well as casual factors of campaign organization, personality, 
and their effects on communication. In taking a somewhat uniform approach in each Republican 
general election campaign, this work will be able to highlight subtle differences that ended up 
having a big impact on messaging in relation to theme. Furthermore, tracking the lessons that can 
be taken from each campaign will provide important insight into campaign calculations.  




The election of 1984 stands as a perfect starting point for this, or any work on narrative in 
campaign communication. The skill exhibited by both Reagan himself and his campaign team is, 
for better or worse, a sterling example of the practice of weaving of themes borne from the broad 
Republican narrative outlined in the first chapter and messaging objectives into various levels of 
communication. Both the man and the campaign machinery displayed, at every level, clear 
mastery of connecting the election of a candidate to themes concerning the essence of American 
identity. The themes, messaging objectives, and their connection to even the most basic units of 
campaign communication were the result of a perfect alignment of political climate, candidate 
personality, staff ability, and strategy. The results of this fateful arrangement, in many ways, 
solidified the trends identified in Chapter One and still present today. Though the success of this 
campaign, both in the realms of theme and pure electoral dominance, proves to be impossible to 
replicate, it is clear that Republicans have adopted many of the practices of message emphasis 
perfected by the Reagan-Bush 1984 campaign 
Themes 
 It is not extremely controversial to say that the broad themes that Ronald Reagan’s 
reelection campaign employed in 1984 were some of the clearest and well articulated in recent 
memory. They were intimately connected to the Broad Republican narrative outlined in the first 
chapter of this work. Tulis argues, “building a political ethos is continuous, complicated and 
absolutely compelling”. He adds, “Reagan was amazingly good at it” (Medhurst 1987, 45). 
Though the broad themes developed and employed by Reagan were several, a few common 
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attributes are shared by nearly all the broad themes used by the Reagan campaign in 1984. One 
of these commonalities was the style of the themes. Reagan, and his writing team, liked to cast 
issues in black and white terms.  They used the simple but effective rhetorical tool of antithesis 
(Weiler 1992, 127). Reagan, or “the people” as was often said, represented one side of an issue. 
His opponents, in any context, represented the opposite. Reagan’s way was characterized as the 
way forward. It was his way that would continue the long American tradition of success. Casting 
themes in this light not only made them compelling, but also made counterargument difficult. 
Opponents certainly did not want to take on the role of the antagonist in these themes as they 
were cast as enemies of progress. This characteristic of Reagan themes made them all the more 
effective.  
Along with this characteristic was Reagan’s commitment to history and populism in his 
themes. No matter what the theme explained or advocated for, Reagan wanted to give historical 
evidence that the explanation was valid. Most of the time, this evidence would come from the 
founding fathers, though other sources like “the People” of bygone eras could be used.  In 
themes that advocated for action, these men and women of the past shared the values of Reagan 
and the modern conservative movement. They were on the good side of history. They rose up to 
move the country forward against their enemies on the other side of history. With the history 
established, Reagan’s themes then turned to a call to action for the audience. They needed to 
make their will known by participating in their government (Weiler 1992, 19). This participation 
came in the form of votes or activism. Reagan gives “the People” credit for things like lowering 
taxes and interest rates. It was up to the citizens to stake their claim and move the country ever 
forward. Here, Reagan’s views about the “Reagan Revolution” seem to aid in the patterns of 
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theme described here. In ways that will be described in detail, his personal attributes aided this 
aspect of theme.  
Several explicit themes can be identified that were used widely in the 1984 election. Each 
of these came to be important to messaging and/or strategic commitments of the campaign. The 
first and most foundational theme that undergirded all of Reagan’s politics could be 
characterized as a “people versus government” theme. This theme explains how greatness is 
achieved in America. It also explains how that greatness may be lost. This theme not only applies 
to economic growth, but takes on tangential forms to cover societal progress and civil religion as 
well. Overreaching government was the enemy and antithesis of progress. According to Reagan, 
this government was that envisioned by the Democratic Party. A bloated government puts 
unnecessary burdens on people in all facets of society (Weiler 1992, 22). Industry suffers 
regulations that limit growth. Reagan utilized the history of the pre-New Deal era to make this 
point. Long before the New Dealers (excluding Franklin Roosevelt) America was a land of free 
opportunity. Our founders, especially Thomas Jefferson, saw America as a land where people 
could work and be free. Businesses should not have to worry about paying exorbitant tax rates or 
complying with complicated regulatory machinery. In order for our nation to grow, business had 
to be able to adapt to run efficiently according to the free market. A government that taxes or 
regulates too much kills the entrepreneurial spirit of America. Thus, Americans interested in 
economic growth cannot let the Democrats follow through on their plans and must support 
Reagan and others who believe in limited government. 
This theme also took on a slightly different enumeration to advocate action and explain 
the world in terms of societal progress. Utilizing the same “American spirit”, a tangential theme 
for societal progress emerged. Reagan argued that only those (like the American worker) who 
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stand on their own feet, and are resilient and wholesome, embody the vision of America and 
should be allowed to prosper (Weiler 1992, 80). This is the spirit of America for Reagan. Going 
out and making it on one’s own was the only formula for success.  It seemed to Reagan that the 
welfare state was helping those who did not deserve it. The bloated government was enabling 
people to slip through the cracks and achieve success without putting in the necessary work to 
build our country. They were taking without giving, thanks to the Democratic or liberal 
conception of government. In order for our society to progress, people had to get rid of the 
Democrats and their societally regressive policies. This theme was very useful in capturing the 
voters that were against government programs like welfare, which was a part of the strategy in 
1984.  
In a third deviation, this theme also encapsulated Reagan’s views on civil religion. Again, 
the history element is important. According to Reagan, although Article I of the Constitution 
denies an establishment of religion, our founders had a deep commitment to politics guided by 
faith. It is how we have always identified ourselves, informed our morality, and moved the 
country forward (Weiler 1992, 25). It was not until the New Dealers rose to power that this 
notion was questioned. With the court decisions of the 1960’s striking down prayer in schools 
and other “religious freedoms,” liberals had started the process of expelling our religious 
commitments. Reagan not only called these actions “intolerant,” but suggested that this too was 
deleterious to American progress (Youtube 2011). Our commitment to religion was a central 
facet of our progress and government because it serves as the moral foundation of everyone. The 
liberal Democrats sought to further strike down religion in civil society. Thus, they wished to 
slow our progress as a nation. The people needed to support Reagan because he would ensure 
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that religion continued to be an integral part of civil society. This theme was particularly useful 
to emphasize based on messaging choices and strategy in 1984.  
These themes, under the “People versus government” heading were compelling for a few 
reasons. First, they all have both of the common characteristics described above. They paint the 
Democrats, with their high taxes, coddling government programs, and attacks on religion, as the 
antagonists to American progress. These themes created a fundamental divergence from what 
was characterized as the growing welfare state (Weiler 1992, 21). Many voters in the 1980’s had 
grievances in all the areas that this theme covered. With a Democratic party that had arguably 
been unchanged since 1968 (when Nixon implemented the Southern Strategy), these themes 
stood to explain the world, and give a radically different vision for the future. The Democratic 
way was conceptualized as being simply deleterious to American progress. These themes also 
have the historical and populist elements. The great men that founded our country agreed with 
Reagan. Now, the voters had to cast their ballots to protect their vision that made the country 
great. This is a great tool in appealing to massive swaths of the population. It does not matter if 
one is a potato farmer or a Wall Street banker, one still wants to make America great and protect 
the “American dream.” 
Secondly, and more important to the reelection effort, people had been experiencing the 
vision of these themes for nearly four years. Times were good. The economy and wealth were 
growing; government spending was on the decline (excepting defense spending); and religion 
was regaining strength in society. Reagan’s themes were apparently playing out in positive ways. 
Results like this would make any theme more compelling. Thus the political climate helped to 
make the theme more compelling.  
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Reagan’s own personal flare to these themes also made them significantly more 
compelling. Reagan depicted his early life as one of struggle and strife. According to him, his 
childhood and early days as an actor were tough. However, Reagan persevered, worked hard and 
rose to become a successful actor, governor, and finally president of the United States. Reagan 
was able to make the themes more compelling by casting his own life as proof of his themes. His 
hard work had resulted in a better life for him and his family. He was living proof that his themes 
explained how the world worked. This angle was undoubtedly helped by his status as somewhat 
of a cult figure. People like Ed Rollins, who revered Reagan as an incredible leader, were all 
over the country. To hear that the man they revered had lived the American dream reinforced the 
very theme that he was now describing would increase their belief even more. In this way, 
Reagan’s ability to weave his personal story into his themes and his status as a major political 
figure strengthened the theme.  
Though the collection of themes just described undoubtedly accounted for the bulk of 
Reagan’s thematic force in 1984, there is another important theme in the realm of foreign policy.  
This theme centered largely around principles and deterrence. In approaching the Cold War, 
Reagan once again used an appeal to American values and history. Reagan believed that 
Americans were, by their nature, peaceful. However, throughout American history, Reagan 
stated, war had never come about due to an abundance of strength. War came as a result of 
America’s lack of defensive might. Thus America needed to exude strength and achieve military 
superiority in order to remain peaceful. Furthermore, when it becomes necessary, America will 
step up and deliver a blow to defend freedom and democracy. In accordance with this principle, 
Reagan held, it sometimes became necessary for America to help out people that were fighting 
for freedom around the world (Youtube 2014). Every ally lost to communism threatened the very 
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idea of freedom in the world. Democrats who want America to stay out of such endeavors, 
Reagan implicitly posits, threaten the idea of freedom. People thus need to support Reagan’s 
policies of deterrence and action when necessary based on our foundational principles. As will 
be described in the section on political climate, foreign policy was a marginal part of the 
campaign. However, this theme will be shown as useful because of an apparent paradox of 
Reagan’s politics in his support of increased defense spending.  
The themes described in this section make up the thematic cluster that Reagan had at his 
disposal for the 1984 campaign. The political climate proved to be friendly to these themes. 
Through their adaptability, they cover essentially all of the messaging objectives that the Reagan 
reelection effort would decide to employ. Besides this, the themes also played perfectly into the 
various strategies that the Reagan team would take up to defeat Walter Mondale. As will be seen, 
this collection of themes is definitely the most effective and well articulated in this period of 
study.  
Political Climate 
 In a presidential election with an incumbent, the nature of the political climate and 
current conditions must be considered extremely important even in discussions of thematic 
usage. The political climate and order in 1984 certainly had a large impact on the selection of 
messaging objectives, emphasis of certain themes, and adoption of strategy. Though there were 
some potential points of vulnerability for the Reagan campaign, the political conditions 
overwhelmingly aided the incumbent in his pursuits of appealing to themes and messaging 
objectives. 
 One major factor of the political climate that is central to a discussion of this campaign’s 
use of theme was the state of the American economy at the time of the election (Moore 1986, 
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xv). Interest rates were lower and inflation was down (Youtube 2006). Taxes had also been 
lowered for many people (Youtube 2014). Compared to the troubled American economy of the 
later 1970’s, the growing economy of the early 1980’s was an extremely important development 
to voters. The optimistic economic outlook had a very considerable impact on the 
communication of the Reagan campaign. As will be discussed, several key messaging objectives 
were selected and themes integrated based, at least in part, due to the strong economic 
conditions.  
Another important facet of the political climate that impacted the running of the general 
election was the lengthy and hard-fought Democratic nomination process. The nomination for 
the democratic candidate for president lasted well into June 1984. The important impact for this 
work is the psychological effect such a long process can have on voters. Mondale could not win 
sufficient support until very late in the primary process. This, if properly framed, can cast doubt 
on the strength of the candidate. Clearly, the Reagan campaign used this point of vulnerability to 
choose messaging objectives and integrate themes of leadership and character.  
The state of the media is always important to consider in a presidential election. In 
general, the press behaved in this election as was described as typical in chapter one. The media 
was constant and demanding. The coverage was based around the horserace and proved easy to 
manipulate. Fitting further with chapter one’s characterizations, the media focused largely on 
issues that had little to do with governance and policy (Moore 1986, xii). The media in this 
election was also characteristically interested in short sound bytes and quick imagery (Moore 
1986, xvi). All of these conditions stood to encourage the Reagan campaign’s commitment to 
theme in messaging. In weaving the broad themes into short messages, the Reagan campaign was 
able to play perfectly into the media’s agenda of distribution.  
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The conditions of the political party system were also an important, if typical, sector of 
the political climate that impacted the themes, messaging objectives, and strategy of the 1984 
election. Fitting the pattern described in chapter one, there was an evident weakness of the party 
machinery (Moore 1986, xv). With the resignation of the nominating convention to a status of 
formality, the Reagan campaign was able to go directly over the head of the Republican Party. In 
the strategies section, it will be argued that the campaign took up strategies that were directly 
deleterious to general Republican goals. These strategies were tied to populist messaging 
objectives and themes that were central to the campaign. The waning power of the Republican 
Party thus had a large impact on the communication of the Reagan campaign.  
In a related way, the dispersion of those who identified as independents was key to the 
selection of strategy, themes, and messaging objectives by the Reagan campaign. At the time of 
the election, 35 to 40 percent of the electorate identified as independent voters (Moore 1986). 
This has an enormous impact on strategy. Winning, and winning decisively, in such an 
environment would have to be predicated on winning more votes from independents that the 
opponent. As discussed in chapter one, the strategy of courting independents calls for the 
emphasis of certain themes and selection of certain messaging objectives. The Reagan campaign 
clearly acknowledged this and worked on messaging and themes pursuant to this strategy. This 
once again demonstrates the interconnected nature of theme, strategy, and messaging objectives.  
There are also important international considerations that affected the thematic emphasis 
of the campaign. Though the Cold war was winding down, the USSR still stood as America’s 
archenemy. They represented the antithesis to individual and market freedom that America was 
based on. This type of antithetical conception would aid the Reagan campaign in its foreign 
policy theme and in delivering related messages about national defense.  
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Perhaps the most important consideration of political climate in 1984 was the political 
movement embodied in, and centered around, Ronald Reagan. Numerous books have been 
written on this subject, and a full treatment of the movement certainly cannot be given here. 
However, at least some attention must be given to what could be called the largest American 
political movement in the second half of the twentieth century. As Skowronek argues, Ronald 
Reagan stood as a great repudiator to the New Deal era (1993, 409).  He advocated for a 
reconstruction of the political order (Skowronek 1993, 415). Rising to prominence in 1980, 
Reagan represented a break with the existing and dominant political order. He embodied 
divergences in governance and future visions of America that contrasted starkly with the New 
Dealers. Whether or not Reagan was the only man who could do this is rather disputed 
(Medhurst 1987, 225). However, the fact that there was in fact a movement cannot be 
discounted. As we shall see, the presence of this movement was ubiquitous in the Reagan 
campaign’s selection of messaging objectives and utilization of theme. The campaign sought to 
ride the wave of the “Reagan Revolution” as far as possible.  
As expected, the political climate in 1984 was a major factor in calculations of strategy, 
theme, and messaging objectives for the Reagan reelection campaign. All of the factors 
described here encouraged and reinforced a campaign that was committed to messaging that was 
deeply connected to broad themes and simple messaging objectives. From the media, to the 
economy, to the ongoing political movement, it seemed that the Reagan campaign recognized 
that the environment they inhabited seemingly begged for a theme-driven campaign that they 
were more than equipped to provide. 
The Players 
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 It is often argued that personal characteristics cannot be overemphasized in analyzing the 
course of history. In any discussion of Ronald Reagan, this argument seems to ring particularly 
true. Certain personal qualities of our fortieth president undoubtedly aided his ascension to 
political success and utilization of theme. These qualities most certainly demonstrated 
themselves in extreme clarity in the 1984 presidential race. Many of these important qualities 
stem from Reagan’s professional background, general disposition, and beliefs regarding political 
movements and governance. These personal affectations will be demonstrated as central to 
Reagan’s skill in weaving themes into his campaign communication.  
 One important personal factor to consider when discussing Ronald Reagan’s thematic 
skills is his professional background as an actor. The importance of this occupation is not simply 
something that scholars have identified as central to his success as a speaker. Reagan himself 
acknowledged the connection of his acting credentials and political skills. By all accounts, 
Reagan truly enjoyed speaking and soaking up the limelight (Weiler 1992, 117). He 
conceptualized the tasks of campaigning and even governing as acting jobs. There was a clear set 
and a clear script. He knew that to be successful in pitching himself, he needed to commit to the 
words and grand ideas that made up his speeches (Didion 2001, 94). This conceptualization 
allowed Reagan to truly believe in his speechwriters. Avoiding micromanagement of speeches 
would definitely allow people like Peggy Noonan to produce clear messages that successfully 
weaved broad themes into speeches.  
Reagan’s acting background further informed his skills in his knowledge of the nature of 
television. Reagan had a foundational understanding that he was really invading living rooms 
and speaking directly to people at home. This led his speaking to become even more casual and 
even “conversational” (Weiler 1992, 115). This kind of understanding undoubtedly reinforces a 
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belief in grand themes. In order to connect to these people on a personal level, Reagan 
understood that themes of American identity would be necessary in all communication.  
Another important facet of Reagan’s personality that was crucial to his success in 
thematic communications was his view of the political movement centered around him. Much 
evidence supports the claim that Reagan did not see himself as the prime mover of the “Reagan 
Revolution”. Rather, he conceptualized himself as a “sub element” of leadership simply 
interpreting the will of the people (Moore 1986, 183). This belief held incredible benefits for the 
Reagan thematic machinery. Reagan was thus able to earnestly place himself on the side of the 
people in important themes regarding American identity. He could sincerely cast himself as a 
“common man”. For populist themes and messaging objectives that were so common in the 
campaign, this quality was indispensible.  
 Though Reagan’s personality and beliefs are of utmost importance in this analysis, 
personal characteristics of many others are also important to consider. Walter Mondale, Reagan’s 
opponent in 1984, had some personal characteristics that seem to have played directly into the 
hand of the Reagan campaign. His personal inclinations may well have served as important 
foundations for messaging objectives and themes utilized by the Reagan campaign regarding 
leadership and trustworthiness. Comparatively, the oratory abilities of nearly anyone would pale 
in comparison to those of Ronald Reagan. However, Mondale was particularly poor at 
incorporating broad themes into his campaign communication. A brief example seems to best 
illuminate this point. At the end of the 1984 Democratic National Convention Mondale rose to 
give his acceptance speech. As explained in chapter one, these speeches are crucial points of the 
campaign where candidates can use broad acclaims and appeal heavily to themes. These 
speeches can inspire and ignite the electorate with grand visions of American identity and values. 
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Mondale undoubtedly failed in this capacity. One section in the beginning of his speech displays 
Mondale’s ineptitude in communicating broad themes. He says:  
“When we speak of family, the voice is Mario Cuomo's. When we speak of 
change, the words are Gary Hart's. When we speak of hope, the fire is Jesse 
Jackson's. When we speak of caring, the spirit is Ted Kennedy's. When we speak 
of patriotism, the strength is John Glenn's. When we speak of the future, the 
message is Geraldine Ferraro.”  
The intention here was to demonstrate that all the wings of the Democratic Party were together. 
However, these lines show a complete lack of thematic force. Not only does Mondale fail to 
assert his own themes about such important American challenges, he does not even take time to 
explain the themes that the people he mentioned may represent. Mondale thus shows both a lack 
of original themes that he can present to America, and any kind of commitment to explicitly 
relating themes that are available to him. This example shows the persistent inability of Mondale 
and his campaign to incorporate theme into important forms of communication.  
 This work also must discuss some of the apparent personal beliefs of Reagan campaign 
manager, Ed Rollins. Though seemingly tangential, it is important to capture the mindset of at 
least one senior Reagan official. His personal beliefs seem emblematic of those of the Reagan 
team generally. This mindset may help to explain the commitment and abilities of the campaign 
to integrate themes into messaging. There are three important facets of Ed Rollins’s personal 
background that are of importance to this work. One such element of his personality pertains to 
his beliefs about Ronald Reagan. Throughout the 1984 Presidential Campaign Decision Making 
Conference, Rollins’s comments are filled with an underlying sentiment of what may be called 
respect or admiration for the President.  In his closing thoughts, Rollins says, “the bottom line is 
that Ronald Reagan is the most dominant political force in this country and in the world today” 
(Moore 1986, 250). Important is Rollins’s commitment to the embodiment of the movement. 
Where Reagan saw himself as more of a mouthpiece, Rollins saw Reagan as the prime mover. 
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He could not laude the President enough on his leadership skills and transformative power. From 
the comments of several other Reagan officials at the aforementioned conference, it is clear that 
this was a commonly held set of beliefs. This frame of mind would clearly have an impact on the 
campaign’s commitment to theme and selection of messaging objectives. If they conceptualized 
this movement as a “dominant political force”, it is clear that the campaign would seek to 
connect Reagan, and his policies, to broad themes of American identity and values.  
 One other set of personal beliefs that Ed Rollins, and others in the Reagan campaign, held 
that is of importance here is their conception of presidential campaigns. At one point in the 1984 
conference described earlier, Rollins stated simply “there’s no ground rules how you run for 
President” (Moore 1986, 182). This attitude is of incredible importance. This implies that there 
was no issue that the campaign would not touch, or strategy it would not pursue, if it stood to 
increase the chances of success. The commitment to theme and selection of certain strategies that 
the Reagan campaign would go on to display seems to be directly related to this notion. The 
campaign saw the advantage of utilizing broad themes and took it. 
Another personal belief that Rollins and others close to the Reagan campaign held that is 
of importance here was their certainty that Ronald Reagan would win in 1984 (Moore 1986, 
173). This earnest belief led directly to the selection of a geographic strategy that will be 
discussed at length later. This strategy, founded from a firm belief in inevitable success, would 
have deep impacts on the messaging objectives selected and themes emphasized by the Reagan 
campaign.  
The bottom line here is that the personal attributes of these major players of the 1984 
campaign would have immeasurable impacts on the themes and messaging objectives that the 
Reagan campaign was to focus on. Whether it was the Reagan’s life as an actor and man of the 
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people, Mondale’s anemic approach to theme, or the deep-seated conceptions of those who ran 
the President’s campaign, very personal factors seemed to have played a large role in producing 
the theme-based communication that will hereafter be described in detail.  
 
Strategy 
 With the above factors of political climate, personal traits, and available themes 
established, the Reagan campaign had to decide upon strategic objectives for victory that would 
take advantage of the position of the candidate in these realms. Most fundamental to the Reagan 
strategy was the conviction within the campaign that the incumbent would undoubtedly win 
reelection. To Rollins, and every other Reagan official present at the 1984 Decision Making 
Conference, Reagan simply would not lose the election if the campaign were even somewhat 
effective (Moore 1986, 173). This conviction led the Reagan team to adopt a strategy of 
complete domination. The Reagan campaign wanted to win all fifty states (Moore 1986, 100). 
This overarching strategy is extremely bold. As we shall see, most campaigns race to the 
necessary 270 electoral votes, and would be happy with scraping by. This strategy of total 
victory resulted in several important minor strategic calculations. The most important result of 
this overarching strategy was the decision to attempt to capture independent votes. As described 
in the political climate section, around 35 percent of the electorate identified as independents. In 
order to achieve the dominance the Reagan campaign strived for, or to win at all, independent 
voters were of utmost importance. Reagan’s team segmented the independent voters into even 
smaller groups. Lee Atwater argued that the people in the middle could be described as either 
populists or libertarians. It became the goal of the Reagan campaign to bring the conservative 
populists and conservative libertarians to their side (Moore 1986, 240). This strategy, as 
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discussed in the first chapter, compels the campaign to consider taking many actions. 
Independent voters decide largely on issues of the economy and character due to the bipartisan 
nature of each of these issues. The Reagan campaign seems to have realized this and, as will be 
demonstrated in the section on specific messaging, emphasized these areas heavily using the 
rather favorable economic outlook and bipartisan themes at their disposal. In all, Reagan’s 
position in the realms of political climate, personal attributes, and available themes definitely 
helped him in building the coalition that Atwater described. Due to the growing economy, 
personal appeal of Reagan, and the conservative nature of his themes, Reagan was able to 
execute the strategy brilliantly through messaging objectives and specific messages laced with 
theme.  
A second implication of the Reagan strategy of total domination was the adoption of a 
geographic, regional approach (Moore 1986, 173). Like the conquest of independents, this 
geographic emphasis is not entirely uncommon in presidential campaigns. However, the way that 
the Reagan campaign approached this strategy had distinct impacts on specific communications 
that will be described in more detail later. Important regions to the campaign were the South, the 
West, and the Northeast (Moore 1986, 164). These regions all dictated that certain themes and 
messaging objectives be emphasized at different times to gain their support. Social conservatives 
in the South would be interested in the civil religion and limited federal government themes. 
Independents in the Northeast, would probably be interested in continuing economic growth. 
Also important in the campaign’s regional effort was the media exposure they strived for. In each 
of the designated regions, the campaign strove to be covered by local and regional outlets, not 
national news networks (Moore 1986, 173). This allowed the targeting to be even better defined 
and the messaging objectives and themes emphasized to be more specific to the region. 
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 Another result of the strategy of total domination taken up by the Reagan campaign was 
to ignore the legislative elections coinciding with the presidential election. This too held 
important consequences for the thematic and messaging emphasis of the campaign. The 
campaign decided that, because they would be attempting to gain votes from independents, a 
group made up partially (according to the campaign) of “soft Democrats,” they would not focus 
on the legislative elections. The campaign reasoned that the voters they were trying to capture 
outside of the Republican Party might have desired a Democratic Congress to keep a check on 
the President. In order to avoid alienating these voters, the campaign would not touch the 
legislative elections. This fits in perfectly with the weakening of parties described in the political 
climate section. In order to achieve the total domination desired, Reagan would ignore broader 
party aims. This gave the campaign the ability to be even more freewheeling with their thematic 
emphasis and messaging choices. The campaign could focus on whatever they believed would 
help them to win all fifty states by capturing independents and Democrats.  
 These constituted the major strategic considerations for the 1984 Reagan campaign. As a 
whole, the strategy fit almost perfectly with the political climate and available themes. The 
conditions were ideal and Reagan had the tools to execute a strategy of total dominance. The 
voters that the campaign would attempt to capture would undoubtedly be open to the themes that 
Reagan had at his disposal because of the growing economy under his first term. This conquest 
was made even easier when the Reagan campaign freed itself from working with the legislative 
elections. The campaign was now able to choose any messaging objectives that would emphasize 
the themes available and result in electoral domination.  
Messaging Objectives 
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 With strategy determined, the Reagan campaign could choose messaging objectives 
specifically tailored to the 1984 campaign that would utilize the strong populist and bipartisan 
themes as well as the friendly political climate. The 1984 Reagan campaign was quite unique in 
its ability to choose messaging objectives. The first chapter lays out the constraining factors of 
selection of messaging objectives. In most of these areas, the Reagan campaign was unfettered. 
The creativity of campaign officials was certainly not an issue. As already demonstrated, Ed 
Rollins was willing to take on almost any messaging objective that would put Reagan over the 
top. Furthermore, the media was not an issue. As discussed, the media in 1984 was largely open 
to manipulation. Also, the regional news outlets that the Reagan campaign specifically targeted 
would be even less able to resist the management of its coverage by the campaign. Surveys and 
voter salience were also not at issue for Reagan. The incumbent was never trailing in the 
campaign and his messaging was almost always well received by voters due to his oratorical 
skills and skilled speechwriters. Reagan’s personal background seemed to aid his display of 
genuine concern. Because of his acting background and public communication skills, Reagan 
was always able to seem completely committed to his messaging choices. Framing was certainly 
not an issue. With Reagan’s broad and clear-cut themes, the frame was always clear: which 
direction would America go? Toward progress or toward ruin? All of the favorable conditions 
allowed the Reagan campaign to select messaging objectives that were low in number and 
complexity. There were really only three major messaging objectives in the 1984 campaign. 
One objective was that of limiting the government to continue economic growth and 
protect individual rights in the increasingly liberal America. The Reagan campaign vowed to 
continue lowering taxes and easing regulation. This would be useful in appealing to the 
“conservative libertarians” the campaign was looking to capture. This would also be helpful 
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geographically in places like the Northeast where independents were interested in further 
economic growth. Protection of religious freedom was also a major part of this objective. Civil 
religion would be encouraged under another four years of Reagan. This would, as stated, be 
useful in places like the South where religion was a major issue. 
A second and related objective was that Reagan had had a better vision for the future than 
his opponent. Basically, Walter Mondale, and liberals like him, saw all of these problems in 
America and were eager to criticize it. The Reagan campaign wanted Americans to be proud 
again. The United States was still a “protector of freedom” and a “pioneer of new frontiers” 
(Moore 1986, 248). People needed take pride in being American and be confident in the future. 
This messaging objective was clearly tailored for independent voters. Its non-partisan overtones 
appeal directly to not only the character of Reagan, but of our country as a whole. It is a message 
of optimism.  
A third and closely related objective was that Reagan had been an excellent leader as 
president and would continue to inspire people and lead the country in the right direction. This 
message was essentially the classic “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. While this objective certainly 
highlighted Reagan’s embodiment as a revolutionary figure, it also insisted that Reagan was 
simply a mouthpiece to the will of the people. He could not be the revered leader voters knew 
him to be if “the People” had not voiced their will in the last election. This messaging objective 
had important uses in appealing to populism and strong leadership. The strong leadership 
messaging proved important in the conquest of independents because of its character-based 
nature. 
It should be noted that the overlap of many of these messaging objectives and broader 
themes in this campaign is uncommonly high. It is not an accident that major messaging 
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objectives seem to be reiterations of Reagan themes. The campaign specifically didn’t bring in 
many specific issues. They opted rather, for broad messaging objectives related to the direction 
of the country and American identity (Moore 1986, 230). These objectives also perfectly played 
into both the geographic and independent conquest strategies. In fact, the way that themes were 
integrally weaved into the messaging objectives of 1984 stands as a glimmering example for any 
campaign interested in effectively combining theme and messaging objectives.  
Specific Communication 
 The ability of the Reagan reelection campaign to tailor messaging that positively 
emphasized theme and messaging objectives was absolutely exemplary. In all the different 
phases of messaging and modes of transmission utilized in 1984, the Reagan team was able to 
create a very clear messaging arc utilizing themes. This work will now analyze three different 
instances of campaign communication from the 1984 reelection effort that showed the mastery of 
thematic integration that has been argued to exist in this chapter.  
 Any student of campaign communication is undoubtedly familiar with the “Morning in 
America” advertisement released by the Reagan campaign in 1984. While this ad does 
demonstrate very skillful integration of theme and messaging, a lesser-known ad entitled “Train” 
demonstrated integration of theme into a messaging objective that was just as well done. This ad 
features the same narrator as in “Morning in America”. It begins with very ordinary people 
closing up their shops early to watch a train carrying the president pass through their town. The 
narrator tells us that the train brings with it  
“a new spirit of accomplishment, and optimism, and pride because in the past 
three and a half years, things have been looking up in the country. Today the 
economy is up. Taxes and inflation are down. Americans are working again, and 
so is America. So, while some folks might have come so they can tell their 
grandchildren they saw President Reagan, most of them just stopped by to say 
thanks… President Reagan: leadership that’s working (Youtube 2009).”  
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At first glance, this advertisement brings up the same feelings as “Morning in America”. There 
was certainly a lot to look forward to in this country and we should reelect a man who helped it 
get there. However, closer analysis of the words and images in the ad, with the themes above in 
mind, reveal true proficiency in thematic emphasis to pursue messaging objectives. The ad is 
also very useful in accomplishing facets of the Reagan reelection strategy, specifically in 
appealing to independent voters.  
One major thematic connection in this advertisement is in its emphasis of the people 
versus government theme (particularly the populist elements of it) while connecting with various 
messaging objectives like pride in America and Reagan’s leadership. From the beginning of the 
ad, the populist elements of the theme are stressed. With the images of everyday people doing 
everyday things, the ad stresses that working people are the spirit of America. This populist 
appeal is very subtle but very effective in transmitting the theme of American identity.  
Even subtler is the use of the train. This mode of transportation has important historical 
connotations that stress the theme of American hard work. This country grew and developed 
because of trains. Our greatness came from hard work and ingenuity that created the steam 
engine and the tracks zigzagging across the country. This mode of transportation encouraged 
industrialization and allowed for an incredible economic boom. Choosing a train is again a subtle 
but effective historical and populist appeal toward the theme and messaging objectives of free 
economic innovation and American identity. 
A third thematic appeal emphasizes further the limiting of the government theme and 
connects to the campaign messaging objectives of confidence in America and continuing the 
success of the administration. The “accomplishment, and optimism, and pride,” directly, refer to 
the theme of pride and confidence in America. This appeal is made not only from the words but 
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also with the symbols in the ad. Throughout the spot, there are American flags everywhere. Even 
the train is draped in star spangled banners. In a more complex way, the “accomplishment, 
optimism, and pride” are implicitly connected to the theme of limiting the government to grow 
the economy. These three feelings are attributed to the lower taxes and interest rates. By 
referencing these impressive economic conditions this message tells the voters that the 
government shrinking policies have worked and made the country stronger. Reagan’s theme has 
essentially proven itself to be correct. In order to keep these things moving in the right direction 
the voters should support Reagan. The ad further affirms this theme when the slogan “leadership 
that’s working” appears on screen. It explicitly tells the voter that Reagan can keep all the 
positivity going. In this way the thematic appeal of limited government helped this advertisement 
get at the messaging objective of pride in America and Reagan leadership. It connects the two in 
an ingenious way.  
Another important populist appeal comes with those who “just stopped by to say thanks.” 
This is directly related to not only the populist elements of the “limiting the government” theme, 
but also the campaign messaging objective of Reagan as a sub-element of leadership. According 
to the ad, the people who came out to see Reagan were not there to worship him or idolize him. 
They came out to say thanks. This is such a simple little phrase. It is an everyman word; 
something you would say to your barber after a haircut. It implies that Reagan is a man of the 
people. They are happy with the lowered taxes and falling interest rates he has helped create. 
Nonetheless, he has a job to do and is responsible to the people. They are the deciders and 
Reagan is the chosen delegate. All of these facets of the advertisement emphasize the populist 
elements of Reagan’s people versus government theme, and connect to messaging objectives like 
American pride, continuing to limit the government, and Reagan as a strong leader.   
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 This advertisement is, in all, extremely effective. In the course of its one minute run time, 
it manages to hit several major messaging objectives of the campaign. The ad is made more 
compelling through its utilization of a couple of very deep and positive themes of American 
identity and limited government. The relaxing music, American symbols, and calming narration 
add to this positivity and really compel the voter to believe that Reagan is taking the country in a 
desirable direction. Strategically, this advertisement is quite useful. By using very broad and 
positive messaging objectives of economic growth, strong leadership, and American pride, the ad 
should be well received by independent voters who find these messages appealing.  The ad does 
not discuss partisanship or controversial issues. Rather, it addresses things that every American 
can be happy about. The “Train” advertisement is an exemplary case of weaving extremely 
broad themes into messaging objectives that are strategically useful.  
 Besides advertisements such as “Morning in America” and “Train,” the Reagan campaign 
also displayed incredible skill in thematic emphasis to touch upon messaging objectives in the 
President’s prepared speeches. These speeches were also very useful in fulfilling the strategies of 
the campaign. One particularly interesting example of this was a speech given at an Ecumenical 
Prayer Breakfast in Dallas in August of 1984. This is interesting for several reasons. First, it is a 
rare example of Reagan explicitly delving into social issues. It was a major goal of the campaign 
to focus on the economy and leadership, avoiding social issues (Moore 1986, 241). Secondly, 
this speech has a very clear link to the unique geographic strategy of the campaign. Most 
importantly though, Reagan’s remarks at this event give an absolutely clear theme regarding civil 
religion in America that he then connects directly to his limited government messaging objective. 
It is an exemplary case of the type of thematic incorporation that Reagan is known for.  
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 Reagan begins his address by clearly explaining the role of religion in American society. 
He follows his typical pattern of theme creation. He references history. He argues that our 
founding fathers knew that religion was the basis of morality for our country. He cites the 
verbiage in the Mayflower Compact and the Declaration of Independence that reference God. He 
mentions the Chaplin that served the members of Congress and the oaths of office that reference 
God. He then sets up his classic antithesis. He relates the failure of France’s purely secular post-
revolutionary government. Reagan then says that both he and George Washington believe that 
“the city of man cannot survive without the city of God. He goes on to argue that the abolitionist 
and civil rights movements had deep ties to religious morality. Reagan then jumps to modern 
times where the Supreme Court has struck down religious practices in public schools. Court 
cases have ensued that have sought to take “under God” out of the pledge of allegiance and strike 
down things like voluntary prayer in public schools. In all, he argues that religion has lost its 
“special place” of respect and fondness in America. He claims that religion needs “defenders 
against those who care only for the interests of the state (Youtube 2011).” Reagan implies that he 
and those listening are those defenders. This is an utterly classic pattern of theme for Reagan. It 
is full of history that supports his conclusion. It draws clear lines of antithesis between right and 
wrong. It has the all-important populist call to action, to defend this sacred American value. It is 
indeed difficult to find another speech from this campaign that so explicitly outlines a full 
thematic arc.  
This speech utilizes the clear theme to touch on the important campaign messaging 
objective of limiting government in order to advance our society. Reagan argues that those 
striking down religious practice are doing so in the name of tolerance. He states that these people 
are ironically behaving intolerantly. He argues, “they refuse to tolerate its [religion’s] importance 
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in our lives.” These courts should not be meddling in religious affairs at all according to 
Reagan’s interpretation of the Constitution. The liberal judges who have struck down prayer in 
school are overreaching their authority and doing so in a way that is deleterious to progress. 
Reagan asks: “If all the children of our country studied together, all of the many religions in our 
country, wouldn’t they learn greater tolerance of each others beliefs?” The rulings of the court 
have thus violated a sacred value and created greater intolerance (Youtube 2011). Reagan, a 
defender of religious freedom, must thus remain in office to turn the tide in this war against 
religion and move the country forward.  
Through a classic pattern, this speech drew a compelling theme and then utilized it to 
transmit a messaging objective to its audience. It showed mastery in these oratory elements. 
However, this speech also used theme and messaging objectives to skillfully execute the 
geographic strategy of the Reagan campaign. This speech was not only aimed at its immediate 
audience, but the entire southern region of the US as well as Catholic voters in the Northeast 
(Moore 1986, 185). The campaign was uneasy about discussing social issues because it was 
attempting to capture independents. However, Lee Atwater argued that it was a move to hold the 
South firmly for Reagan. They hoped to get the religious independent voters and Democrats that 
cared about, and were in favor of, prayer in schools (Moore 1986, 184). Furthermore, Ed Rollins 
believed that this speech helped Reagan’s likability and leadership appeal to these voters. Thus, 
this speech demonstrated mastery in inclusion of theme to explain a messaging objective in a 
way that was strategically beneficial.  
Reagan’s acceptance speech at the Republican Nominating Convention in 1984 is another 
piece of communication that shows high levels of skill in incorporating theme to hammer home 
major messaging objectives in a strategically significant manner. Convention speeches, as 
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discussed in the first chapter, are one of the most important forms of communication in any 
given campaign. It is a time to use broad appeals and acclaims that will get voters excited about 
the election. Reagan’s hour-long speech fills the criteria of a successful convention speech to a 
tee. In this speech, Reagan sketches a couple of the major themes used by the campaign. He uses 
these themes to inform many of the messaging objectives listed above and advocate for his 
reelection in accordance with the strategies decided upon by the campaign.  
The theme of limiting government shows up in order to discuss many of the messaging 
objectives in the campaign. In many cases, this theme is used in tandem with other themes to 
make them even more compelling. The expulsion of the government from the economy is the 
most dominant form of this theme. From the beginning of the speech, Reagan uses his 
characteristic style of theme. He draws a clear line of distinction. He claims that in 1984, the 
voters have an electoral choice that represents a divergence in the vision of government. 
Reagan’s vision is one of “growth and freedom,” evidenced by the high economic growth, low 
taxes, and low inflation of his administration. The Democratic vision of government is one of 
“fear and limits.” They want to impose regulations and burdens that would stop the growth of the 
American economy. Reagan cleverly states that they “never met a tax they didn’t like or hike 
(Youtube 2014).” Reagan goes on to argue that the terms “left” and “right” do not apply to this 
election. The correct terms are “up” and “down”. The Democrats wish to descend into the 
Welfare State. Reagan wants to go up to “the dream conceptualized by our founding fathers.” 
This distinction sketches the theme clearly. A conception of limited government was the way of 
economic growth. The Democratic vision was the way to economic ruin.  
This theme was then used to appeal directly to several of the campaign’s messaging 
objectives. The most obvious is the limiting government message. This appeal is included in the 
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flushing out of the theme and reference to the positive economic outlook. This theme 
additionally aided in the transmission of the “continuation of leadership” message. The country 
was experiencing the good economic conditions that, according to Reagan, arise from the 
limiting of the government’s role in the economy. If Reagan were not there to put policy in place 
that the people desired, these conditions would not exist. He argues that together, the people, not 
the government, have put the economy on the right track. Reagan also vows to continue this 
trend of freedom and prosperity in the future. The speech makes the connection more explicit by 
referencing policies that Reagan has enacted that have helped the economy grow.  In this way, 
the theme also helps to explain the future vision message of the campaign. Reagan’s vision for 
the future has created prosperity and a thriving economy. Reagan vows to continue the 
movement of freedom and prosperity in the future. Moreover, the country can once again be 
proud of its place as a leader in the world. The US, Reagan argues, is a beacon of freedom in the 
world.  Thus, this speech used one theme to hit several major messaging objectives of the 
campaign in a compelling way. The messaging objectives of limiting government, continuing the 
economic growth, Reagan’s unique form of populist leadership, and pride in America are made 
compelling by the casting of the election in broad, black and white themes about the nature of 
government in the economy.  
Strategically, this aspect of the convention speech was very useful. Once again, the broad 
appeals were very palatable to independent voters. The economic outlook drawn by Reagan is 
very appealing to those not affiliated with the Republican Party. Moreover, Reagan’s likability 
and character ratings would be aided by his objectively brilliant oratorical skills and positive 
nature of his theme regarding the nature of government. Reagan’s conviction and earnestness 
truly connected with voters. It seems impossible not to find goose bumps on one’s arms when 
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Reagan speaks so highly of the values that we hold dear and our proud history. In all these ways, 
the speech’s clear thematic connection with messaging objectives seems very effective in 
capturing independent attention.  
 In a much more minor way, the Reagan theme regarding foreign policy was used in the 
convention speech to illuminate the campaign’s messaging objective of continuing the progress 
made and being proud of our American values. It is important to analyze this aspect of the 
speech because foreign policy was a very tangential part of the campaign, and it is in this speech 
that the theme is very clearly sketched. As stated above, Reagan explains that Americans are 
peaceful. Peace only comes from strength. Furthermore, as Americans, we are compelled to 
protect freedom and democracy around the world. This theme is compelling because it gets to the 
heart of our values of democracy.  
This theme is used in this speech to expand on a couple of the campaign’s messaging 
objectives. The most obvious is the connection to continuing the success of Reagan’s leadership. 
Reagan argues that since he took office, “not one inch of soil has fallen to the communists.” He 
credits the increased investment in the military with bringing this phenomenon about. The 
actions we took in Grenada, according to Reagan, were very important. They let the world know 
that the United States would not sit by and let a country fall under the “yoke” of communism 
(Youtube 2014). Thus, in order to remain powerful and peaceful, Reagan must be reelected in 
order to continuing outfitting the military with the best weapons possible. Furthermore, this 
theme implicitly connects with the “pride in America” messaging objective of the campaign. By 
going out into the world and protecting freedom, we are reaffirming our faith in our values. 
Reagan knows that this is important to our country and leads to success as a nation. In these 
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ways, the theme on foreign policy helped to touch upon an important messaging objective of the 
campaign.  
In terms of strategy, this facet of the speech was quite useful. Again, the broad theme 
about American identity and message about patriotism and pride would be useful in capturing 
independent votes. Moreover, this part of the speech was useful in the regional strategy. Reagan 
makes explicit reference to remaining close with the state of Israel. Regionally, this would aid 
the campaign with Jews in the Northeast who cared very deeply about Israeli statehood. In both 
of these ways, the incorporation of these themes and messages into the convention speech aided 
the campaign strategically. 
By, most any measure, Reagan’s convention speech in 1984 was a very successful bit of 
communication. Reagan and his writing team showed incredible skill at outlining broad themes 
about government and American values, and incorporating them into messaging objectives of the 
campaign. The speech was also very impressive in its strategic mindedness. Like all of the 
communication analyzed here, campaigns could take a lesson about incorporating theme into 
objectives of campaign messaging.  
Conclusion  
The presidential election of 1984 is exceptional in a number of ways. The economic 
climate was particularly warm to the incumbent. Unique to this campaign, the incumbent himself 
was at the center of a massive political movement. Reagan was also personally disposed to 
allowing his very skilled campaign officials prepare most facets of the campaign. Furthermore, 
the themes that Reagan and his advisors had at their disposal were also uniquely clear and 
accessible. All of this is to say that perhaps the most unique and important manner in which this 
campaign is distinctive is in how all of the above factors aligned in such a way to allow the 
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Reagan-Bush 1984 campaign to use theme in incredibly effective and interesting ways in its 
messaging. All of the factors highlighted in this chapter interacted in irreducible ways to create 
theme-driven messages that connected to messaging objectives and fulfilled the strategies of the 
campaign.  
 In terms of trends in this type of thematic integration, this campaign set many. Though a 
profound mixture of a great number of factors contributed to the success of theme in this 
campaign, the impression was that theme was a true driver of all messaging. In order to make the 
messaging objectives compelling, campaigns in the future would have to tie them inseparably to 
broad themes about American identity and progress. To employ these types of themes that cast 
issues in black and white, every election would have to represent the “clear divergence” in the 
direction of the country that Reagan had alluded to in so much of his communication to make 
messaging objectives more compelling. Because of his success and the movement that was 
created, Republicans in future campaigns would look to Reagan to draw inspiration for their 
thematic genesis as well as selection of messaging objectives. They would attempt to avoid 
specific policy suggestions as major messaging objectives because, as the Reagan team had, they 
saw the inherent challenges of connecting specific policy to major themes.  
  




 In Stephen Skowronek’s influential work The Politics Presidents Make George H.W. 
Bush’s administration is characterized as one of articulation. Throughout his time in presidential 
politics, Bush attempted to manipulate the commitments left by Reagan “the repudiator” to make 
them his own (Skowronek 1993, 41). This characterization is quite true in Bush’s 1988 
campaign. In the realms of theme and messaging objectives, the Bush campaign took cues from 
the previous president and put minor twists to make them unique and more germane to the 
political climate in 1988. This climate was marked by a very strong economy, but more 
important, the aftermath of the Reagan administration. In terms of personality, this campaign 
featured some important considerations. George H.W. Bush had many personal attributes that 
presented challenges for the utilization of themes in messaging. Michael Dukakis’ personal 
disposition however, made many aspects of the Bush thematic and messaging approach much 
more effective. Lee Atwater is by far the most interesting figure of this campaign and probably 
of the entire period of study. His personal characteristics had tremendous impact on the themes, 
messaging objectives, and strategy of this campaign and all campaigns to follow. The strategy 
selected was logical and simple enough: partially reassemble the Reagan conservatives. This 
time though, the campaign simply wished to win the election through the mathematics of the 
Electoral College. In all, this race is very important in analyzing how the successor, with 
suboptimal thematic skill, of a very popular incumbent may gain election not through a 
supremely effective theme-driven strategy, but one that is logical and married to messaging 
objectives.   
Themes 
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 As argued in the last chapter, no other campaign in this time period had a collection of 
themes as clear and well articulated as Reagan in 1984. However, the Bush campaign was able to 
implicitly lay out a couple of identifiable themes that would be used to illuminate central 
campaign messaging objectives. There are a few common patterns to many of Bush’s themes 
that worked to undermine their effectiveness. The most important of these patterns is the lack of 
antithesis in theme (Medhurst 2006, 24-5). Bush could not seem to always create the enemies of 
progress that Reagan was so skilled at doing. Though he may highlight the “virtuous people” in 
America, or the obstacles to progress, he had trouble tying them together in the same theme. This 
not only weakened the themes, but also made them somewhat more pessimistic. A theme of a 
societal ill with no hero to redeem it would inevitably lead to a message of negativity. As we 
shall see, this turn to negativity occurred quite often in the campaign messaging.  
Furthermore, there was a noticeable lack of historical appeal to Bush’s themes. Reagan 
was very skilled at relating his themes to the past. This allowed him to create themes about the 
concrete aspects of American identity. Bush struggled to make this clear connection. Without the 
appeal to the past, Bush’s themes lacked force in asserting the validity of his themes. There was 
no evidence given that Bush’s explanations of the world were correct. This lack of historic 
appeal also meant that Bush could not create a solid message of American identity. Because 
there was no full story of American progress, Bush could not outline the values that brought 
America to where it was. This resulted in a weakening of the themes that Bush conveyed. 
 Related to these patterns was the lack of a strong, uniform, and explicit appeal to 
populism. Reagan saw this call to action as completely necessary in any compelling theme. 
Though one of Bush’s themes to be discussed was largely populist, it lacked the impetus to 
action that was ubiquitous in Reagan’s discourse. This problem stemmed from the fact that there 
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was no direct antithesis. Because the forces of good and evil were not drawn together in one 
theme, there was no impetus for action, no explicit need for his election (Medhurst 2006, 25). 
Here the lack of antithesis compounded the anemic nature of the populist appeals. Also, with the 
lack of history in the themes, there was no direct explanation that “the People” were the vehicle 
of change in America. Thus, the lack of the historical appeals further weakened the ability of 
Bush’s themes to be convincingly populist. Together, all of the characteristics that weakened 
Bush’s themes worked in concert to create themes that were less compelling than they potentially 
may have been.   
 All of this notwithstanding, a couple of major themes emerged in 1988. One of the most 
important themes for the Bush campaign was that liberals were weak and dangerous to American 
progress (see appendix). The economic elements of this theme related to raising taxes and 
increasing government spending. However, in this campaign the economic consequences were 
much less explicit than the social and foreign policy consequences. In the area of social progress, 
liberals are dangerous because they are soft. They coddle those who simply do not deserve it. 
This applies implicitly to programs like welfare, and explicitly to issues of law and order. Bush 
argued that liberals are soft on crime. They oppose the death penalty where it should be applied. 
The death penalty, to Bush, was important to our morality and the protection of justice. Liberals 
were also in favor of programs that gave criminals certain amenities, specifically “weekend 
passes” from prison. These programs were not only bad because they betrayed the value of 
justice, but because they actually allowed criminals, who have broken our laws, to walk the 
streets. In foreign policy, liberals were also weak. Their policies of cutting military spending and 
weapons systems demonstrated this weakness. America’s enemies like the USSR were not to be 
trusted and weakness would provoke them. Disarming would put America and its freedom in 
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danger of attack. Finally, in the area of religion, liberals are more than willing to abandon our 
commitments in the name of some form of political correctness. A commitment to religion is a 
basic part American civil society and should not be changed. The liberals also have no pride in 
our American symbols. They want to change things that we hold dear like the Pledge of 
Allegiance. This social area of the theme is quite possibly the most compelling because it had a 
clear assertion of value and led to very strong emotional response from voters. This collection of 
themes was useful for the Bush campaign. The ties to the Republican narrative are somewhat 
clear. The weakness of liberals stems from their identity that exists outside of the Republican 
Party provided by the narrative. Republicans represent the true values of America while liberals 
work to destroy them. These themes were used to emphasize messaging objectives like law and 
order, government spending and taxation, defense, and commitments to civil society. Also, they 
fit well into the strategies the campaign decided upon including reconquering the conservatives 
that voted for Reagan (Runkel 1989, 34).  
This collection of themes is not particularly weak or particularly strong. They certainly 
provoke emotions of fear. People certainly want to avoid the disastrous consequences of liberal 
rule. The characteristics that weakened Bush’s themes are clear. The themes contain no clear 
path of action, simply a path that we want to avoid. Though clearly implicit, there is no clear 
hero. Neither George Bush nor “the People” are called directly to combat the liberal menace. The 
solutions to the problems posed by these themes would thus have to come from the more specific 
messaging objectives. Furthermore, in sections on messaging objectives and specific 
communication, it will become clear that these themes took on a very negative tone because of 
its one-sided description. With the liberal messaging, messages could only come as negative 
characterizations of the left. There is also a clear lack of appeal to history. Once again, it is 
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implicit that our history supports these conclusions. However, explicit mention of founders or 
historic values is not readily available. Because of all of these deficiencies, the themes that result 
have serious weaknesses. It definitely gives an explanation of the way that liberals think and the 
way their policies would be deleterious. However, there is not a lot of backing to the explanation. 
Neither historical evidence, nor a specific path forward are given explicitly. Thus, although this 
theme certainly stimulated emotion, it did less to guide votes than the Reagan themes did.   
Although the themes described above made up much of the thematic force in the 1988 
campaign, there was another, distinct theme that Bush utilized. This was the theme of citizen 
activism, volunteerism, and individualism. This theme is, at its heart, a tweak on Reagan’s 
limited government theme. It posits that the people are at the heart of national progress. Working 
in their communities, people and small organizations, not the government, are responsible for 
moving America forward. These people sacrifice and serve their communities in any way that 
they can. Individuals like this are the unsung heroes of America. Church groups, charities, and 
NGO’s hold the reins of government because they represent the interests of everyday Americans. 
The government should not impede their work. Rather, it should be accountable to their interests 
and further their aims. This theme is populist in its praise of the individual (Medhurst 2006, 24). 
It was a useful theme for appealing to conservative independent voters because of its bipartisan 
optimism and conception of limited government.  
Though this is an optimistic theme that stood as a centerpiece of ideology for the 
campaign, there are some clear weak points that fall in line with the general characteristics 
enumerated above. First, it does not show an explicit threat to the individual. Though one can 
imply that a large and restrictive government would hurt the individual, there is no specific 
mention of this in the campaign’s communication. Secondly, there is a lack of history here. 
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Though the organizations are made clear, Bush fails to mention their role throughout American 
history or periods where they were repressed. Lastly, though Bush praises the individual, he 
never really articulated the ways that they were virtuous. Compared with Reagan’s explicit 
characteristics of “wholesome” individuals, Bush’s praise seems impotent. Thus, though this 
theme was powerful and positive, it lacked the enormous potential of the limited government 
populist appeal that was demonstrated by Reagan in 1984. This weakness explains, in part, the 
reason the Bush campaign could not produce messaging with strong connection to this theme.  
Political Climate 
 In this chapter, there are three sets of aspects of political climate that are important to the 
analysis of theme in messaging. One important set is the ever-present economic outlook. By all 
accounts, the US economy was thriving and continuing to grow during the campaign. 
Unemployment was continually lowered, and manufacturing was on the rise (Cacy, Roberts 
1988, 3-6). This strong economic outlook boded well for Bush as he was running on a similar 
economic platform as his predecessor Ronald Reagan. This positive economic outlook led the 
Bush campaign to select messaging objectives and undertake strategies that would reinforce the 
idea that he would continue the economic policies undertaken by Reagan that had led to this 
success.  
 The second set of conditions of political climate of importance in this work is the nature 
of the media covering the 1988 election. Like the characterization in the first chapter and in the 
1984 case, the media was very easily manipulated. Lee Atwater was an absolute wizard with the 
press. He was incredibly good at controlling the information the press received and the resulting 
reports. His skill at media manipulation will be discussed at length later. However, it is important 
to note that the state of the press at the time allowed Atwater to release communication that 
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fulfilled messaging objectives and was strategically useful, and sometimes successful at 
emphasizing themes.  
The final, and most crucial feature of the political climate at the time of the 1988 election 
relates to the political order in America immediately following the Reagan Administration. As 
discussed previously, the “Reagan Revolution” was the largest political movement in the second 
half of the Twentieth Century. He stood as a political icon to many people. This stood as both a 
problem and an opportunity for George Bush in 1988. Skowronek argues that those who follow 
repudiators, as Bush was following Reagan, often have a hard time governing because they are 
forced to pick up the pieces of a shattered political order  (1993, 34). This seems as though it 
could be true of campaigning in a post-Reagan America as well. Bush had to acknowledge the 
incredible movement that had elevated his predecessor to political preeminence. In order to have 
success, Bush would have to tie himself to the Reagan movement. However, this alone would not 
allow Bush to win the presidency, as it is an office that relies so heavily on character and 
uniqueness. Thus, the Bush campaign would need to strike a balance between being the “faithful 
son” of the Reagan Revolution, and having a unique personality and vision for America  
(Skowronek 1993, 430). This impetus of balance caused the Bush campaign to select several 
messaging objectives, emphasize certain themes, and take up certain strategies that would touch 
upon both of the electoral necessities outlined above.  
The Players 
 To say that personality had a large impact on theme, messaging objectives, strategy, and 
the interplay of the three in the Bush 1988 campaign is an understatement that truly subtracts 
from understanding the dynamics of the entire campaign. George H.W Bush is overall one of the 
most interesting Republican candidates of the late 20th Century. Many of his personal traits had a 
Owens   
61 
profound effect on both the 1988 race and the 1992 reelection bid that will be discussed in the 
next chapter. These attributes included Bush’s views on the very nature of political campaigns, 
preference of communication, and personal disclosure. These personal convictions had both 
positive and negative impacts on the use of theme in messaging and also dictated strategy to 
some extent.  
 The most foundational aspect of Bush’s personal affectation to this work was his personal 
thoughts on political campaigns. Bush believed that campaign activities were “narrow and self-
interested” (Medhurst 2006, 10). He got absolutely no enjoyment out of running a campaign. 
This type of distaste of course limits the potential of the candidate to truly throw himself into the 
difficult task of weaving theme into campaign messaging objectives. It seems that here the 
candidate held back the thematic potential of the campaign.  Bush’s cynical thoughts about 
campaigns were not all bad however. Bush saw a clear dichotomy between governing and 
running for election. Campaigns were just the means to the end of governing. This led Bush to 
believe that campaign communication had little bearing on what the public expected the 
incoming administration to do. He believed that people generally understood that circumstances 
that elected officials find themselves in force them to betray some campaign promises (Medhurst 
2006, 4). It is not difficult to see the potential for theme and freedom in message choice that 
comes with this kind of belief. Bush would have been open to a large number of messaging 
objectives because he did not believe that they represented any real expectations once election 
had been gained. Although this belief had the potential to undermine the much-discussed 
“genuine” qualities in the campaign communication, it seems that Bush already may have been 
lacking in that area given his distaste of campaigning. Thus, in this campaign Bush’s views on 
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the nature of political campaigns hurt the potential for thematic integration in one sense and 
helped it in another way.  
 Bush’s preferred modes of communication also constituted a very influential personal 
attribute that impacted the ability of his campaign to emphasize themes in messages that were set 
as objectives and were strategically useful. First and foremost, Bush did not enjoy speaking 
publicly (Medhurst 2006, 4). He was much more comfortable with personal interaction and 
persuasion than large-scale communication (Medhurst 2006, 10).  This in itself has serious 
consequences for theme integration. If Bush did not like communicating with a large audience, 
how could he be expected to effectively espouse broad themes of American identity and tie them 
to messaging objectives? Not only would it be strange to do such thematic weaving on an 
interpersonal level, but strategically it is an impossibility. Furthermore, Bush also was not fond 
of flowery language or rhetoric. Successful theme emphasis depends on a mastery of rhetoric. 
When people are being told what it means to be an American, or what type of government to 
believe in they are not hoping for logical arguments, they are looking to be emotionally moved. 
Bush also resisted reading prepared speeches. He would often change many words in his 
speeches because they were not his. Where Reagan allowed his speechwriters to exercise their 
considerable skill, Bush impeded them. The micromanagement of speech material would stand to 
undermine the coherent themes that speechwriters like Peggy Noonan (a writer during both the 
Reagan and Bush campaigns) were very proficient at producing (Medhurst 2006, 9). These 
preferences of communication put Bush out of his element and handicapped the campaign when 
attempting theme driven communication.  
 A third character trait of George Bush that impacted his ability to weave theme and 
messaging objectives in a strategically significant way was his commitment to personal privacy. 
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Bush felt personally violated when he was forced to speak about what patriotism, America, and 
duty meant to him (Medhurst 2006, 13). Once again, comparison with Reagan is useful to 
illustrate the limiting effects of this character attribute. When Reagan could place himself in his 
themes on American identity they became especially compelling. The themes were proven to be 
more legitimate. This also served to show the positive aspects of his character. Since Bush 
lacked this ability, his themes were far less compelling and his character was not addressed. 
Refusing to become a part of his explanations of American society, Bush left the audience 
wanting to know more. With less compelling themes, not only is it tougher to weave them into 
objectives of messaging, but strategically it is less effective. People will not react as strongly to 
positive messages about American identity if the candidate cannot relate to them. This may have, 
to a minor extent, influenced the choice of themes and messaging objectives that were more 
negative in nature. Since Bush was not the centerpiece of these themes and messages, it was 
easier to connect the two. In a similar way, it may have accounted for the types of specific 
advertisements that the campaign produced to touch upon these negative messaging objectives. 
In this way, Bush’s refusal to insert his personal beliefs into his themes had an impact on those 
emphasized, the messaging objectives selected, and strategies chosen. 
 Bush’s opponent in 1988, Michael Dukakis, also had many personal attributes that 
impacted the Bush themes, messaging objectives, and strategy. There are two important facets 
about Dukakis’s personal characteristics that are of importance here. The first and less important 
facet was his belief in group consensus in campaign decision-making. Dukakis surrounded 
himself with a large number of advisors. Each had a say in the running of the campaign, but there 
was not really a leading advisor (Runkel 1989, 83). This organization fell under the “horizontal” 
structure of campaigning. The common obstacles of this organizations were present in the 
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Dukakis campaign. They were often slow to respond and their messages were not unified and 
coherent because they were forced to go through many channels to make decisions. This was 
very beneficial to the Bush campaign’s commitment to always be “on offense.” They could 
control the discourse because the Dukakis campaign had to go through many institutional steps 
to get a message out. Thus, Dukakis’s convictions in campaign organization boosted the Bush 
campaign’s ability to emphasize the themes and messages they desired based on strategic utility.  
 The second and more important character attribute of Michael Dukakis in the realms of 
theme and messaging objectives was his personal commitment to run a positive campaign. 
Dukakis firmly believed that running a “cleaner” campaign was not only morally commendable, 
but also strategically beneficial. He believed that voters would see through the wild accusations 
and negative messaging of the Bush campaign and chose to vote for him (Runkel 1989, 200). In 
the documentary Boogie Man, Dukakis plainly states that his campaign “wasn’t going to 
respond” to things like the prison furlough debate, his mental health, or the accusation of his wife 
burning an American flag (Forbes 2009). Though commendable, this approach was quite naïve 
and gave the Bush campaign even more autonomy in controlling the messaging agenda. Free 
from retaliation, Lee Atwater and the Bush team were able to select any message, emphasize any 
theme, and pursue any strategy they believed would help them.  
 This stands as a logical segué to a discussion of Lee Atwater’s personal characteristics. 
What needs to be said about Lee Atwater’s contributions, good and bad, to campaign 
communication could take up an entire volume on its own. In the opinion of this writer, there has 
not been nearly enough literature produced to measure the effects (positive or negative) this man 
has had on presidential campaigns. However, some length will be devoted here to describe a few 
of the ways Lee Atwater’s personal traits impacted the themes, messaging objectives, and 
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strategy of the 1988 Bush campaign. The attributes that will be focused on here are his 
commitment to winning at all costs, his ability to identify salient issues and messaging objectives 
among various populations, and his incredible skill in dealing with the media.  
 Atwater’s competitive nature is the most foundational of the personal aspects identified 
above. From his youth, Atwater took any opportunity to succeed. He became a Republican 
because in his home state of South Carolina it was the less populated power, giving Atwater 
more potential for advancement. Many participants in Boogie Man, the documentary chronicling 
his life, spoke often of his competitiveness. Losing made Atwater “physically ill.” Atwater 
himself made many comments about never accepting defeat. He said of his political career 
simply, “If you’re on the other team I’m gonna try to beat you (Forbes 2009).” This commitment 
to victory allowed Atwater to be very unfettered in his decisions regarding campaigns. If he 
believed that a theme, messaging, or strategy would help his candidate, he would pursue it. He 
conceptualized campaigns as open season where anything goes. He referred to it as “making 
sausage.” Atwater realized that to put the heat on the other candidate made the opposition angry 
and kept the heat off his candidate. This approach had many impacts on the 1988 campaign. 
Atwater took up a strategy to “stick it to them first,” control the agenda and play offense that will 
be discussed in detail later (Forbes 2009).  
 A second major personal attribute of Lee Atwater that is important here was his uncanny 
knack for finding the “sticky issue” that would elicit emotional and visceral responses from 
certain groups of voters. Atwater fully understood that people vote based on “their fears, not 
their hopes,” and that anger is a very powerful political motivator (Forbes 2009). Coming from a 
poor town in the South, Atwater understood the contempt that Southerners and lower income 
people had for liberals. They were seen as the elite and were conceptualized as “people who 
Owens   
66 
thought they were better than you are (Forbes 2008).” The connection with the Bush theme on 
liberal leadership is very clear here. The generation of this theme for 1988 was undoubtedly 
influenced by Atwater’s acknowledgment that this was a very sizeable and useful group of voters 
for Bush. Furthermore, Atwater realized that appeals to patriotism and non-materialistic values 
could be more effective than economic interests. Some messaging objectives like the pledge of 
allegiance and prayer in schools were selected based on Atwater’s ability to find the issue that 
would spark controversy and emotional responses among conservative voters.  
 The final personality attribute of Lee Atwater of importance here was his arguably 
unmatched ability to manipulate and deal with the media. Contributors to Boogie Man all agreed 
that Atwater was magic with the press. He was able to become friendly with members of the 
press. The close personal ties he fostered enabled him to manipulate their work in important 
ways. He would offer exclusive stories to reporters that he knew would be friendly to Bush’ 
messaging objectives. Most fundamentally, Atwater was excellent at staying on message and 
emphasizing major messaging objectives and themes at every opportunity. He not only embodied 
this skill, but demanded it of the candidate and all involved with the campaign (Forbes 2009). 
Atwater was also very in tune with the press. He knew exactly what he could get away with, 
what they would cover, and how to influence the stories that they would write (Forbes 2009). It 
was said that the “press spoke the Republican talking points without even getting them (Forbes 
2009).” Obviously, this skill with the media had profound impacts on the communication of the 
Bush campaign. With the ability to make almost anything play to his favor in the media, Atwater 
would be free to choose messaging objectives and messages that were controversial and uniquely 
helped Bush. This would also be important strategically in staying on offense and appealing to 
conservatives.  
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 It should be noted that the conditions for theme driven communication are much murkier 
than they were in 1984. Weakness has already been identified in the themes that Bush had 
available for emphasis. The political climate also held its own set of dangerous conditions. The 
picture becomes even more clouded with this discussion of personal disposition. Several 
personal convictions of George Bush clearly put the campaign at a disadvantage in utilizing 
theme. However, Bush’s personality has been shown to not be a total loss in the realms of 
messaging and strategy. Michael Dukakis’s personal beliefs also seemed to have aided the Bush 
campaign in their strategy and messaging pursuits. Most of all though, the Bush campaign was 
aided by the personal affectations of Lee Atwater. He serves as an embodiment of a manager 
who will do anything to win. His contributions to the campaign in realms of messaging 
objectives and strategy were immeasurable. However, his personality could really only do so 
much to aid Bush in utilizing theme as his commitment to strategy and useful messaging 
objectives overrode any other commitments.  
Strategy 
 With all of the factors already described, it seems that George Bush had no guarantees of 
effectively utilizing theme and messaging objectives together, much less winning election. With 
a less than optimal outlook, a premium was placed on choosing a strategy that would allow the 
Vice President to succeed Reagan. With the man who was the center of the Reagan Revolution 
out of office, there was both a challenge and an opportunity present for the Bush campaign. 
Continuing to claim the Reagan coalition would undoubtedly ensure election for Bush. The 
challenge for the Bush team was preventing the loss of votes from the coalition in 1984. 
Confronting this challenge was the absolute center of all strategic decisions that the Bush 
campaign took. It led directly to two strategic aims in 1988 that are of importance in this work. 
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The first was ensuring the support of the conservatives in the electorate by both remaining close 
to Reagan and creating Bush’s own intellectual space. This included both Democratic and 
Republican conservatives. This perceived strategic necessity also led to the conviction of the 
Bush team to stay on offense and “control the agenda (Runkel 1989, 88).” Both of these strategic 
aims, guided by the most basic impetus of recapturing Reagan’s coalition, would have large 
impacts on messaging objectives, the themes utilized to espouse them, and specific messaging.  
 The first strategic calculation of appealing to conservatives in the electorate was the more 
basic of the two. This strategy was informed by a couple of perceptions held by Lee Atwater and 
others. The first perception that led to this strategic aim was the worry that Bush’s image was 
weak. There was a feeling in the electorate that George Bush was not as committed to 
conservatism as Reagan was. He would not be an authoritative supporter of limited government 
as Reagan had been (Runkel 1989, 31). This worried the Bush campaign in appealing to 
conservatives who valued limited government. This calculation would lead the campaign to 
select certain messages that would build an image of George Bush as a committed conservative.  
 This strategy of continuing Reagan also held a sub-aspect of strategy. Bush had to show 
how he was measurably different from Michael Dukakis. Atwater was worried that early on the 
candidates seemed too similar to each other. Atwater also believed in a cyclical view of the 
electorate. After eight years under a Republican president, some people may simply wish to give 
the other party a try. This would especially be the case if voters could not see a clear divergence 
in the candidates (Runkel 1989, 112). This being the case, The Bush team took very large steps 
to ensure that differentiation was achieved and Bush was seen as the conservative. These steps 
included selecting messaging objectives about divergence of character and governmental 
conception between the two candidates. The messages selected from this calculation would 
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attempt to paint George Bush as a strong conservative, and Michael Dukakis as a tax and spend 
liberal who implemented programs that were bad for America. These messaging objectives 
would be wrapped into the theme regarding liberal leadership.  
 The second major aspect of strategy important to this work is the Bush campaign’s goal 
to play offense as much as possible. There were many facets to this strategy that had an impact 
on the use of theme in messaging objectives. One was making Dukakis a major issue of the 
campaign. This was done through specific messaging objectives to be detailed later. However, 
strategically it involved constantly bringing new information to light about Dukakis.  The Bush 
team was organized in order to execute this facet of the strategy. Atwater described the structure 
of the campaign as five people with “a lot of turf (Runkel 1989, 92).” Everyone involved in the 
high levels of campaign messaging were entrusted to make quick decisions. According to 
Atwater, the messaging team met every day in order to formulate a messaging strategy for that 
day (Runkel 1989, 91). Because of the intimate and constant environment this created, the 
messaging was at once consistent and dynamic. The resultant messaging would be very 
connected to messaging objectives. The major players in the campaign organization, led by 
Atwater’s commitment to staying on message, would be looking daily to take new information 
and fit it into the messaging objectives. This would be good for the enforcement of messaging 
objectives. However, the ways in which it could be tied to the broad themes was mixed. If the 
messages are very specific and are emitted daily, it is difficult to weave them into broad positive 
themes. Furthermore, with character assaults on Dukakis, it seems harder to connect themes of 
American identity although the liberal theme could be used. Due to the nature of themes as broad 
explanations of the political world, they are not well suited for specific character attacks. This 
area is reserved for the realm of messaging objectives, as it is more specific to the election. 
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However, where the Bush campaign could connect Dukakis to general liberal policies, the theme 
could be tied in. This was obviously complicated and resulted in mixed effectiveness of thematic 
integration. On the whole though, it is easy to see how this would make the resultant messages 
negative in nature.  
 The insistence of the Bush campaign to stay on offense also took on a meaningful role in 
impacting theme driven messaging in the way it dictated the Bush response to attacks on his 
character. Throughout the campaign, several negative rumors regarding Bush’s character came to 
light. The most telling of these was an allegation of an extramarital affair by the Vice President. 
In order to remain on the offensive, Atwater chose to go after “the dirty trickster putting out the 
rumor (Runkel 1989, 49).” The Bush campaign did have George W Bush deny the rumor. 
However, the response was more focused on going after the source of the rumor. Instead of 
defending, the response attacked. As discussed in the first chapter, defending can sometimes be 
useful in acclaiming the candidate. Not only did the campaign not use the opportunity to 
emphasize the messaging objective of character, but the also could not tie it to a theme because 
of Bush’s inability to place himself in themes. Through this example, it is clear that staying on 
the offense could have some negative impacts on the use of themes and messaging objectives in 
messaging.  
 In general, the strategies taken by the Bush administrations had measurable impacts on 
theme driven messaging. In the strategy to reassemble the Reagan coalition, a strong theme of 
American identity could have been useful. However, due to Bush’s personal distaste of placing 
himself in thematic arcs, the campaign could not inject Bush’s personal fulfillment of a theme of 
identity as Reagan did. In the sub-strategy of differentiation messages and themes could be 
mixed with success into the messaging of the campaign. If the theme about dangerous liberal 
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leadership could be accessed, it would prove useful. However, with the constant and Dukakis-
character based nature of the messaging no theme was really useful in integrating. In responding 
to attacks, the Bush strategy of remaining on offense at all times, combined with Bush’s aversion 
to personal disclosure, seemed to subtract from the potential of weaving themes into messaging 
objectives.  
Messaging Objectives 
 As can be expected, every factor described above had considerable impact on the 
messaging objectives that the Bush campaign would choose in the 1988 campaign. In most cases, 
a mixture of factors combined to result in the choice of messaging objectives. Unlike the Reagan 
campaign, some of the messaging objectives selected in 1988 were linked weakly to themes. 
This trouble of connection came from several factors. The themes that the campaign had 
available was a major factor. Bush’s personality cannot be discounted either in this respect. His 
unwillingness to use theme effectively was a major reason certain messaging objectives lacked 
connection with themes. Strategy also played a role in limiting the synthesis between theme and 
messaging objectives. Because the campaign both wanted to remain intimate with the Reagan 
movement and stay on offense, certain messages that could connect with Bush’s theme may have 
been shrugged off for strategic reasons. Contrastingly, the many of the limiting factors of 
message selection discussed in the first chapter were not an issue for the Bush campaign. 
Atwater’s desire to win and creativity would enable him to select any messaging objective 
necessary. Also, because of Atwater’s abilities to handle the media, it would certainly not be 
difficult to obtain coverage and frame messages correctly. Lastly, Dukakis’s unwillingness to 
engage actually made message selection easier and more effective. The major messaging 
objectives that emerged out of these calculations were that George Bush would continue the 
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work of Ronald Reagan as a strong conservative, George Bush was a strong personality and 
capable leader, and Michael Dukakis was a weak tax and spend liberal.  Some connections with 
theme are obvious and will be analyzed in detail here. However, what is truly striking in this 
collection of messages is their intimate connection with strategy. Every messaging objective here 
is intricately tied to one or more facets of strategy, most notably the sub-strategy of 
differentiation.  
  The first major messaging objective to be addressed is the conscious effort of the Bush 
campaign to link the Vice President inseparably from his predecessor and promote his 
conservative credentials. Bush himself recognized the utility and importance of this messaging 
objective (Runkel 1989, 91). Early on in the campaign, the decision was made to ride the wave 
of the Reagan Revolution. The Bush campaign was careful in its teasing out of this messaging 
objective. Bush asserted that he was not Ronald Reagan. He did not have the incomparable 
leadership skills or command of rhetoric. This recognition was useful because it nodded to the 
Reagan movement. No one could compare with Reagan’s strong leadership according to those 
who believed in the revolution. George Bush was thus depicted as a loyal son of the Reagan 
movement. He vowed to continue limiting government and protecting the individual. The 
campaign decided that Bush needed to be extremely strong on both taxes and communism. This 
would save him from attacks on the right that he was not a true conservative (Runkel 1989, 34). 
Attacks like this could break up the coalition of conservatives that had voted for Reagan. Also 
important in this message of conservative commitments was Bush’s commitment to American 
Pride. Atwtaer’s creativity was responsible for this selection of messaging objective. He saw that 
this was an emotional issue in what was an issueless campaign (Runkel 1989, 35). Bush argued 
that things like the pledge of allegiance and the American flag were sacred emblems of the US. 
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They held a special place in our society. It is clear how this messaging objective was chosen due 
to its strategic significance. Not only did this serve to gather the Reagan coalition under Bush’s 
belt, but it also set up the strategy of differentiation from Michael Dukakis. As part of this 
messaging objective, Bush also vowed to be tough on crime. Strict enforcement of drug offenses 
was important to protecting honest hard-working Americans. Tying Bush to Reagan and 
acclaiming his conservative credentials was the most logical and obvious way to capture the 
conservative Democrats and Republicans that Reagan had done so successfully. Also important 
to consider in the strategic impacts of selecting messaging objectives like American pride in the 
flag and pledge of allegiance was their uniqueness. Though Bush would undoubtedly need to be 
deeply connected with Reagan, the campaign recognized that their candidate would also need to 
have his own unique set of issues. This was important in the political climate of a post-Reagan 
America. Simple reuse of Reagan’s issues would not be sufficient to activate conservatives for 
George Bush. This also served to draw attention from Bush’s ambiguous economic plans. 
Strategically, this messaging objective was very well thought out.  
Less obvious and effective is this messaging objective’s connection to any theme. 
Though this messaging objective contains implicit ties to the praise of the individual present in 
Bush’s theme, it is not completely cogent. Because Bush could never really be explicit about 
what was so great about the individual, or what it meant to protect them, the theme could not be 
used in any meaningful way. In this example, the chosen message was married perfectly to 
strategy. However, in terms of powerful appeal to theme, it was lacking severely.  
 Creating an image of George Bush as a strong leader and personality was another major 
messaging objective of the campaign. As mentioned earlier, the “wimp factor” was a major 
worry of the Bush campaign. If he was not seen as a strong leader, the campaign could very 
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easily lose the confidence of conservative Democrats and Republicans. To enumerate this 
message, the campaign took many steps in everyday campaign events as well as specific 
messaging. Bush’s tone was harsh; his messages were clear and authoritative. One of the most 
interesting and humorous messages that sought to touch upon this messaging objective came at a 
press conference. Bush exclaimed, “don’t let them tell you I’m not Texan.” He then proceeded to 
put his foot up on a barrier and raise his pant leg to expose a cowboy boot embroidered with a 
Texas flag (Forbes 2008). The campaign wished to paint Bush not as the wealthy man born in 
New England that he was, but a down-home rancher. The cowboy boot was meant to indicate 
strength and hard work. This messaging objective also dictated arguing that Bush was a qualified 
and capable leader. In advertisements and speeches the Bush campaign argued that their 
candidate was qualified to make tough decisions. Once again, this messaging objective played 
perfectly into the strategy of the Bush campaign. In order to appeal to conservatives who cared 
about strong leadership, Bush would need to show his strength of personality. Also similar to the 
previous messaging objective though is its lack of strong connection with a theme. Because Bush 
refused to put his own life into a theme about American identity, his story and personal 
accomplishments could not be attached to a broad and compelling theme.  
 Painting Dukakis as a weak liberal was probably the most central messaging objective of 
the Bush campaign in 1988. This messaging objective was directly informed by strategy. In order 
to stay on the offense at all times, Atwater knew that the opponent had to be a major part of the 
communication. Also, this was an opportunity to weave the theme about liberal leadership into 
campaign communication. The list of issues that the campaign used to enumerate this messaging 
objective is extremely long. Some major topics included Dukakis’s veto of a law requiring 
teachers to lead the pledge of allegiance in classrooms, Dukakis’s prison furlough program, his 
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cuts on military spending, and his stance on gun control. The Bush campaign aggressively 
discussed these topics and framed them as dangerous to American society. If we do not 
appreciate our symbols, punish our criminals, protect our country, and keep our freedoms, 
America is destined for destruction. The connections to both strategy and theme are strong with 
this messaging objective. Strategically, this would make Dukakis look very unattractive to the 
conservative voters that were fearful of liberal government. In this same vein, this messaging 
objective had deep connections with the liberal government theme used by the Bush campaign. If 
Dukakis had his way, he would pursue policy that harmed the safety and precious individual 
freedoms that conservative Americans held dear. Dukakis’s fitness as a leader was also important 
to this objective of messaging. The Bush campaign attempted to show that Dukakis was out of 
touch and could not confront challenges. This was done through essentially calling Dukakis out 
for not responding to troubling rumors. Because he would not respond to the rumors, the Bush 
campaign implied that he could not face tough issues in the campaign or in his potential 
administration. The Bush campaign also leaked rumors suggesting that Dukakis was mentally 
unstable (Forbes 2009). Here Dukakis’s personal attribute of not responding to negative tactics 
aided the Bush campaign in espousing the message of Dukakis as a weak leader. At its core, this 
messaging objective promotes negative messaging. The painting of Dukakis as a liberal could in 
no way be positive for the Bush campaign.  
 Taken together, the major messaging objectives of the Bush campaign showed a weak 
connection to theme. While the “strong Reagan conservative” message had a tangential 
connection to Bush’s theme regarding the individual, only the “liberal Dukakis” message could 
truly be weaved intricately into the theme on liberal leadership. This was a result of strategy, 
personal disposition, and political climate. It is clear though that these major messaging 
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objectives were married to strategic calculations. Appealing to conservatives was something that 
each of these messaging objectives did successfully at every turn. Also, when assembled 
together, these messages would very effectively pursue the strategy of differentiation. George 
Bush as a Reagan conservative and a strong leader contrasted perfectly with Dukakis as a 
Northeast liberal that was not a leader. When combined, these messaging objectives formed a 
compelling messaging arc in terms of strategic utility. They were however, not particularly well 
suited to thematic integration.  
Specific Communication 
 With the nature of the available themes, personality, strategic plans, and selections of 
messaging objectives, the Bush campaign faced great obstacles in weaving theme into messaging 
objectives. In the analysis of specific communication from 1988, it will become clear that the 
Bush campaign had limited success in thematic integration due to the above conditional factors. 
Though some specific messaging objectives did have important ties to theme, much of it was 
more concentrated in weaving messaging objectives into elements of strategy. Both the successes 
and failures of advertisements, interviews, and speeches in these areas will be assessed. 
The Bush campaign, because of its aggressive and constant media onslaught, relied 
heavily on very small interactions, usually led by Atwater, with members of the press. These 
types of interactions served as major venues of messaging for the Bush campaign. This, though 
now commonplace, was a bit of a game changer. Though the interactions are too numerous to 
recount fully, some highlights deserve attention here. One such example of importance came 
when Lee Atwater decided to touch on the messaging objective of Dukakis as a liberal. Gathered 
in front members of the press Atwater yelled: 
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“The question I really want to hear him (Dukakis) answer is: Why in the world did he 
veto this bill calling for the pledge of allegiance to be said in our classrooms? Can you 
imagine that? Get down here Dukakis and answer that question (Forbes 2009).”  
This type of indictment was incredibly common in the 1988 race. In a few short sentences, 
Atwater touches on important messaging objectives and themes. With the accusation that 
Dukakis is dodging the question because he will not answer it, Atwater touches upon the 
messaging objective inept leadership. The messaging objective about sacred symbolism and 
Bush’s commitment to conservatism is expounded with the reference to the pledge of allegiance 
and the forceful “Can you imagine that?” The sort of lack of pride in America also ties 
tangentially to the theme regarding liberals. Unlike Bush, they are willing to abandon important 
symbolic aspects of American civil society. Clearly, this would play into the strategy of going 
after conservative voters in the electorate. Many of the interactions with the press like this were 
just as useful. This is why the campaign utilized them so heavily. Because Bush was personally 
averse to theme, it fell upon people like Atwater to provide messaging objectives that were 
strategically significant and connected somewhat to themes.  
 Aside from this type of press conference communication, it is also important to evaluate 
the strength and weakness of the Bush campaign in the realm of television advertisements. 
Several very advertisements that proved useful for the Bush campaign are of importance here. 
Each of them emphasizes a major messaging objective. The strategic calculations in each are 
very clear and connect with the selected objective of messaging. Only a few though are 
successful in connecting to themes. However, even in the advertisements that connect to a theme, 
the connection is not very explicit or strong.  
 The first television ad of interest here is entitled “Solemnly Swear.” The ad opens on 
Bush taking the oath of office for the vice presidency. Charlton Hesston then begins narrating the 
commercial. He outlines many of Bush’s credentials. His service in the Navy, his building of a 
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company, his service in Congress, his ambassadorship to the UN, his time as emissary to China, 
his time as director of the CIA are all listed with photos and videos form the past. Hesston then 
says, “the more you learn how George Bush came this far, the more you realize that perhaps no 
one in this century is better prepared to be President of the United States (Youtube 2011).” This 
ad is characteristically weak on thematic integration but strong on messaging objective focus and 
strategy. Once again, because Bush had no connection of his personal story to a theme, his list of 
accomplishments is really just a résumé. Thus, there is no real thematic connection in this ad. 
However, the connection to the messaging objective is clear. This ad’s only true purpose was to 
prove that George Bush had strong leadership skills and, judging by his heroic service in the 
Navy, he was certainly not a wimp. Strategically, this ad was obviously aimed at the 
conservatives that valued strong leadership. In all, this ad was unsuccessful in appealing to theme 
to display a message, but it was a successful message, according to the objectives, that fulfilled 
strategy.  
 While the “Solemnly Swear” advertisement was positive, a great number of the Bush 
campaign ads were negative as dictated by the strategy of playing offense and the “Dukakis is a 
weak liberal” message. One of these negative advertisements was entitled “Tank”. It starts with a 
tank being driven around a field. A narrator says, “Michael Dukakis has opposed virtually every 
defense system we developed.” A scrolling list rolls as the narrator outlines all of the defense 
systems Michael Dukakis opposed. As the ad comes to a close the narrator says, “and now he 
wants to be our commander-in-chief.” As he does so, Dukakis appears riding in the tank. He is 
wearing a helmet and smiling. The image is less than flattering. The narrator says, “America 
can’t afford that risk (Youtube 2011).” This ad is one that is actually effective in utilizing theme, 
to pursue a messaging objective and strategy. The message of Dukakis as a weak liberal and 
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inept leader is clear. He not only opposed defense initiatives in typical liberal fashion, but riding 
in the tank he does not appear as a strong commander. Rather, he looks quite like a child riding a 
roller coaster. The message is also implicitly tied to the theme regarding liberals. His opposition 
to defense measures puts America directly at “risk.” This is a consequence of liberal policies and 
should be avoided. Strategically the success is also clear. The conservatives in America not only 
saw Dukakis looking like anything but a strong commander-in-chief, but the policies that would 
weaken America’s defense. This message was one that used a theme to enforce a messaging 
objective and was useful strategically.  
 The last ad that will be analyzed here was known as “Revolving Door.” Like the previous 
message, this was an attack on Dukakis that implicitly hinted at themes to instruct a messaging 
objective and pursue strategy. The ad shows scenes of a prison. A narrator explains, “as 
governor, Michael Dukakis vetoed mandatory sentences for drug dealers. He vetoed the death 
penalty. His revolving door policy gave weekend furloughs to first-degree murderers not eligible 
for parole.” As he speaks, men in prison uniforms walk around a revolving door and a graphic 
saying “268 escaped” is displayed on the bottom of the screen. The narrator goes on to say that 
many crimes, “like kidnap and rape,” were committed when these convicts were out of prison. 
He adds that many are still at large. The narrator continues, “now Michael Dukakis says he wants 
to do for America what he has done for Massachusetts. America can’t afford that risk (Youtube 
2012).” The theme-message weave is again clear. Dukakis is a liberal: messaging objective. The 
liberal policies he favors put America at risk: theme regarding liberals. Ending this ad in the 
same way as the last reinforces the connection to the messaging objective. This message is so 
strong because it suggests that criminals are on the loose as a direct result of the liberal prison 
furlough policy. This fulfills the theme about liberal leadership perfectly. What is more 
Owens   
80 
dangerous than violent criminals being free to run the streets? Strategically, this again targets 
conservatives. The death penalty and mandatory sentencing were important to those 
conservatives who agreed with the war on drugs. Also, the messaging objective of Dukakis as a 
weak leader is touched upon. Dukakis not only passed a bad program, but the fact that criminals 
are at large calls into question his ability to administer programs. In all, this ad is a successful 
one in terms of strategy, messaging objective, and thematic integration.  
 Considering that the Bush campaign faced serious obstacles overall in weaving themes 
into messaging objectives, the realm of television advertisements seems to be an area where the 
Bush campaign excelled in doing so. Two of the three ads analyzed here had some success in 
transmitting messaging objectives with the help of theme. However, further analysis is useful. 
Look at the advertisement that was unsuccessful in thematic integration. It was about the 
candidate. Now, notice that the two that were successful were about Michael Dukakis. The 
elements of personal attributes and strategy seem to be most important in acknowledging the 
discrepancy. Bush was so averse to placing himself into themes that his campaign was unable to 
do it even when Charlton Hesston was discussing his accomplishments. However, the Bush 
campaign could take a short video of Dukakis looking silly in a tank and connect it somewhat 
effectively to themes of liberal leadership. This is because Lee Atwater was so good at playing 
offense and his team was strategically committed to doing so. Thus, in the case of television ads, 
an important pattern seems to emerge. The attacking messages seemed to be more effective in 
thematic integration as a function of personality and strategy. 
 The acceptance speech at a nominating convention is a form of communication that 
stands apart from these smaller bits of communication. In 1988, a premium was placed on 
George Bush’s acceptance speech. As described earlier, these speeches stand as an opportunity 
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for the campaign to nail down messages with strong thematic ties and go after the voters upon 
which their strategy depends. George Bush’s attempt at doing this served as an admirable one. 
His speech was able to touch all the major messaging objectives by appealing to themes in a 
limited way. Elements of strategy were also clear throughout the speech. Considering all the 
handicaps that plagued the Bush campaign, and Bush personally, in utilizing theme, this was an 
exceptional effort. However, the theme connection was less compelling than it may have been.  
 The first and most pervasive element of message running throughout the speech was the 
connection to Ronald Reagan (while acknowledging Bush’s inferiority). This message was clear 
throughout the entire speech and also tied in strategy. From the beginning, Bush gives the nod to 
Reagan. In one of the first sentences he thanks his “friend” Ronald Reagan. Later he claims that 
Reagan “did not ask for but did receive (Bush’s) loyalty,” and anyone that heard “the simple 
truth in his words understands (his) loyalty all these years.” The strongest appeal to the Reagan 
movement came in a discussion of missions. Bush explained, ”I’m a man who sees life in terms 
of missions. Missions defined and missions completed… and the most important work in my life 
is to complete the mission that we started in 1980.” Bush later drives at this messaging objective 
even more. He argues, “When you have to change horses in midstream. Doesn’t it make sense to 
switch to one who’s going the same way?” Tying his success with the Reagan movement in these 
ways was an extremely effective way of enumerating message that connects Bush to Reagan. 
Importantly, the speech also recognizes that Bush is not Ronald Reagan. Bush agrees that he is 
quiet, ineloquent, and awkward. This humility is important in acknowledging to the believers in 
the Reagan revolution who believed that Reagan was incomparable. These words are a clear 
attempt to hammer home the “faithful son of Reagan” messaging objective. In a very indirect 
way, these aspects of the speech connect to the Bush’s conception of limited government. 
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However, they lack a direct connection to theme because there was no theme available to 
emphasize this message effectively. Strategically though, this was necessary to assemble the 
Reagan coalition.  
 Bush also showed that Michael Dukakis was a liberal throughout the speech in 
accordance with the messaging objective. This often tied in with strategy and, at times, theme. 
Near the beginning of the speech Bush says, “The differences between the two candidates are as 
deep and wide as they have ever been.” He goes on to say, “My opponent’s view of the world is 
a long slow decline for our country and inevitable fall mandated by impersonal historical forces.” 
Bush’s view is that “America is not in decline America is a rising nation… America is a unique 
nation with a special role in the world.” Here we see the use of the message informed slightly by 
theme, and influenced heavily by strategy. The message that Dukakis is a liberal is implicit. 
Theme comes in now to explain the messaging objective. Being a liber, says the “liberal” theme, 
Dukakis is willing to sit back, undertake deleterious policies, and watch America decline. 
Dukakis is not proud of America’s accomplishments or place of preeminence in the world. 
Strategically, this section fills the differentiation strategy perfectly. The words draw a perfect 
line of differentiation between Bush and Dukakis. Important to note, as to not to contradict 
earlier statements in this chapter, is that the theme did not set the lines of antithesis. What made 
the lines clear was the message and structure of the remarks. Regardless this was a compelling 
way for Bush to use theme to explain a messaging objective in a strategically meaningful way.  
In a couple of sections of the speech, the message painting Dukakis as a liberal also 
worked in tandem with the messaging objective regarding Bush’s commitment to conservatism. 
Theme was also partially useful in explaining the message in these sections. Strategic concerns 
were also ubiquitous in these examples. At a couple of points Bush makes lists filled with 
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distinctions between himself and Dukakis. In one listing, Bush claims at length that liberals want 
to take opportunity from young people, economic empowerment from women, and social 
security from the elderly. After describing that the liberals want to take each of these things, 
Bush says of all three, “I won’t let them take it away from you.” A second list comes up later in 
the speech. Bush calls attention to the pledge of allegiance, the death penalty, voluntary prayer, 
gun ownership, sanctity of life in the womb, not allowing weekend furlough, and lowering taxes. 
In a similar way to the first, Bush brings up each of these and says, “my opponent says no, and I 
say yes.” Two messaging objectives are present in each of these. Bush is a conservative, and 
Dukakis is a liberal. Bush is able to touch every issue that is wrapped up in his messaging 
objectives. Two themes are also implicit here. The liberals want to take economic freedom away 
because that is the nature of their politics according to the theme. George Bush however, 
applauds the individual and will not take these freedoms away in accordance with his theme. 
Notice that the thematic connection is there but it is tangential and weak. Where voters could not 
miss Reagan’s themes, Bush’s is easy to overlook. The strategic influence in this is clear and 
two-fold. First, Bush wants to appeal to the conservative voters. Second, he wants to draw a clear 
line between Dukakis and himself. In both of these ways the two sections of the speech identified 
here are successful.  
The final and greatest triumph of the speech in weaving theme and message together in a 
strategically useful way is Bush’s identification of America as “a thousand points of light.” Bush 
argues that his opponent sees America as a small collection of interest groups in Washington. 
The nation waits while these groups decide its fate. Contrastingly, Bush sees the individual as 
“the bright center” of America.  
“And radiating out from him or her is the family... to the community then on out to the 
town, the church and the school. And still echoing out to the county, the state, and the 
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nation; each doing only what it does well and no more. And I believe that power must 
always be kept close to the individual.” 
Bush goes on to say, “Government is part of the nation of communities. It’s not the whole just a 
part.” The message is clear: Bush is a conservative. The theme is crucial to explaining this. Since 
the individual is precious and the communities are at the heart of American life, Bush believes in 
limited government guided by “the People.” This serves as perhaps Bush’s best integration of 
positive theme with message. The theme makes the conservative message immeasurably more 
compelling by serving as an explanation of the political world. The strategic significance here is 
also great. By giving a compelling account of limited government, Bush is attempting to reach 
the conservatives that Reagan had assembled so proficiently.  
 Again, based on all the disadvantages the Bush campaign faced in utilizing theme, Bush’s 
convention speech was a rather successful effort. He was able to use theme to instruct messaging 
objectives to fulfill strategy. These appeals were weak and implied for the most part however. 
Unlike Reagan, Bush could not fully and unmistakably enumerate all his messaging objectives 
using theme. Also, even with the strong points addressed above, it is important to address some 
failures in theme. Though the “thousand points of light” section was undeniably populist, most of 
the speech lacked such appeals. For example, Bush missed serious opportunities to appeal to 
populism by constantly referring to himself. In the beginning he says, “I mean to run hard, to 
fight hard, to stand on the issues and I mean to win.” A person who is skilled at appealing to 
populism would have made this much more collective. “We” could be used here to refer to all 
the individuals and small communities that represented conservative interests. This would have 
tied in the theme of activism that was powerful. Even when Bush does use the pronoun “we” he 
refers to himself and Ronald Reagan. At the very end of the speech, a place reserved for the 
strongest rallying cry, Bush asks, “Who should sit behind that desk? My friends I’m that man 
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(CSPAN 2008).” Where Reagan used we (signifying the “true” America) constantly while 
outlining his accomplishments and ambitions, Bush used I. This was probably informed not only 
by a lack of theme that was populist in this was, but also because of the strategic need to build 
George Bush as a strong leader. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that Bush missed an 
opportunity to truly incorporate the powerful tool of populist theme in his acceptance speech.  
 If the picture was cloudy before this section, it may be no clearer now. It seems that 
Bush’s overall communication was a mixed bag. At times, the campaign was able to weave 
theme into messaging objectives while at other times they were not. It seems that the campaign 
had an extremely hard time connecting Bush’s image as a strong leader to any theme because he 
refused to be placed in such a situation. Contrastingly, because of the care taken to construct a 
theme of liberal government, the campaign seemed to be somewhat proficient at connecting 
theme and message when Dukakis was the target. In all cases though, the connection to theme is 
tangential and almost always implied. Compared to Reagan, Bush truly had a harder tie of 
relating messaging objectives inseparably with theme. However, in messaging objectives, the 
Bush campaign was very successful at strategic emphasis.  
Conclusion  
 The 1988 presidential election is sometimes considered one of the dirtiest in history. 
More important to this work, the race stands as an interesting case of the combination of many 
causal factors. Its political climate was entirely unique. The Reagan Revolution had shaken the 
foundations of American electoral politics. The Bush campaign needed to find a way to ride the 
wave while seeming unique. The themes that Bush constructed were on the whole much weaker 
than Reagan’s. They lacked clear antithesis, direct populist appeals, history, personal connection 
and compelling explanatory power. In terms of personality, the race is exceptional. Bush had 
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severe misgivings about using theme and disclosing personal attributes. However, Bush’s unique 
conception of campaigning left him willing to take on a variety of messaging objectives. Dukakis 
had reservations about responding to certain messages that turned into an enormous advantage 
for Bush. Lee Atwater is incomparable for his incredible competitiveness and brilliance in 
selecting messaging objectives and strategy, and working with the media. The strategies the 
campaign decided upon were incredibly logical to an almost cynical level. The messaging 
objectives selected were very closely related to each other and married inseparably not to theme, 
but to strategy. The campaign had a hard time connecting the character of George Bush to their 
available themes, but was much more successful in thematic connection when discussing its 
opponent. Through the analysis of specific messaging, this trend is identifiable. In negative 
messages attacking Dukakis, the campaign was at least able to implicitly tie in themes about 
liberal governance. Bush’s convention speech stood as the most successful attempt by George 
Bush of tying theme to messaging objectives in a strategically meaningful way. This is 
evidenced by the cutting of the speech into not one, but two ads used later by the campaign.  
 The take away in theme-driven messaging from this campaign is perhaps even more 
difficult to assess than the campaign itself. However, for the sake of this work an attempt must 
be made. A lot has to be said about political climate. The momentum of the Reagan revolution 
was something that the Bush campaign ended up utilizing. However, the political climate cannot 
account for too much here because Bush was behind in the polls by a significant margin at one 
point (Runkel, 1989). He could have quite easily lost the race. Strong themes were also not the 
focal point of this campaign as evidenced in the superficial connection of theme to messaging. 
Personality and strategy are very likely the most important considerations in this race. The 
strategy was simple enough: win a sufficient bloc of the conservative coalition that Reagan had 
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assembled. The personality referred to here is Lee Atwater’s. He knew that Bush would most 
likely lose the race if the issues were not actively defined by the Bush campaign. His ability to 
find salient messages for conservatives that played well for Bush like the pledge of allegiance 
and the prison furlough were important. His ability to control the media to make these issues 
those that defined the later part of the campaign is what probably saved Bush from defeat. The 
race turned from one about the economy to one about other tangential issues. These messaging 
objectives however, were not something that Bush had powerful encompassing themes to handle. 
This is why the connection of messaging objectives to themes was mostly tangential. However, 
Atwater saw these issues as the only path to victory and so the campaign adapted. Thus, the 
strategy that Atwater chose to win, compounded by Bush’s aversion to theme and the inherent 
weakness of the themes he did have at his disposal created a messages that were faithful to 
strategy and message, but not necessarily theme. 
 Moving forward it seems campaigns could learn a few things. First, that it really helps to 
appeal to Reagan or other popular Presidents leaving office. Second, going negative could work 
incredibly well under certain conditions. One condition was having an opponent that was both 
slow and emotionally hesitant to respond to attacks.  The second condition was to choose attacks 
that both the media and the electorate would find controversial and reference them constantly, 
resulting in “free play” of a message. Lastly, and most important to this work, was that playing 
offense, defining the agenda, and being creative about what messages would assemble a coalition 
and motivate the electorate could overpower an anemic collection of themes. George Bush 
admitted himself that he was not a charismatic individual. However, because Atwater was able to 
find “sticky issues,” harp on them incessantly, actively combat criticism with ad hominem 
attacks, and control the agenda, Bush proved victorious. Theme was no doubt still important in 
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elections moving forward. However, the lesson was that if you could not win with positive 
Reagan-like themes, victory could still be achieved through ruthless strategy and carefully 
selected messaging objectives.     




 George H.W. Bush’s reelection effort was plagued with difficulty from the outset. The 
political climate, the candidate’s personality, the strategy selected, and even his White House 
staff worked against Bush gaining a second term. These same factors also doomed any effort 
Bush may have made to incorporate theme into his messaging objectives to fulfill strategy. In the 
end, this election serves as a reminder that incumbents are not guaranteed anything in 
presidential elections. Without dedication and focus of resources and time, not only is reelection 
out of reach, but so too is the ability to utilize theme in messaging.  
Themes 
For all intents and purposes, the collection of themes that Bush had at his disposal in 
1992 was the same as it was in 1988. Still present, yet implied was Bush’s theme on the 
individual and limited government. More importantly, Bush still clung to the theme against 
liberal government and the dangerous policies they pursued in areas like the economy, crime, 
foreign policy, and religion. This religious theme did take on a somewhat new tone in 1992. 
Bush’s stance on abortion became a more important part of his thematic reserve. Though not 
clearly argued by the campaign for a number of strategic and political climate issues to be 
discussed, the theme seemed to argue that from the moment of conception, life was sacred. 
Except in cases of rape or health of the mother, terminating a pregnancy should not be allowed. 
The sacredness of life in this theme is a common appeal and comes from religious convictions. 
This particular theme was meant to be strategically significant. As will be seen, this theme was 
not incredibly useful to the strategy of the Bush ’92 campaign. The same can be said for the 
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themes Bush had at his disposal generally. For reasons of personal disposition, weak strategy and 
execution, and selection of messaging objectives the Bush campaign was incredibly ill suited for 
utilizing themes to pursue theme-driven messaging.  
There was also a new theme that Bush used in 1992 outlining his own convictions on 
foreign policy. Bush argued that in the post-Cold War world, America had a duty to defend 
freedom abroad and take necessary action to ensure that democracy is the government of choice 
in the developing world. This theme is essentially an adaptation of Reagan’s foreign policy 
theme for a new post-Soviet era. It is born from the Republican narrative’s assertions about 
foreign policy. The Republican was the strong leader in the defense of American interests and 
values abroad. This theme was actually quite important for the Bush campaign in messaging 
objectives. Though the theme was rarely explicit, it stands as a guiding principle for Bush’s 
messaging objectives of leadership and foreign policy credentials. However, this theme was 
weak in its lack of antithesis. With no archenemy in the form of the Soviet Union it seemed as 
though democracy and freedom were not really in mortal danger. Despite this weakness, this 
theme and related messaging objective were important for strategies undertaken by, though not 
necessarily effective for, the Bush reelection effort.  
This account of the themes available to the incumbent may seem very anemic. However, 
it is a true reflection of the strength of thematic appeals Bush had in his arsenal. If the 1988 
campaign struggled with thematic integration, the 1992 campaign was helpless in the pursuit. 
Characteristics of the political climate, the players, strategy, and the selected messaging 
objectives combined in a way that made successful utilization of theme nearly impossible for the 
Bush campaign.  
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Political Climate 
 The political climate at the time of the 1992 presidential election made the use of theme 
difficult for the Bush campaign. It also served to limit their selection of messaging objectives and 
aspects of strategy. The most important aspect of the political climate to this work is the 
economic conditions at the time. There was a noticeable economic recession in 1992 (Hall 2006, 
171). This downturn was inescapably bad for Bush. First, it made the economy the most salient 
issue in the upcoming campaign. James Carville put it best when he claimed: “It’s the economy 
stupid” (Hall 2006, 174). With 44% of people believing that the recession was a result of federal 
policies, the Bush campaign could not run on economic credentials (Hall 2006, 174). 
Furthermore, for Bush to salvage any potential for positively discussing the economy he would 
essentially have to say, “I feel your pain (Hall 2006, 171).” This presented enormous problems 
for the campaign. First, it would be admitting that his stance on the economy was wrong. Thus, 
his credibility in the economy would decrease even more. The campaign would be unable to 
control the agenda and play offense with the issue of the economy (Royer 1994, 109). This 
would also hurt Bush’s ability to utilize the tangential implied aspects of his theme that 
advocated for limiting government in the economy. Where Reagan’s theme on the economy had 
fulfilled itself with economic growth, Bush’s had proven itself to be wrong. This would make 
any thematic appeals to the economy impossible. The media actually made the problems the 
Bush campaign had in approaching the economy even worse. The media aided in the perception 
that the economic downturn was a result of federal policies. When Bush broke his “read my lips” 
promise and raised taxes, the media was there to remind the public of the inconsistency. This was 
not a conspiratorial decision on the part of the media. The blatant disconnect of Bush’s actions 
from his proclamation was irresistibly low-hanging fruit. Such a clear case of broken promises is 
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difficult to find and thus very advantageous for news outlets to highlight. Furthermore, the rise of 
all-day news stations made this reinforcement all the more prevalent. This killed Bush’s 
credibility not only in the economy, but in nearly all his comments and commitments. (Royer 
1994, 109). In all, the economy was the most salient issue of the 1992 election. What was 
troubling for the Bush campaign was that it was a negative for them in almost every way. Of 
particular importance in this work, the state of the US economy in 1992 negatively impacted the 
ability of the Bush campaign to utilize the already weak theme about limiting the government’s 
role in the economy.  
 As already discussed, the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War was an 
aspect of the political climate that would impact the ability of the Bush campaign to utilize 
theme. Since the threat of global communism was essentially gone, it seemed that democracy 
had triumphed as the dominant form of government. Though there would be issues of foreign 
policy (like the Gulf War), they were not the grand issues of bipolar antithesis the US had known 
for the previous forty plus years. As Mary Matalin, the political director of the Bush campaign 
said, the end of the Cold War “had taken defense and foreign policy off the table more than the 
Gulf War had put it back on (Royer 1994, 112).” This would harm the Bush campaign in 
integrating its foreign policy theme into messages of the same nature. Although America would 
be called upon to help nations fighting for freedom, the danger to peace and freedom was far less 
imminent than it had been a short time ago. Thus, the theme and messages would be far less 
compelling as a reason to elect Bush.  
 There were other minor issues of political climate that had an impact. One was Lee 
Atwater’s conception of an electoral cycle (Royer 1994, 20). Republicans had been in power for 
nearly twelve years by 1992. The electorate seems as though it may have had an impulse to 
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simply try something new. This would undoubtedly be tied to the poor economic outlook during 
the campaign. This issue would injure the campaign in its selection of messaging objectives as 
predicted in the first chapter. With limited messaging choices, the campaign would be unable to 
choose those that would have strong appeals to theme. Another issue was Bush’s job approval 
and right track wrong track ratings. By the time of the campaign, Bush’s job approval rating had 
plummeted by forty points to the lowest it had ever been (Royer 1994, xiv). Furthermore, by 
campaign time more than seventy percent of the electorate believed that the country was on the 
“wrong track” (Royer 1994, 112).  These types of numbers would limit the selection of 
messaging objectives and emphases of themes even further.  
 From the political climate, it is clear that the Bush campaign would have trouble not only 
utilizing theme, but simply winning reelection. The ability to control the agenda regarding the 
economy stood as a giant obstacle for the Bush campaign. Not only was the outlook negative, but 
all of his credibility had been destroyed in light of the economic numbers and broken promises. 
He could not use his weak theme of limited government because it had seemingly not been 
working. The Bush campaign was also limited in the realm of foreign policy. Without a strong 
antagonist, Bush’s preemptive foreign policy theme and related messages were not as compelling 
as one would hope. Bush’s approval ratings were a further limiting factor of political climate. He 
did not have freedom in selecting messages and themes in light of public opinion. Overall, the 
political climate was a serious issue for Bush’s use of theme and reelection.  
 
The Players 
 For the 1992 case, there are a host of players that are important to consider for this work. 
George Bush’s personal dispositions are of course central. Also important here is the “player” 
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that is composed of more than one person. The nature of the Bush White House was actually an 
important player in the 1992 race. The dynamics between it and the campaign held major 
consequences for the use of theme, selection of messaging objectives, and the execution of 
strategy. Also certain personal aspects of Bill Clinton served as important geneses of campaign 
messages. Ross Perot is also important in the disruption he created in the 1992 campaign. Certain 
aspects of Ross Perot’s personality made this disruption even greater and had a profound impact 
on strategy and messaging objectives. All of these players’ personal dispositions served in some 
way to constrain the ability of the Cush campaign to select messages, take effective strategic 
measures, and utilize theme in messaging.  
Like the section on theme, it is important to revisit Bush’s personal affectations in the 
way they uniquely impacted this race. Most fundamental to this analysis is Bush’s unshaking 
conviction that governing ought to be separate from campaigning. This underlying issue had 
several distinct impacts on the campaign. Throughout his administration, Bush refused to play 
politics. He would not discuss his accomplishments in a politically meaningful way. Resultantly, 
the public was largely unaware of the positive steps his administration may have taken 
domestically (Royer 1994, 19). This made defining the agenda even more difficult. This would 
affect the selection of messaging objectives and the use of theme in those messaging objectives. 
Bush’s unwillingness to act politically also affected the campaign in his resistance to begin 
campaign activities, and reluctance to campaign throughout the period. Bush knew that while he 
was campaigning, he could not govern (Jones 2006, 162). Since Bush enjoyed governing much 
more than campaigning, his commitment to reelection would be lower than necessary. This aloof 
attitude would not allow the campaign to be committed to theme. As discussed in the first 
chapter, a candidate that is emotionally removed from the messages of the campaign comes off 
Owens   
95 
as much less genuine. This was a major issue for the campaign. A final way that Bush’s 
detachment from campaigning impacted his reelection effort was his breaking of the “read my 
lips” promise. It was Bush’s belief in the violable nature of campaign promises that led him to 
make the promise in the first place. With no internal commitment to the promise, Bush did not 
mind breaking it. As discussed, he believed that people would understand that compromises had 
to be made. This clearly came back to bite Bush. People seemed to care that he had gone back on 
his promise. As just discussed in the political climate section, it largely ruined his credibility. 
This severely undermined the campaign’s ability to select messaging objectives and utilize 
theme. Bush’s belief in a separation of governance and campaigning clearly had profound 
impacts on his reelection effort. 
Bush’s distaste for rhetoric and inability to place himself in themes are other personal 
characteristics worth revisiting for their impact in 1992. Because Bush did not wish to partake in 
rhetoric, his campaign was unable to effectively use theme to connect to a number of messaging 
objectives including leadership and the economy. He approached these messages coldly. He 
could not effectively feel the voters’ pain in the economy (Hall 2006, 181). Without an 
emotional appeal to theme, his empathy did not seem genuine. With messaging objectives of 
leadership, the problems were two-fold. As in 1988, Bush could not insert himself in themes to 
prove his leadership skills. This was particularly harmful because a major messaging objective of 
the campaign alleged that Bill Clinton was a draft dodger that could not lead. Bush could not 
connect his service in the Navy to strong leadership in comparison to Clinton’s lack of such 
qualities. In these ways, Bush’s distaste of theme put his campaign at a disadvantage in utilizing 
theme in messaging objectives.  
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All of these personal attributes of Bush were compounded by the culture of his White 
House staff that actually constituted what this work would consider a player. In March of 1990, 
Lee Atwater was diagnosed with a brain tumor that took him off the political scene, and soon 
after, claimed his life. Immediately, the political communication from the Bush White House 
began deteriorating (Royer 1994, 108). John Sununu, the White House Chief of Staff, (with the 
backing of Bush) began erecting a wall between governing and politics (Royer 1994, 115). This 
was a major problem for the campaign because the White House still wrote Bush’s speeches for 
the campaign. There was little strategic coherence to communication coming from the White 
House. For example, the White House wrote Bush’s convention speech with no guidance from 
the campaign staff (Royer 1994, 217). This obviously had tremendous impact on the ability of 
the campaign to select messages, use themes, and execute strategy. Because they had little input 
into Bush’s written material, they were at the mercy of the White House staff. Because of the 
wall erected between governance and politics, the White House would be paying less than full 
attention to the polling numbers, strategic aims, and messaging objectives selected by the 
campaign. Without full attention, the messages often lacked coherence to messaging objectives 
and strategy. The “player” that was the staff of the White House clearly created massive 
problems in the campaign communication for Bush in 1992.  
In these two “players” we see that the possible seeds of destruction from ‘88 bloomed in 
‘92. Bush’s personal issues that could have killed the campaign in 1988 would haunt him in his 
reelection effort. His staff at the White House who, like their boss, did not commit to major 
campaigning activities that would involve the use of message and theme to pursue strategy 
compounded these problems. What is the explanation for this? It seems two factors are important 
to consider. First, in 1988 Bush did not have the ability to govern because he was seeking the 
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office for the first time. Since he was now the president, he could distract himself with 
governing. The mere existence of this distractive power may have account for some of the lack 
of commitment. Also important to consider is the absence of Lee Atwater. He demanded that 
everyone be committed to the messaging objectives, specific communication, and strategies of 
the campaign. He had a strong personality and a lot of skill. Without him, the Bush campaign 
may have been unable to demand this kind of control from the White House. Regardless of the 
cause, the lack of commitment to campaigning activities clearly had an effect on the Bush 
reelection effort in utilizing theme.  
Bill Clinton is an extremely interesting political figure. His personal life has been the 
subject of much investigation and interest. For the purposes of this work, there are only a few 
features personal background that are important. Each has to do with his past. The first important 
feature of Clinton’s past was his actions to avoid the draft. He did actively attempt to avoid 
conscription by asking an ROTC officer to excuse him from service (Royer 1994, 310). This 
served as an important personal fact that informed part of the Bush messaging objective of 
distrust for Bill Clinton due to his hesitation in admitting it. Similarly, it became known that 
Clinton made a trip to Moscow during the Cold War. This was implicitly connected to the Bush 
message of Clinton’s trustworthiness because he initially failed to admit it (Royer 1994, 270). 
Furthermore, Clinton had admitted to having extramarital affairs. This stood as an important 
attack point for the Bush campaign in the trust messaging objective. It also stood to be part of the 
strategy for the reelection effort. With the selection of trust as a major messaging objective for 
the Bush campaign, Clinton’s personal past became an important point of emphasis in 
communication. 
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The final player to be analyzed here is Ross Perot. He was able to achieve something 
unique in modern American politics. As an independent, he received nearly twenty percent of the 
national vote. This served as a major disruptive force to the political establishment. Ross Perot’s 
personal dispositions increased the disruption of his candidacy for the Bush campaign. First, 
Perot had a grassroots appeal. He gained a very diverse group of supporters. His main message 
was that Bush did not care about domestic issues (Royer 1994, 29). Perot was also very wealthy. 
He had the ability to essentially stay in the race in a relevant manner for as long as he wished. 
This made the disruption even greater. Perot staying in the race was not the greatest problem for 
the Bush campaign however. He actually seemed to take votes from Clinton due to his anti-Bush 
stance. Since the Bush campaign believed they could not reach a true majority in the electorate, 
they preferred Perot remain in the race. However, Perot did drop out for a time just before the 
Republican Convention. Because Perot was a very insular person, he advised no one of his 
decision. The Bush campaign was not ready for the announcement. They did not prepare for a 
two-candidate race (Royer 1994, 167). This left the Bush team with a strategy that was obsolete. 
Furthermore, Perot’s leaving gave many of his votes to Clinton. Even though Perot later rejoined 
the race, many of his supporters did not return and stayed with Clinton (Royer 1994). The 
complicated nature of this series of events serves to denote the impacts this had on the Bush 
campaign. The Perot saga left the Bush campaign with strategies that had to be drastically 
changed more than once. With Perot being in, then out, then in again, the Bush campaign had to 
reevaluate huge aspects of strategy. The strategies necessitated different messaging objectives. 
This erodes the coherence of the messages. With this lack of coherence it is even harder to apply 
messaging objectives to broad themes. In this way, Perot’s personal attributes and actions had an 
impact on all facets of Bush’s communication.  
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Strategy 
 The strategy for the Bush campaign in 1992 is difficult to track. Like many aspects of the 
campaign it was somewhat incoherent and not incredibly thought out. Though there was some 
emphasis on geography, like nailing down support in states like Wyoming and Montana, the 
strategy was essentially guided by the conviction that there was still a conservative majority in 
America (Royer 1994, 214,279). Seizing the conservative majority was the only way the Bush 
campaign believed reelection was possible. This was a big problem for the Bush campaign 
because at the outset of the campaign, around one third of Republicans did not support George 
Bush. This was aided on the right by the early candidacy of Pat Buchanan, and towards the 
middle by Ross Perot. The conviction led to two major issues of strategy. First was solidifying 
the right wing of the Republican Party. There seemed to be much distrust of Bush on the right 
(Royer 1994, 221). In the economy, he had raised taxes after vowing not to. His loss of 
credibility cannot be discounted. However, Bush also was distrusted in social issues. Throughout 
his administration, Bush had lost the full support of many social conservatives in the Religious 
Right. Bush believed that abortion was acceptable in the cases of rape or health of the mother. 
This was not a conservative enough position for the Religious Right that largely believed that 
abortion is not permissible. Also, Bush had invited gay leaders into the White House. This 
implicit condoning of homosexual lifestyles angered many in the Religious Right (Jones 2006, 
150). These problems of conservative distrust led the Bush campaign to move to the right, 
particularly on social issues due to the lack of a method for discussing the economy positively. 
This actually caused the campaign to select a pro-life messaging objective that ended up 
becoming awkward and further undermined the effectiveness of the campaign communication. 
This also aided in the selection of the Clinton distrust message that was central to the campaign.  
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The other strategic impetus was getting the conservatives that Perot had toward the 
middle. These people were primarily concerned with domestic issues, especially the economy. 
One superficial sub-strategy to accomplish this was to tell the electorate not to waste their vote 
on the unviable Perot (Royer 1994, 174). This did not really work well and added to the populist 
appeal of Ross Perot as an outsider. Thus, the Bush campaign had to try to approach the 
economy. This led them to the selection of two messaging objectives. They would attempt to 
show Bush’s strong leadership in foreign policy, and then pivot to the importance of this skill for 
the economy. This was a very difficult strategy because it depended on three things. First, that 
the voters were aware of “domestic policies” and “past achievements.” Second, that “the 
president would get credit for foreign policy achievements.” Lastly, it depended on the recovery 
of the economy (Royer 1994, 18). It is not difficult to see that only one of these things would end 
up happening. The first requirement would not be met because the White House had been 
unskilled at outlining Bush’s accomplishments and would continue to create his communication. 
The third requisite also did not end up happening, which was largely unlucky for the campaign. 
The second requirement did happen, due to the commitment of the campaign and Bush to 
outlining this messaging objective. However, without the other two, this strategy was doomed to 
fail. It will be shown that efforts were made to pursue this strategy. However, with all the 
problems of theme use and general communication that plagued the Bush campaign, this was not 
done successfully.  
The overarching problem with this strategy is quite apparent. The campaign had 
committed itself to both moving to the right and the middle. The strategy is more divergent than 
coherent. Of course, the campaign had a hard time with the dynamic nature of the Perot 
candidacy. However, with the Bush campaign expecting and hoping that Perot would remain in 
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the race it seems they were committed to the divergence. With such an incoherent strategy, it 
follows that the messaging objectives selected would either be scattered or ignore one half of the 
strategy. It seems that the Bush campaign would end up favoring the “going right” approach. 
This would probably be guided by their belief that Perot staying in the race would allow them to 
win without any type of majority. Regardless of the reasoning, the strategy committed to by the 
Bush campaign would have impacts on the messaging objectives selected and themes they would 
weakly attempt to integrate.  
Messaging Objectives 
 With all of this said, it is not difficult to imagine that the messaging objectives selected 
by the Bush campaign were highly constrained and not easily tied to themes. In terms of political 
climate, the Bush campaign was forced to try to adopt an economic messaging objective and 
abandon a positive theme regarding foreign policy. With the personality of the candidate and the 
nature of the White House staff, the campaign could only truly pursue a few messaging 
objectives. Of all the campaigns discussed to this point, this one seems to be the most 
constrained in selection of messaging objectives. The selection of messaging objectives and their 
emphasis in 1992 really took place over time. The campaign had planned to roll out different 
messaging objectives in phases, which is not uncommon. However, the rollout of messaging 
objectives was disrupted several different times.  
 The campaign planned to begin with Bush’s leadership credentials in the Gulf War. Bush 
was portrayed as a strong leader that defended freedom abroad. This was a good messaging 
objective for the Bush campaign because it seems to be the one messaging objective that Bush 
himself enjoyed talking about (Jones 2006, 161). He saw this as the shining moment of his 
administration. For reasons already briefly mentioned this was not an incredibly strong 
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messaging objective overall. Due to the political climate (the recession and the collapse of the 
USSR), voters were much more concerned with the economy than foreign policy. The Bush 
campaign could possibly try to make this the main issue of the campaign, but the weakness of the 
theme on foreign policy prevented this from happening. Without the enemy of the Soviet Union, 
people were not incredibly concerned with issues of defense. For these reasons of political 
climate and weak theme, the foreign policy messaging objective proved to be much less useful 
than the Bush campaign might have hoped. 
 The next messaging objective that the Bush campaign wished to move to was in Bush’s 
ability to turn around the economy. This took on two different points of argument. The first was 
that Bush’s abilities to positively impact foreign relations would improve the economy. With the 
new allies and democracies Bush was attempting to create abroad, the US would get access to 
new markets for products and trading partners (Royer 1994, 18). This seems to be a good 
argument for the strength of an export economy. However, the Bush campaign still could not 
control the agenda on this issue. The voters and Bush’s opponents demanded a domestic 
economic plan not an argument that hinged on foreign policy. The inability to define the agenda 
again undermined Bush’s ability to articulate a positive message. Thus, the messaging objective 
of strengthening the economy took on its second enumeration. This part of the messaging 
objective involved Bush admitting that the economy was not performing well and proving that he 
had a plan to revive it. Bush had to show “that he had a connection with people’s problems, and 
that he had a plan (Royer 1994, 108).” He had to simultaneously admit that the country was on 
the wrong track and argue that he was the man to bring it back. The awkwardness of this 
message is obvious. However, it was not a guaranteed failure if the campaign tread carefully. 
Unfortunately though, the articulation of this messaging objective also proved to be weak and 
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incomplete (Royer 1994, 183). The first issue was that Bush’s plan was released relatively late. 
This seemed to stem from the problems of communication between the White House and the 
campaign. The White House was responsible for enumerating the plan; but, as has been shown, 
the White House constantly dragged its feet on campaign activities. Secondly, and also as a 
result of the “wall” between the White House and the campaign, the messaging objective was not 
consistent. After a speech at the Detroit Economic Club, at which the President said that he 
would lower taxes and decrease regulation, the messaging objective was not consistently 
reinforced (Hall 2006, 186). Since the White House did not commit to the campaign, they did not 
stay on the economic messaging objective. To the dismay of the campaign, it simply could not 
convince the White House to reinforce Bush’s positive economic message due to its preference 
of the foreign policy theme. Without repetition, it was impossible to explicitly integrate the 
theme regarding limited government in the economy. Furthermore, the inability of the Bush 
campaign to deliver these positive economic messaging objectives due to both the political 
climate and issues of communication forced it to drop the economy as a major messaging 
objective. Strategically, this is obviously a major problem because the economy was the most 
salient issue of the 1992 election. Without a strong conservative messaging objective on the 
economy, the Bush campaign was severely handicapped in tapping into the conservative 
majority they believed to exist in the electorate.  
 With the economic messaging objective essentially disposed of, the Bush campaign was 
forced to turn to a messaging objective that espoused Bush’s conservative view on social issues 
(Royer 1994, 216). This was guided by the strategy of assembling a conservative voting bloc 
while not focusing on the economy. In the end, the adoption of this as a messaging objective 
proved to be very subtractive for the Bush campaign. Due to the campaign of Pat Buchannan, the 
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Bush campaign felt that it must move right on social issues to eliminate the one third of 
Republicans that did not support Bush. The most important aspect of this messaging objective 
was the stance on abortion. For the official platform, the campaign met with members of the 
Religious Right. They decided on a “’big tent’” solution that incorporated the views of the right 
wing of the party (Royer 1994, 213). William Kristol of the Bush campaign admitted that they 
did not know how to “handle” the base on the abortion issue (Royer 1994, 221). The messaging 
objective ended up becoming awkward for the Bush campaign, as Bush had previously argued 
that abortion should be permissible in the cases of rape and health of the mother.  Bush did not 
really appear genuine in his espousal of this message. The distrust of Bush from the right was not 
really mended and the messaging objective was somewhat avoided in the communication. 
Without explicitly arguing for this messaging objective, it clearly could not be tied to themes 
regarding the sanctity of human life. Exit polls seem to suggest that religious voters were not 
compelled to vote for bush as a result of these weaknesses. In 1988, Bush had collected 63.9% of 
the Mainline Protestant vote and 69.4% of the Evangelical Protestant vote. In 1992, Bush 
received only 40% and 55.1% from these respective groups. This outcome represented a 
fracturing of the normally very solid voting bloc of social conservatives for Republican 
candidates (Djupe, Olson 2003, 370-1). This messaging objective was thus not very strategically 
significant, nor could it be explained strongly with a theme.  
 With all of these possible positive messaging objectives untenable, the campaign was 
then forced to take on negative messaging objectives regarding Bill Clinton (Royer 1994, 191). 
This messaging objective took on two aspects for the Bush campaign: “taxes and trust (Royer 
1994, 281).” The “taxes” aspect of this messaging objective consisted of attacks on Bill Clinton’s 
record in Arkansas. The Bush campaign argued that Clinton had raised taxes in Arkansas and 
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increased government spending on programs like Welfare. This messaging objective would seem 
to be strategically significant. If the Bush campaign could effectively argue that Clinton would 
raise taxes, it would rally the conservative majority to the polls. In thematic integration, this 
messaging objective could also prove useful. If the Bush campaign could connect this messaging 
objective to the theme opposing liberal government the message would be all the more 
compelling. However, this could not be accomplished. As has been argued, the Bush reelection 
campaign simply could not incorporate broad themes due to personal and institutional forces. 
This forced the campaign to espouse this messaging objective using statistics and numbers. The 
campaign soon found that this type of evidence was not compelling to the electorate. Voters were 
confused by the numbers and did not know what to make of it. Thus, the inability of the Bush 
campaign to utilize theme effectively took this aspect of messaging objective off the table.  
 The “trust” aspect of this messaging objective was that which was most heavily utilized 
by the Bush campaign. It seems that this came about of pure necessity. Like in 1988, the Bush 
campaign could not assert a positive theme-driven message and was thus forced to rely heavily 
on negative character attacks. The character attacks on Bill Clinton came in numerous forms. 
The main and explicit form of attack was based on Clinton’s objection to the Vietnam War and 
subsequent evasion of the draft. The story is complicated and Clinton was never charged with 
any wrongdoing. Essentially, Clinton had demonstrated disagreement with the war throughout 
his years at Oxford. Clinton then attempted several tactics to avoid fighting in Vietnam. This 
included joining and then disaffiliating from an ROTC program so that he would not have to 
enter combat and an apparent attempt by his uncle to put him in the Navy Reserves. Regardless 
of what truly happened, the Bush campaign attempted to argue that Clinton was being dishonest 
about his past (Royer 1994, 192). The Bush campaign demanded answers and claimed that 
Owens   
106 
someone who had lied about their past and may have avoided serving their country had no 
business becoming commander-in-chief. In a similar attack, the Bush campaign found that 
Clinton had lied about traveling to Moscow while abroad. The campaign questioned his motives 
for lying again. These attacks from the Bush campaign were also implicitly linked to other issues 
regarding Clinton’s character. Though the campaign never explicitly mentioned Clinton’s 
infidelity or use of marijuana, the issues of trust that they raised were undoubtedly tied to his 
overall character. Strategically, these messaging objectives could be useful in capturing 
conservatives. Since all of these attacks insinuated a non-traditional lifestyle, social 
conservatives may be compelled to flock to the polls to ensure that Clinton did not get elected. 
However, the messaging objectives were not very compelling. The political climate dictated that 
the economy was the most salient issue in the election. Character attacks, though highly covered, 
did not have a lot of impact on vote choice. Furthermore, the Bush campaign could not make this 
message more compelling because no themes were readily available to make Clinton’s character 
a major factor. To truly motivate the social conservatives, the Bush campaign would have had to 
connect Clinton’s character to broad themes. There was no such theme available and the White 
House was uncommitted to campaigning. These factors made the Clinton attacks less compelling 
than they may have been.  
 There are several important aspects to consider about this collection of messaging 
objectives as a whole. First is the way they came about. Each subsequent messaging objective 
came as a result of the failure of the previous one. The foreign policy was tossed because it was 
irrelevant to voters and could not be made relevant because of the political climate and inability 
of Bush to incorporate broad themes to make it salient. The resultant economic objective of 
messaging was disposed of due to the lack of reinforcement by repetition and strong theme. The 
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last effort at a positive messaging objective came with social issues. This too proved ineffectual 
due again to the salience of the economy and lack of explicit connection to a deep theme given 
by Bush. It was an awkward message for the campaign to approach. With a lack of options in the 
positive realm, the campaign went negative against Clinton to rally conservatives. The more 
substantive and policy-based attacks against Clinton failed due to the inability and unwillingness 
of Bush and the White house to provide coherent and theme-driven communication. With all 
other options exhausted, the campaign went after Clinton’s character. This messaging objective 
unavoidably had no connection to theme and was brushed off by the electorate in preference of 
economic concerns. In all, the arc of messaging objectives used by the Bush campaign devolved 
over time with less and less potential to appeal to theme.  
Specific Communication  
 With the disheveled nature of the Bush campaign described above, it is clear that their 
communication would face serious issues in coherence and connection of messaging objective to 
theme in a strategically useful way. A few specific examples of communications are illustrative 
of the different types of issues the Bush campaign faced in espousing messaging objectives with 
theme to aid in strategy. Two 30-second television ads display two different ways the Bush 
campaign struggled in this type of communication. Also evident of Bush’s issues of thematic 
integration into messaging objectives was a uniquely awkward question-and-answer interaction 
in one of the debates. Furthermore, like the previous two chapters, the acceptance speech at the 
RNC will be analyzed. In this case, Bush exhibited his common problems in utilizing theme and 
also touching on appropriate messaging objectives that would be useful. These problems most 
likely came from the problems of communication between the White House and the campaign. 
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In all the specific communication attempts outlined here show the overall weakness of the Bush 
campaign in thematic integration.  
The first piece of communication to be analyzed here was a 30-second television ad that 
will be referred to here as “Breakfast.” It opens with the words “Breakfast, St. Louis. After the 
Debate” appearing on screen. Then, the commercial turns to several different patrons of a 
restaurant giving their reactions to the debate. The first three patrons speak of the confidence 
they have in Bush, and that he is necessary to check a Democratic Congress. The next says, “I 
don’t trust Clinton.” The next: “The man says one thing and does another.” Another says, “First 
he denies it then he says: ‘well maybe it happened.’ You can’t trust him.” The ad cuts to another 
saying, “If Clinton gets in what we’re going to see is more taxes.” The ad cuts a final time and a 
man says that he supports Bush because he “remember(s) what happened the last time we did 
things the way Bill Clinton wants to do them (Youtube 2008).” This ad is deeply symbolic of the 
general problems that the Bush campaign had with communication in 1992. In thirty seconds, the 
commercial covered all of the campaign’s major messaging objectives. Strategically this is 
useful because it attempts to assemble the conservative majority against taxes and Clinton’s 
character. However, the manner in which the commercial accomplished this was incredibly 
ungraceful. The bustling restaurant takes away from the clarity of the message. The constant 
cutting to different people makes the disjointed nature of the jumps in messaging objectives even 
clearer. In terms of messaging objectives, the commercial fails to develop them using theme and 
simply goes through a list. The themes cannot be touched upon because the sound bytes used are 
so short. Furthermore, the attacks against Bill Clinton’s character have no corresponding themes. 
Since they make up a majority of the advertisement, thematic connection is impossible. The only 
statement in the commercial that has a chance to appeal to theme is the final one. The man’s 
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condemnation of Democratic leadership implicitly ties to the theme regarding dangerous liberal 
leadership. However, this is undercut due to the time devoted to this man’s view and the manner 
of the shot. The man is on camera a total of seven seconds. He is unable to give any specific 
negative aspects that Democrats bring to national government. Furthermore, though all of the 
video segments in the advertisement are shaky, this is the shakiest and most poorly shot. During 
his seven seconds of air time the camera literally moves away from the man’s face more than 
once and dramatically loses focus. This movement distracts from whatever point the man may 
have been making. In all, this commercial showcased the larger issues of the campaign’s 
communication. Its messaging objectives were numerous and lacked coherence and strength in 
repetition. This was pretty much an issue of the campaign on the macro-level. The ad largely 
ignored theme because it focused on the messaging objective attacking Bill Clinton. The one 
time it could have seized upon strong themes, the attempt was cut short and distorted. This too 
was a common occurrence throughout the campaign due to the lack of commitment and 
communication between the White House and the campaign.  
Another television ad that shows the weakness of the Bush campaign in communicating 
messaging objectives was entitled “Governor Doublespeak” (Royer 1994). It opens with a 
“Welcome to Arkansas sign.” A narrator says, “To pay his increased spending in Arkansas, Bill 
Clinton raised state taxes, and not just on the rich.” It goes on to list some of the taxes Clinton 
established or raised while videos of things like cash registers, mobile homes, and motel signs. In 
between some of these videos a sped up video of Clinton signing a bill with an applauding 
audience plays in the background. The advertisement goes on to say, “Now, if elected President, 
Bill Clinton has promised to increase government spending by $220 Billion. Guess where he’ll 
get the money?” In terms of messaging objectives, this advertisement is very coherent. It is 
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clearly an attack on Bill Clinton’s record on taxes. Again, this works to collect votes from 
conservatives that dislike taxes. However, the commercial completely ignores appeals to theme. 
The increase of taxes has a tangential place in Bush’s theme against liberals, but the commercial 
largely ignores the connection. It does not argue why the taxes are dangerous to America in any 
way. All that this really implies is that people would rather keep their money than lose it. The 
lack of thematic appeal combined with the bluegrass music in the background and some comical 
visuals makes the commercial less compelling and serious. In all, the advertisement is really just 
a list of taxes Clinton has increased. This again seems to be symptomatic of the campaign on a 
large scale. Because there was no way for Bush to assert a positive message, the campaign had to 
turn to messaging objectives that it could not implicitly connect to themes.  
One interaction during a debate seems to show the problems Bush had with connecting 
theme to messaging objectives. During the second debate, an audience member asked Bush how 
the national debt “personally affected” his life. She continued “if it hasn’t how can you honestly 
find a cure for the economic problems of the common people if you have no experience in 
what’s ailing them?” Bush begins by saying “I think the national debt affects everybody. 
Obviously, it has a lot to do with interest rates.” The asker interrupts saying “you on a personal 
basis, how has it affected you?” He says, “I’m sure it has. I love my grandchildren I want to 
think that they’re going to be able to afford an education.” Bush then says that he does not 
understand the question. He asks if she is “suggesting that if somebody has means, the national 
debt doesn’t affect them?” The asker restates her question. At this point Bush looks very 
confused. Eventually, he says,  
“you ought to be in the White House for a day and hear what I hear… I was in the Lomax 
AME Church…and I read in the bulletin about teenage pregnancies about the difficulty 
that families are having to make ends meet. I talk to parents. You’ve got to care; 
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everybody cares that people aren’t doing well. I don’t think its fair to say, ‘you haven’t 
had cancer; therefore you don’t know what its like (Youtube 2007).’” 
This exchange evidences perfectly the problems Bush had with incorporating theme into 
messaging objectives. The question clearly prompts a response regarding the economy. As 
described and evidenced here, Bush could not effectively feel the voters’ pain with their 
economic woes (Medhurst 2006). The question was extremely hard for Bush to answer. As a 
very affluent man, the national debt (what the asker really meant was the recession) could not 
affect him in the ways that it would common people. Thus, the majority of this interaction was 
spent by Bush fumbling around with the semantics of the askers wording. What resulted was an 
awkward, and less than genuine answer to a question that demanded an emotional and thematic 
appeal. If Bush could have tied his response to a broad limited government theme, he may have 
successfully pursued the economic messaging objective. However, this interaction showed a 
complete lack of ability to do this on Bush’s part.  
As in all presidential campaigns, the convention speech was an important moment for the 
Bush campaign in 1992.  Like all the examples of communication outlined in this chapter, it 
showed the problems the Bush reelection campaign had with communication. Theme-based 
messaging that fulfilled objectives were few and weak due in some cases to the unwillingness of 
Bush to use theme, and in others because of the lack of thematic connection. The writers at the 
White House that penned the speech overemphasized messaging objectives that were largely 
irrelevant to the electorate. Other messaging objectives were approached awkwardly. In all, the 
speech fails in delivering messaging objectives in strategically useful ways that are informed by 
theme.  
The first and most obvious weakness of Bush’s acceptance speech in the realms of 
messaging objectives and theme was Bush’s emphasis on foreign policy. The speech seemed to 
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revolve around international issues. Approximately the first half of the speech deals directly with 
issues of national security. He talks for a while about his mission aimed at “defending our 
security and promoting the American ideal abroad.” He spends a few minutes outlining his 
accomplishments, focusing largely on the Gulf war. He argues “we did what was right and what 
was necessary. We destroyed a threat, freed a people, and locked a tyrant in the prison of his own 
country.” He does connect this to American improvement saying that “a safer world means a 
stronger America.” He says that his method of improving the economy is to “look forward, to 
open new markets, prepare our people to compete, to restore our social fabric, to save and invest 
so we can win.” This clearly references the Bush campaign’s messaging objective of strong 
foreign policy spurring economic growth. Throughout this section he also outlines Democratic 
and Clintonian opposition to these positive actions. He says that during the Cold War, Democrats 
advocated for a “nuclear freeze.”  They wanted to negotiate and appease dictators.  
This is a moment where Bush actually connected theme with an objective of messaging. 
He compares his strength in foreign policy to Democratic weakness. The weakness of Democrats 
is a direct tie to his theme about dangerous liberal leadership. Though this is a strong point in 
that regard, the larger picture shows its weakness. As discussed extensively, the electorate did 
not care to hear about the foreign policy messaging objective. The economy was at the front of 
their minds. Bush quips, “In his acceptance speech he (Clinton) devoted just 65 seconds to 
telling us about the world.” This was not a mistake by Clinton. It was his campaign’s recognition 
that domestic issues dominated this election. Thus, though this part of the speech demonstrated 
relatively strong thematic integration, strategically it was a waste. Clinton did not err in spending 
a short amount of time on the issue. The mistake was Bush’s for wasting half of his speech on an 
irrelevant messaging objective. The communication issues between the campaign and the White 
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House, coupled with Bush’s commitment to the foreign policy messaging objective undoubtedly 
caused this waste of precious speech time. Thus, factors of organization and personality caused 
this strategically insignificant message to be overemphasized, even if it had a connection to 
theme.  
Talking about the Democratic congress was another completely incoherent message that 
Bush spent an inordinate amount of time on in his acceptance speech. This message was not a 
major messaging objective of the campaign. It was featured in some communication to explain 
why Bush had taken certain actions, specifically his breaking of the “read my lips” promise. 
However, the campaign had no comprehensive engagement with this message. Bush spends 
more than a couple of minutes talking about the gridlock in Washington. He laments that he 
could not pass a balanced budget amendment or a line item veto. He talks about the commitment 
he would have to the incoming members of congress to protect them from special interests. 
Although this does have a connection with Bush’s themes about limited government and the 
importance of the individual, all of this is completely disconnected from any strategy or 
messaging objective that the campaign decided to focus on. Again the organizational wall 
between the White House and the campaign seems to account for this. Talking about pursuing 
legislation shows the commitment the White House had to governing over campaigning. Again, 
the White House speechwriters who penned the acceptance speech disrupted the campaign 
communication negatively by wasting time on an irrelevant messaging objective. 
Aside from the two above messages, attacks on Bill Clinton in the areas of “taxes and 
trust” were the most prevalent part of the speech. In the “trust” area, Bush made several quick 
references to character. In the very beginning of the speech Bush asserts that the election is in 
some part “about character.”  He also made a light reference to the trust issue when discussing 
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his foreign policy achievements. He claims that if he predicted the way the world looked in 1992 
during his first campaign the voters would have said: “George Bush you must have been 
smoking something, and you must have inhaled.” This is an illusion to Clinton admitting that he 
tried, but did not inhale, marijuana. It quickly touches on the trust messaging objective because 
Clinton had been hesitant to admit it. Strategically this could be a tad useful in gaining 
conservative votes from those adamantly opposed to drugs and those who cared about trusting 
leaders. However, it is much too quick to be really useful. Bush again hits the “trust” messaging 
objective when he discusses Bill Clinton’s views on the Gulf War. Clinton had said that he was 
not really in support of it but would have voted for it in a close vote. He says that this was 
reminiscent of the “slippery when wet” road sign. It implied that Americans could not trust 
Clinton to make the tough decisions. Bush got at this messaging objective more when he talked 
about a balanced budget amendment. He argues that Clinton is “for balanced budgets. But he 
came out against the amendment. He's like that on a lot of issues, first on one side, then the other. 
He's been spotted in more places than Elvis Presley.” This remark implies that Americans cannot 
trust Clinton on the views that he holds. All of these “trust” statements were strategically useful. 
They may have helped to assemble a conservative bloc that cared about leadership. However, 
thematic connection is missing. Because they are essentially character assaults, they are too 
specific to connect to broad themes. Though clever, these quips are not extremely compelling 
because they do not connect to any theme. 
Bush also took Clinton to task on the “taxes” messaging objective. These attacks also 
lacked connection to broad theme. He spends a moment outlining Clinton’s plan to increase 
government spending and implement “the biggest tax increase in history, $150 billion.” This is a 
legitimate area of disagreement that Bush could exploit. He could outline why, in accordance 
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with his themes on limited government and the liberal, this is dangerous to progress because it 
puts too much burden on the individual. However, Bush chooses to make the argument much 
more superficial. He jokes, “You've heard of the separation of powers. Well, my opponent 
practices a different theory: the power of separations. Government has the power to separate you 
from your wallet.” The crowd laughs loudly and the joke is clever. However, making a serious 
policy into a lighthearted joke makes the argument much less compelling. As has been shown, 
Bush did not enjoy weaving theme into messaging objectives. This is probably the reason that 
this strategically significant and objective-driven message lacked any connection to theme.  
As mentioned in the section on messaging objectives, the abortion issue was an awkward 
message for Bush to approach. However, it was strategically imperative that Bush push right on 
this message to reconcile the great distrust of him on the right. The convention speech failed 
miserably in making this a strong message and connecting it to any theme. While discussing the 
importance of the family Bush says, “I happen to believe very deeply in the worth of each 
individual human being, born or unborn (Miller Center).” This is literally all that Bush says on 
the subject of abortion. He does not outline any policy suggestion or plan of action to protect 
unborn children. Furthermore, he does not explain why he believes this by utilizing a broad 
theme about the importance of preserving life. Thus, Bush awkwardly skirts around the 
messaging objective that could repair his relationship with the Religious Right. This failure 
undoubtedly came from the inability of the campaign to “handle the base” on this issue. They did 
not know how to comprehensively pursue the messaging objective in a strategically meaningful 
way, so they simply dropped a token sentence regarding the issue into the speech.  
In all, Bush’s 1992 convention speech showcases the issues that the campaign had with 
communicating messaging objectives in a coherent, strategically significant way with connection 
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to theme. Unimportant messaging objectives like foreign policy and the Democratic Congress 
were incredibly overemphasized due to the convictions of the White House staff that refused to 
be responsive to the campaign.  The speech also could not incorporate attacks on Clinton’s 
character because they do not easily mesh with any broad theme. Bush’s distaste of theme kept 
him from connecting attacks on Clinton’s fiscal policy to the theme regarding liberal leadership. 
The messaging objective on social issues took on a characteristically awkward form in the 
speech. Because the campaign did not know how to effectively approach the issue, the speech 
included only a solitary sentence regarding abortion, a major facet of the social issues messaging 
objective. All of these factors combined to create a speech that failed to integrate theme into 
messaging objectives to effectively pursue strategies.  
A pattern is clear in the specific messages assessed here. The issues visible in the 
messaging were symptomatic of macro-issues of the campaign. The inability to commit to and 
fully articulate messaging objectives using theme was a problem that plagued each of these 
messages and the campaign’s communication. The problems were brought on by the previously 
described issues of campaign organization, personality, political climate and strategy. The nature 
of the messaging objectives constrained the use of theme. Messaging objectives had to be 
changed quickly because none of them could be fully articulated. The White House’s 
uncommitted attitude left the campaign helpless in asserting the messaging objectives it desired 
in a theme-driven manner. In effect, the problems described throughout this chapter played out in 
entirely logical ways in specific communication. 
Conclusion 
 The issues of the Bush reelection effort are perhaps best encapsulated in a comparison. If 
the stars seemed to align for Reagan in 1984 to poise him for success, they seemed to align to set 
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Bush up for disaster in 1992. While Reagan was well disposed to perfectly utilize theme in 
messaging objectives that pursued strategy, Bush seemed destined to fail in such a pursuit. 
Bush’s collection of themes was weak from the outset. He was forced to run for reelection in the 
midst of an economic downturn. The foreign policy foe of the Soviet Union had vanished. He 
was seeking to commit the country to sixteen years of uninterrupted Republican presidency. The 
candidate himself was reluctant to stop governing and begin campaigning. He also had an innate 
dislike of rhetorical practices. His White House staff was equally uncommitted to campaign 
activities and would not coordinate with the campaign. The incumbent’s strategic outlook was 
less that optimal. He had move to the right, while appealing to the Perot coalition from all over 
the spectrum.  
These factors constrained the campaign in its selection of messaging objectives. They 
preferred to start with foreign policy and use it to get at the economy. This did not work as the 
electorate was concerned with domestic economics. Bush’s economic message was late and not 
well articulated. He tried to use social issues to find a useful, positive theme but this proved 
awkward. With no other option the Bush campaign took to attacking Clinton on “trust and 
taxes.” Though the messaging objectives were numerous, they all had a common lack of 
thematic appeal due to the force of pretty much every factor discussed in this chapter. The 
resultant communication was as disjointed as would be expected. The campaign could not put 
together coherent, theme-driven messages, and the heavy hand of the White House staff ensured 
that the convention speech would fail in the same ways and waste time.  
It is often a sin in academic work to attribute the occurrence of an event to “everything.” 
However, it seems that this may be appropriate in assessing why the Bush campaign failed to 
utilize theme in 1992. This notwithstanding, there seem to be a couple of factors to note. It is 
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useful to analyze differences between the two Bush campaigns. Bush was still the same Bush. He 
hated rhetoric and campaigning. Bush was not the President in 1988 however. He did not have 
the distraction of his administration to prevent him from committing to the campaign. Also 
missing in 1992 was Lee Atwater. Aside from his skills in manipulating the media, his 
commitment to staying on message, which he demanded of all involved in the campaign, was 
missing. If he had enforced this commitment with the White House, the communication could 
have been more coherent. This can also be formulated without reference to Lee Atwater 
specifically. Atwater, or someone like him, may have also been able to manipulate messaging 
objectives to be more compelling and fit into themes in some way. If someone was able to 
commit the White House to the campaign, define the agenda, connect themes more effectively to 
the messaging objectives, and find a way out of the paradoxical strategy taken by Bush ’92, the 
campaign may have been successful. However, no such force arose. Essentially, where the Bush 
campaign in 1988 was able to save their candidate from himself by taking complex strategy, 
choosing innovative messaging objectives, and producing useful messages, the 1992 campaign 
was unable to do so. The lesson here is somewhat simple. With a candidate and White House 
staff that is uncommitted and unhelpful in integrating theme into messaging objectives, 
incumbents with issues in the political climate, issues of personality, and issues of strategy 
cannot win reelection.   




 Departing from the format of the previous three chapters, this chapter will take a more 
surveyed approach to each of Republican presidential general election campaigns from 1996 to 
2012. The analysis will be of a similar focus. Namely attempting to identify narrative-based 
themes that were used in campaign messaging. The factors that will not be as deeply analyzed in 
this chapter include personality and specific communication. Though not as in depth, this 
analysis is important in discussing the ways that each candidate has extracted themes from the 
available Republican narrative and uses them to espouse messaging objectives that were 
strategically useful.   
1996 
 The election of 1996 is, in all, not a compelling case study in the realms of concern in this 
work. All told, less than half of all eligible voters cast a vote in the election. Bob Dole faced 
numerous obstacles to unseat Bill Clinton who was a popular incumbent. Dole was able to form 
an optimistic theme regarding the individual. However, factors of political climate, Dole’s 
image, the nature of his opponent’s campaign, the strategy decided upon by his campaign, and 
the lack of execution in strategy and messaging resulted in a very election effort overall. The 
campaign was especially unskilled in integrating theme into messaging objectives.  
 Bob Dole had essentially one broad theme at his disposal in 1996. Much like George 
H.W. Bush’s theme, it centered around protecting the individual and the family. However, 
Dole’s theme had more specific assertions regarding the basis of individual greatness and 
morality. Dole’s theme argues that doing the right thing is what the individual does so well. 
Good people in America act on the concepts of God, family, honor, duty, and country. These 
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people are what make America great. They start families and raise children in effective ways. 
Dole asserts that his life is evidence of this theme. He grew up poor with parents that worked 
hard and made it on their own. From their dedication he was able to live the life he did. The 
theme then posits that there is an enemy to these individuals: Democrats. Dole argues that in the 
past, the individual was allowed autonomy, but the Democrats have since corrupted it in pursuit 
of material wealth. They have violated the commitment to morality over economic success. They 
extract too much from the worker in taxes in order to fund their government programs. They also 
take away the ability of the family to raise children effectively by taking away educational 
choices (CNN 1997).  
 In all, this theme is somewhat strong. It contains the values, history, personal appeal, and 
antithesis that were so useful to Ronald Reagan and are available in the broader Republican 
narrative. The Democrats clearly pose a threat to all of the positive things that the individual 
does in society. Dole’s vision would bring back the shining liberty of the past. This theme really 
only falls down in its lack of specificity. Where Reagan could go on about what the values that 
defined America meant, Dole seems to simply list them. Any definition of what duty, honor, or 
sacrifice truly mean to him are missing from his exposition of the theme. This weakness aside, 
the theme seems to have a decent amount of explanatory power. Certainly, compared to Bush’s 
themes, this is more compelling. Where Bush’s issues of thematic integration stemmed, in large 
part, from their intrinsic weakness, Dole’s came from other factors that must now be discussed.  
 Several factors of political climate hampered Dole’s ability to integrate his theme 
usefully into messaging objectives in the general election. Of overriding importance in this 
respect was the state of the US economy. The economy was performing extremely well. Inflation 
and interest rates were low (Broder 1997, 12). The Dole campaign recognized that this 1996 
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election would unavoidably be a referendum on Clinton (Broder 1997, 12). The economy was, as 
it almost always is, the most salient issue in this campaign. With a strong economy, the Dole 
campaign would have to find a unique way of arguing that their candidate would handle the 
economy more effectively than Clinton had already done. It will be shown that this led to select a 
specific economic messaging objective. Whatever the economic messaging objective would 
posit, it would likely be ineffective. As it was with Reagan in 1984, it is difficult for an 
incumbent to be reproached on the economy when it is successful. This made the messaging 
objective somewhat ineffective even if it could be tied to a broad theme.  
 Dole’s image was another limiting factor of thematic integration into messaging 
objectives in the general election. Dole was largely seen as old, mean and out of touch (Broder 
1997, 179). He was not a very outgoing man and seemed aloof. For instance, he was famously 
quoted saying that tobacco was not addictive (Broder 1997, 190). Comments like this reinforced 
the perception of Bob Dole as a backward, old candidate. The perception of Dole as a grumpy 
old man made it difficult for the campaign to espouse its messaging objectives using the positive 
theme regarding the individual because of his perceived demeanor. He seemed unable to talk 
about reclaiming the future for the individual since because of his image (Broder 1997).    
 The Dole campaign was also limited in its use of theme in messaging objectives due to 
way the Republican primary transpired. Dole had been through an unprecedentedly long primary 
season. This left the campaign with an empty checkbook. More importantly, this gave Clinton 
(who was uncontested) the ability to define the agenda for the general election. Clinton was able 
to make strategic moves to constrain messaging objectives in anticipation of the upcoming 
election. In the legislative session in 1996, Clinton had taken immigration and welfare off the 
table through calculated moves. He also moved his politics toward the center. These moves 
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further forced the Dole campaign to focus on the economy (Broder 1997, 11). As described, this 
was a messaging objective that would be extremely difficult for the Dole campaign to use 
effectively even if it could incorporate a theme. Furthermore, Clinton was able to portray the 
Republican Party, and thus Bob Dole, as extremist. Because Newt Gingrich had brought the 
Contract With America to Congress, the Republicans seemed far more right wing then they had 
been. The lack of primary challenge allowed Clinton to sell the image of Republicans as ultra-
rightist. This definition of agenda and image was something that would subtract from the Dole 
campaign’s ability to select messaging objectives that would emphasize themes in an effective 
way.  
 Considering all this, the Dole campaign saw a few strategic imperatives. Because they 
knew this was to be a referendum on Clinton, the campaign knew that it had to differentiate itself 
from Clinton, and convince voters that there was a good reason to change leadership (Broder 
1997, 12). In ways that have already been described, both of these aims were difficult. First and 
foremost, the economy was very robust. As described, this always makes it difficult to unseat an 
incumbent. Also, with Clinton’s centrist policies, drawing distinctions would be more difficult. 
The campaign could not effectively polarize the race because of Clinton’s moderate tendencies 
(Broder 1997, 12). The Dole campaign was also handicapped in differentiation because of Dole’s 
image. Because Dole was seen as a mean old man, the campaign was very worried that negative 
messaging defining Bill Clinton as a liberal would not be well received (Broder 1997, 174). In all 
these ways the Dole campaign would be limited, not only in its selection of messaging 
objectives, but also in their effectiveness.  
 Several messaging objectives were selected by the Dole campaign in light of these 
considerations. The most important messaging objective for Dole was his economic plan. In his 
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convention speech he argued that he wanted to pass a balanced budget amendment, a fifteen 
percent across-the-board tax cut, a fifty percent cut in capital gains taxes, tort reform, estate tax 
reform, and decreased regulation. Another messaging objective was the policy suggestion of 
education reform. Dole argued for greater school choice with government scholarships. Dole also 
selected legal reform as another minor messaging objective. He wanted to end parole at the state 
level and get rid of liberal judges. Dole also wished to continue the war on drugs. Attacking 
Clinton, though difficult for Dole, was also a messaging objective. He took issue with Clinton’s 
stance on abortion. He also claimed the Clinton administration was weak on drug enforcement. 
Overall he tried to paint Clinton’s policies as overwhelmingly liberal. This was, in all, a very 
predictable Republican economic platform. Upon analysis, it appears that this collection of 
messaging objectives connects well with Dole’s theme of individualism. He wanted the 
government to interfere less in people’s lives. People would have more autonomy in raising their 
children with lower taxes and more education options. His messaging objectives also cast 
Democrats, specifically Clinton, as the enemy. In these ways, the messaging objectives of the 
Dole campaign meshed quite well with his theme.  
 With effective thematic overlap of messaging objectives, it is surprising that the 
campaign overall was ineffective at thematic integration. There were several reasons for this 
failure. Most important was the ability of the Clinton campaign to define the agenda. Not only 
did this make the economy, a difficult issues for Dole, the main messaging objective, but Dole 
campaign officials also lamented that they were unable to craft a cohesive messaging program. 
This seemed to come from the campaign’s inability to stick with a messaging objective. They felt 
that they had to respond to the Clinton campaign’s moves. For example, the Dole campaign was 
in the early stages of fully enumerating the crime messaging objective. However, they stopped 
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the messaging of this objective after only one week and switched to the tax messaging objective. 
This seemed to happen quite frequently (Broder 1997, 193). The Dole campaign bounced around 
in their emphasis of messaging objectives. These messaging objectives then, were not gaining 
sufficient resonance with voters due to a strategic calculation. In terms of theme, this choppy 
approach would not allow broad themes to be integrated. If the pursuit of messaging objectives 
was not disciplined, themes could not be utilized. On a tactical level, the campaign was also 
limited in its ability to utilize theme. The commercials that the campaign produced were not 
compelling. Officials within the campaign even acknowledged their weakness. One official said 
that their commercial following the convention simply showed “tax cuts, balloons, confetti, Bob 
Dole and Jack Kemp (Broder 1997, 194).” There was no substantive message, and certainly no 
tie to theme. These factors, combined with issues of political climate and image prevented the 
Dole campaign from effectively espousing messaging objectivess that seemed to be rather well 
connected to the available theme.  
 The takeaway from this campaign is somewhat incoherent. It seems that this campaign 
was severely limited in thematic utilization through a number of factors. Of particular 
importance was the existence of a popular centrist incumbent. This made differentiation very 
difficult. The Dole campaign attempted to show differences through economic policy, 
educational issues, and crime. The campaign also made attempts to paint Clinton as a big 
government liberal. In the end, the Dole campaign could not create an effective reason for voters 
to unseat the opponent. They were also unable to use Dole’s positive theme regarding 
individualism. This was due to their inability to stick with a messaging objective. Tactically, the 
Dole campaign was also unskilled in creating messaging that fulfilled objectives. In all, a popular 
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Clinton and weaknesses of the Dole campaign staff seemed to do the most in limiting the use of 
theme in pursuing objectives of messaging.  
2000 
 The 2000 presidential election is unique in this period of study thus far in that it did not 
feature an incumbent candidate.  While the 1996 election was less than compelling, the 2000 
race featured a very interesting mix of personality and strategy. Also interesting in this race was 
the unique theme that Bush employed to prevent Al Gore, the embodiment of the continuation of 
Clintonian policy, from becoming president. The campaign was very skilled in weaving its broad 
theme into messaging objectives that were significant to strategy. This allowed the Bush 
campaign to distract from the strong economy created by the Clinton-Gore administration and 
define the agenda in messaging objectives that were beneficial for Bush.  
 The theme Bush employed was somewhat related to earlier Republican themes, but 
contained important differences. While implicitly arguing for limited government that was a 
central part of the broader Republican narrative, the main thrust of Bush’s theme was an anti-
Washington sentiment. This theme claimed that politics-as-usual was having an incredibly 
negative effect on the country. It argued that the morality of leaders was continuously declining. 
A large basis for this appeal was the impeachment scandal of Bill Clinton (Edsall 2007, 193). 
The nation was in need of a leader that was wholesome and virtuous. Furthermore, this theme 
argued that the politicians in Washington did not care about confronting actual issues. They 
simply cared about looking better in “the next news cycle” (Institute 2000, 195). Because of this, 
nothing was being done to improve education or lower the tax burden. In and of itself, this theme 
is strong in several ways. First it captures a socially conservative sentiment that the Clintons and 
the Washington establishment were leading America into moral ruin. This group of voters would 
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be important for Bush strategically. This theme is also useful in its distraction from the economy. 
Although it is the guiding theme of the Bush campaign, it is based more on morality that 
economic well-being. This allowed the campaign to only tangentially center its messaging 
around the economy. Unlike the Dole campaign, Bush was able to skirt around the issue of the 
economy and focus on principled leadership.  
 The Bush campaign was able to calculate strategy that allowed it to utilize its broad 
theme very effectively. The entire campaign was predicated on the beliefs that Bush would be 
the nominee and that the general election would be extremely close. These beliefs led to a few 
important strategic calculations that would guide the entirety of the campaign. First, the 
campaign largely did not engage its primary opponents. Karl Rove was able to solidify the 
Republican leadership in support of Bush, allowing him to focus on general campaign messaging 
objectives throughout the primary (Institute 2003, 109). This made the messaging overall more 
cohesive and reinforced, which was a major goal of the campaign (Institute 2003, 117). The 
conviction that the general election would be a close race also led to the intensely focused nature 
of the campaign. Karl Rove argued that suburban voters were the key demographic to the Bush 
2000 effort. These were the people he believed would care about the moral decay of national 
leadership and other Bush messaging objectives (Institute 2003, 228). Furthermore, the Bush 
campaign decided to focus most of its effort in geographic areas that would result in the 
necessary 270 Electoral College votes. This resulted the Bush campaign focusing on a small 
number of counties in places like Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington (Institute 2003, 
229). These were also areas where the theme and messaging objectives selected by the Bush 
campaign would be strategically significant.  
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 The messaging objectives that were decided upon based on the available theme and 
strategic choices provided voters with a cohesive vision containing both positive and negative 
messaging objectives that were connected to Bush’s anti-Washington theme. The most 
fundamental messaging objective involved transmitting to voters George Bush’s values. The 
campaign officials saw George Bush as “approachable, folksy and likeable, with an inclusive 
spirit” (Institute 2003, 20). He was displayed as a different kind of Republican. He believed in 
faith-based initiatives and “compassionate conservatism” that valued individualism (Institute 
2003, 130). The tie to the theme is quite obvious. Bush was to shown to be radically different 
from the politicians of Washington. His campaign commercials would often depict Bush as a 
down-to-earth guy in a quarter zip displaying a friendly smile. He cared much more about getting 
things done than coming out on top in the news. This positive messaging objective about Bush 
was strategically imperative based on the decisions of the campaign. Displaying Bush as a 
Washington outsider and “different” Republican was important in obtaining the target suburban 
voters that were perceived as being concerned about the moral decay of government. In this case, 
the inextricable link to theme made this messaging objective more compelling in a way that was 
strategically useful.  
 The second major messaging objective for the Bush campaign in 2000 involved directly 
tying Al Gore to the deleterious politics of Washington described in the theme. Because he was 
following in the footsteps of Clinton, the Bush campaign tried to show that Gore was just as 
committed to the argumentative politics of the past eight years. Gore represented the 
hyperpartisainship that disregarded the desires of voters. This messaging objective was directly 
and obviously connected to the Bush anti-Washington theme. Gore was part of the 
administration that had done nothing to improve education or lower taxes. This messaging 
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objective was not only argued for by the campaign, but was also reinforced by some of Gore’s 
actions. He had a reputation of being exaggerative (Institute 2003, 198). For example, Gore once 
claimed that he “took the initiative in creating the Internet” (Youtube 2013). Gore obviously had 
not created the Internet. Comments like this aided the Bush campaign in espousing the 
messaging objective regarding Gore’s commitment to media-obsessed Washington politics. This 
messaging objective was strategically useful in the same ways that the previous messaging 
objective was. If the targeted suburban voters in the swing states could be persuaded that Gore 
was a typical example of deleterious immoral Washington politics, they could be convinced to 
support Bush rather than Gore. The anti-Washington theme made this messaging objective more 
compelling in directly tying Al Gore to the harmful politics of Washington.   
 Another important messaging objective for Bush was the policies that he hoped to 
implement in office. These did not appear separately but as a cluster. Economically, he was in 
favor of an across the board tax cut, a child tax credit, and cuts in capital gains and corporate 
taxes (Institute 2003, 128). He also believed in devolving power to state governments, reforming 
education, and increasing government funding to faith-based initiatives (Institute 2003, 130, 
147). Though not as direct as the other two messaging objectives, this objective was connected to 
Bush’s theme. It implicitly argued that these were issues that would not be dealt with by Al 
Gore. Because he was committed to the partisan politics of Washington, he would not tackle 
these legitimate issues. Thus, the theme was used to explain the reasons why these issues were 
not dealt with in terms of the broader theme.  This thematic appeal made the normally dry policy 
objectives more compelling. The policy messaging objective held the same strategic utility as the 
other two messaging objectives. However, instead of convincing swing voters in the target states 
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to vote for Bush due to leadership issues, this messaging objective aimed to persuade them on 
policy connected to leadership issues.  
 In all, the Bush campaign in 2000 was successful in integrating theme into messaging 
objectives for several reasons. First, they had a compelling theme that played very well for their 
candidate and took advantage of the political climate. The political scandals of Clinton’s second 
term had produced a considerable amount of angst with political leadership in the population. 
Karl Rove was an expert at tapping into these sentiments (Institute 2003, 53). In a very Atwater-
like way, Rove was able to solidify the anger people felt into votes for his candidate (Edsall 
2007, 53). The campaign was able to convince people that Gore was simply another Clinton. In a 
lengthier work, the career of Karl Rove would be a major topic of discussion in the contributions 
he made (positive and negative) to the running of presidential elections in America. Furthermore, 
being a governor, Bush could earnestly play the Washington outsider. He could put himself on 
the side of the average person because his political power was not based within the Beltway. 
Strategically, the campaign also made decisions that allowed them to utilize theme effectively. 
First, the focus on suburban swing voters allowed them to use the morality issue to their 
advantage. Rove and his team were able to see that the deterioration of morality in Washington, 
and its resultant lack of issue tackling in education and taxes, would produce an effective appeal 
for these people. Furthermore, the geographic specificity was somewhat unprecedented. The 
campaign had narrowed its activity to a surprisingly small number of counties in swing states. 
This allowed the Bush campaign to even more specifically constrain its messaging objectives 
while tying them to themes. This is evident in Bush’s support of faith-based initiatives and 
education reform. These were issues that were salient and could only be addressed by a 
Washington outsider. Choices of messaging objectives made by the campaign also lent 
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themselves well to the use of Bush’s theme. Bush was the outsider; Gore the insider. Bush would 
tackle the political issues that Gore’s Washington politics would not allow him to.  
 So, what is the take away? It seems that the campaign here was very active. Where Dole 
was unable to define the agenda, Bush was able to shift the race from the issue of the economy. 
Where Dole’s team was incompetent, Bush’s had political minds like Karl Rove, who were 
absolute experts at selecting unique messaging objectives and strategies that would benefit their 
candidate. None of this would have been possible though without the unprecedented level of 
funding the Bush campaign received from donors. Though not directly related to the use of 
theme, the incredible amount of money spent by the Bush campaign helped them to do all that 
they did in defining the agenda and finding the geographic areas they could push their messaging 
objectives. These factors seemed to work together to allow Bush to utilize theme in pursuing 
messaging objectives in a compelling and strategically significant manner. 
2004 
 The term “a complete 180” is often difficult to use appropriately in politics, particularly 
when discussing campaigns. However, it seems that in comparing the Bush 2000 campaign to his 
reelection run, the terminology is appropriate. Everything from the themes created, to the 
strategies undertaken, to the messaging objectives selected were radically different for the 
second presidential campaign of George W Bush. These changes were motivated by changing 
political conditions, and vastly different strategic commitments held by officials within the Bush 
campaign. Despite these radical changes, the 2004 campaign was still able to weave its broad 
themes into objectives of messaging in ways that fulfilled strategic commitments.  
 The themes that Bush employed in his reelection bid varied drastically from the one 
utilized in his first presidential campaign. The divergence in theme makes logical sense. Since 
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Bush had now been elected president, he could not be considered a Washington outsider. He was 
now at the center of national politics, so casting Washington leadership in a negative light was 
not feasible. Two themes were used by the Bush campaign in 2004. The first dealt with foreign 
policy. Bush claimed, as his father did, that Democrats were weak on national security. The link 
with the Republican narrative is clear in this theme. While the challenges of terrorism demanded 
an active strategy, Democrats had been hesitant. Bush had been proactive in establishing the 
Department of Homeland Security and, more importantly, in waging the war on terror and 
invading Iraq. These actions were necessary in keeping America safe. The Democrats that 
opposed these actions were weak and posed a threat to American security. This theme had ties to 
history. Bush’s father had been active in the Gulf war and had protected America while some 
Democrats opposed him. Thus, as the broader narrative implies, Republicans were better at using 
force to protect American interests than their Democratic counterparts (Edsall 2007, 179). It also 
displayed clear antithesis and personal connection. This was a theme that informed a major 
messaging objective of the campaign that was crucial to strategy. 
 The second theme that Bush utilized was much more subtle but was also important. It 
was essentially an argument that values in America had been eroded and that conservative had to 
push back. Implicitly, this tied to things like welfare, no-fault divorce, abortion, and gay 
marriage (Edsall 2007, 53). According to this theme, the leftist media was increasingly 
advocating for the implementation of these deleterious policies (Edsall 2007, 101). These 
increasingly liberal commitments had led to weaker families. Republicans like George Bush 
were committed to turning the tide on these issues. Bush would push back against the liberals 
and the media in order to keep traditional family values in tact. This theme was much less central 
to the campaign in 2004 than the foreign policy theme. However, this theme was critical for 
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making the messaging objective regarding gay marriage more compelling. The thematic 
integration of this messaging objective also proved to be important to strategy.  
 Strategically, the calculations of the Bush campaign in 2004 contrasted from the 2000 
campaign in perhaps the most significant manner possible. In 2000 the entire strategy of the 
Bush campaign was predicated on receiving support from swing voters. In 2004 the opposite was 
the case. The Bush campaign was committed to motivating their base and receiving as many 
conservative votes as possible. This strategy came as a result of findings from Bush’s chief 
pollster Matt Dowd. He found that a campaign could lose swing voters and still win the election 
if that campaign’s base was larger than its opponent’s (Edsall 2007, 64). Essentially, going after 
swing voters is difficult. Receiving votes from the base is relatively easier (Edsall 2007, 71). 
This changed commitment led to important decisions regarding strategy that had an impact on 
the use of theme and selection of messaging objectives. First, the Bush campaign sought to 
increase the size of its base. They attempted to target Latinos, African-Americans, and further 
solidify the Religious Right. The campaign also sought to polarize the election. Dowd 
characterizes the difference between the two approaches of the Bush campaigns as “crunchy 
versus squishy”. In 2000, the Bush camp had attempted to “blunt” the differences between the 
candidates in order to appeal to swing voters. In 2004, the campaign attempted to highlight the 
differences between the candidates in order to activate the base (Institute 2005, 137). This too 
would have important consequences in the selection of messaging objectives and the emphasis of 
themes.  
 With this new strategy decided upon, the Bush campaign chose messaging objectives that 
would fulfill this strategy and utilize the themes available. The most important messaging 
objective of the 2004 campaign was that regarding national security. This messaging objective 
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involved depicting George Bush as a strong wartime leader while, at the same time, arguing that 
John Kerry would not be effective in the same respect. From the outset of the election, the Bush 
campaign was able to make this messaging objective the number one item on the agenda. As 
early as February 2004, the campaign was airing commercials regarding 9/11 and lauding actions 
the president was taking (Institute 2005, 109). Furthermore, the RNC taking place in New York 
City further served to highlight the importance of the war on terror (Institute 2005, 109). The 
Bush campaign argued that people may not always like Bush’s position, but they always knew 
where he stood. He would unequivocally do anything he saw necessary to end the threat of 
terrorism (Institute 2005, 131). The campaign also argued in its messaging that Bush had gone to 
war for the right reasons (Institute 2005, 191). This part of the message had clear ties to Bush’s 
foreign policy theme. Being a Republican, Bush was effective in using force to protect American 
interests. This connection to a broad theme makes this part of the messaging objective more 
compelling. Strategically, this unapologetic and partisan message would have invigorated the 
base. Bush cared about protecting America and was less concerned with contemplation than 
action.  
 The second phase of this messaging objective that painted Kerry as a weak wartime 
leader was equally important. The Bush campaign was chiefly concerned with calling into 
question Kerry’s fickle record toward the war in Iraq and his disposition toward war generally. 
The Bush campaign called attention to the fact that Kerry had flip-flopped several times on his 
support of the Iraq war and increasing the funding to support troops (youtube 2006). This was 
meant to question his convictions in direct contrast to Bush. The Bush campaign also made a 
point to diminish Kerry’s military service in Vietnam. Bob Dole, stumping for the Bush 
campaign, argued that his allegations of war crimes committed by the US disrespected veterans 
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(Institute 2005, 40). This kind of contempt for the troops was meant to undermine Kerry’s 
potential as a wartime leader. This part of the foreign policy message is also implicitly connected 
to the foreign policy theme. Being a Democrat, Kerry was soft on defending American interests. 
This explains his changing opinions on the war in Iraq. The theme helps to explain this part of 
the messaging objective. Strategically, this part of the messaging objective is very useful. Since 
the strategy was predicated on making sure the Republican base showed up to vote, suggesting 
that Kerry would put America in danger due to his weakness would compel them to vote for 
George Bush on Election Day.  
 Social issues also made up an important messaging objective for the Bush campaign in 
2004. Though abortion was an important issue for the campaign, gay marriage was by far the 
most salient social issue (Edsall 2007, 60). Bush argued that liberals were attempting to make 
gay marriage legal.  Bush would fight to ensure that this would not happen. This messaging 
objective was not a huge thrust of the campaign but was clearly connected to Bush’s theme 
regarding conservative pushback. Bush would stand up for the conservative values against 
liberals and the mainstream media. The strategic importance of this messaging objective is rather 
obvious. It served to appeal to socially conservative Latinos, thus expanding the base. More 
importantly, this message appealed to the Republican base. If they were sufficiently worried that 
liberals would attempt to enact these morally perverse policies, they would show up and vote for 
Bush.  
 It is clear that the 2004 Bush campaign was radically different from his previous 
presidential campaign. Instead of going after swing votes, Bush simply attempted to get the 
larger Republican base to the polls. This strategic aim deeply impacted the messaging objectives 
chosen and themes emphasized by the Bush campaign. While the 2000 Bush was a 
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“compassionate conservative” and a “different kind of Republican,” the 2004 Bush was a strong 
wartime leader with strong convictions on social issues. The turnaround is notable. The 
divergences in the two campaigns seem to suggest that an incumbent can radically change all the 
facets of his campaign and achieve success if the numbers (meaning strategic calculations) are 
correct. More importantly, this election proved that candidates can win elections by committing 
completely to the base of their party and ensuring they turn out to vote. In any case, despite the 
radical changes, the Bush campaign was able to successfully integrate theme into messaging 
objectives that were strategically significant.  
2008 
 The McCain campaign in 2008 seems to be a unique case in this period of study. It was 
the second race where no incumbent was up for reelection. However, in this election a 
Republican was leaving his second term. Furthermore, unlike the strong economy in 2000, one 
of the largest financial crashes in American history occurred during the most heated time of this 
campaign. The percentage of Americans who believed that the country was on the wrong track 
rose above ninety by Election Day (Institute 2009, 89). All of these factors severely hampered 
McCain’s chances of electoral success. More important to this work, the factors of political 
climate along with other issues, severely limited the ability of the McCain campaign to utilize 
theme in pursuing messaging objectives.  
 McCain essentially had one theme that was not espoused in very specific terms. 
Essentially, McCain believed that America’s defining characteristic was standing up for what is 
right (Institute 2009, 89). This seems to incorporate all levels of American life. Everyday people 
stand up for what is right based on their values and commitments. This sentiment is clearly taken 
from the Republican narrative. Furthermore, McCain argued that those who are good at 
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governing do the same. Good government is not about partisanship or rank-and-file membership; 
it is about doing what is good for constituents. McCain embodied this theory of governance. He 
had a reputation for bucking his party as a long-time senator. He was portrayed as a maverick 
that was “everyone’s worst enemy” in congress (Institute 2009, 6). This theme certainly has 
some compelling force. It shows a values-based theory of governance that was connected to 
American identity. This moral leadership was a part of the values outlined in the Republican 
narrative. It also depicted McCain as a prime example of the validity of the theme. This theme 
would come to be central to one of the McCain campaign’s major messaging objectives. This 
would also be useful in attempting to fulfill the strategy of differentiation that was key for the 
campaign.  
 The strategy for McCain had two important facets that must be discussed here. The first 
strategic aim of the McCain campaign was to create a large organization with a grassroots feel 
(Institute 2009, 6). This strategic aim was embodied in the campaign’s use of Internet messaging. 
This election had a hereto historically large place on the Internet. Although social media had not 
yet truly taken off, the Internet was a very important asset to both campaigns. The McCain 
campaign tried to reinforce its grassroots aims on the Internet. It attempted to distribute messages 
that they could spin to large audiences. This was meant to drum up large numbers of supporters 
for McCain (Institute 2009, 101). This would encourage the selection of a messaging objective 
regarding McCain’s differentiation from George Bush that would emphasize his theme regarding 
moral leadership.  
 The second tenant of McCain’s strategy was to go after swing voters in the form of 
suburban voters and women (Institute 2009, 188). The method of attracting these voters was to 
define the Republican Party on McCain’s terms. This would further influence the selection of 
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two major messaging objectives. One was that differentiation from Bush that was rooted in 
McCain’s theme. This would distance McCain from the unpopular Republican mainstream and 
attract swing voters. The other messaging objective this gave rise to was that of an economic 
message that would appeal to those swing voters whose primary concern was the economy.  
 With these factors guiding it, the McCain campaign selected three major messaging 
objectives. The first argued that McCain was very unlike George Bush and the Republican 
establishment. McCain pointed to his record and argued that his career was defined by his 
rejection of partisan politics. On numerous occasions, McCain voted against his party based on 
his commitments to his constituents. He had a history of working with Democrats to craft 
legislation (Institute 2009, 169). This was directly linked to the theme regarding moral 
leadership. McCain did not vote based on party identification. He voted based on what he 
believed was right. This messaging objective was used as motivation for the selection of Sarah 
Palin. She had gone after her own party in Alaska on corruption (Institute 2009, 170). She too 
embodied the ethical government that McCain was committed to. Strategically, this is a clear 
attempt to gain votes from swing voters. McCain unapologetically put country before party. As 
president, he would not let party politics get in the way of doing what was right. This is a 
message the McCain campaign hoped would be appealing to swing voters who were angered by 
partisan politics.   
 The second major messaging objective of the McCain campaign was his plan to improve 
the economy. This message became particularly important in the late stages of the campaign 
when the financial collapse occurred. The McCain campaign made some serious missteps in 
enumerating this messaging objective however. When the collapse first began to unfold, McCain 
claimed that the fundamentals of the economy were still sound. In contradiction to McCain’s 
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belief, the crash continued to worsen. This cast doubt on McCain’s ability to guide the economy 
as he had argued (Institute 2009, 191). McCain also flip-flopped on his stance of bailing out AIG 
when it collapsed. This further eroded confidence in his economic credentials (Institute 2009, 
194). McCain made a final error when he suspended his campaign to work out a bailout package 
in the Senate. He was unable to close a deal while his campaign was suspended (Institute 2009, 
198). His economic credentials were further questioned with this failure. In all, McCain’s 
enumeration of the economic messaging objective was not successful. Voters were not sure if he 
could handle the economic troubles to come due to the several missteps in enumerating the 
messaging objective.  
 The final messaging objective for the McCain campaign attempted to “disqualify” 
Obama as a potential president (Institute 2009, 168). The McCain campaign called into question 
Obama’s experience and qualifications. Not only was he a first term senator, but his popularity 
could be characterized as a cultural phenomenon. The campaign released an advertisement 
entitled “Celeb” that compared Obama visually to Britney Spears and showed him in front of a 
gigantic crowd in Germany (Institute 2009, 177). This was meant to call into question Obama’s 
abilities to actually lead rather than be a cultural phenomenon. This messaging objective does not 
seem to be directly connected to McCain’s theme. Furthermore, this was largely insignificant in 
terms of strategy. Swing voters were worried about serious issues regarding the economy less 
than Obama’s character (Institute 2009, 177).  
 From the outset, the McCain campaign had a steep mountain to climb in order to win 
election. They faced a very hostile political climate. He was a member of an extremely 
unpopular party. McCain also faced serious obstacle in effectively utilizing his theme. The main 
appeal of his theme was that it represented a change in politics. McCain was largely beaten to the 
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punch on this type of appeal. Change became a major slogan of the Obama campaign. McCain 
lost by 31 percentage points on the change issue (Institute 2009, 168). This seems logical, as 
McCain was one of the most senior members of the Senate. With a theme that was deeply 
connected to change, and a candidate that could not be seen as an agent of change, it is not 
surprising that targeted voters did not find the arguments compelling. In the economy, McCain 
made many mistakes in his reaction to the crash that occurred during the campaign. His attempts 
to discredit Obama also fell short. This campaign is rather exceptional in the economic crash that 
occurred during the heart of the campaign. It seems that political climate had a large role in this 
race. McCain would have been hard pressed to effectively convince that his party could 
effectively lead the country in a different direction despite his theme that displayed his distaste of 
partisan politics and his distance from Republicans.  
2012 
 The 2012 presidential election is in some ways extremely different from any election that 
came before it. Technological advancements had more impact in this election than perhaps in 
any other during this period of study. Twitter and Facebook had grown to be major sources of 
information for millions of voters. This allowed the dissemination of information from both the 
campaigns and the media to be immeasurably faster. Furthermore, the methods that campaigns, 
particularly Obama’s, used to recruit volunteers and target voters were unprecedented in their 
depth and mathematic sophistication (Institute 2012). Traditional methods of polling via phone 
were also proven insufficient due to the large number of voters, particularly the young, who used 
only cell phones. Record amounts of money were spent by both campaigns and by independent 
PACs and Super PACS (Institute 2012, xviii). With these vastly different conditions, the 
Romney campaign would attempt to unseat an incumbent with an economy that was not as 
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improved as many Americans hoped following the recession beginning in 2008. Many, strategic 
calculations and decisions on messaging objectives were made to provide voters with a different 
economic vision for the future. In terms of thematic integration, the Romney campaign made a 
successful effort to connect the economic vision to a broad political theme. However, the 
successful use of theme in pursuing messaging objectives was not strategically useful and could 
not garner election.  
 Mitt Romney employed one broad theme to explain his views on the nature of economic 
growth in America. The theme is perhaps the only one in this work that comes with a confirmed 
title: “We Built It”. This theme was constructed in response to comments President Obama made 
during the campaign. He said that people who are successful in business are not necessarily 
smarter or more hardworking than anyone else. Obama claimed that if someone has a successful 
business, they did not build it; “Somebody else made that happen.” The government was 
essential for the prosperity of business. Romney’s theme claimed that this was a completely 
flawed conception of business. Individuals that are smart and hardworking are in fact the sole 
causers of their success. For Romney, suggesting that the government makes successful 
businesses “isn’t just foolishness; it’s insulting to every entrepreneur, every innovator in 
America, and it’s wrong”. In Romney’s view, Obama “attacks success,” and therefore is less 
success is had (Youtube 2012).  
 This theme is somewhat difficult to assess. It certainly contains antithesis. Obama is the 
enemy of economic success. The proposed differences are very stark. Where Obama sees the 
government as a catalyst of success, Romney sees it as an inhibitor. The theme has clear 
narrative connection in its advocacy for limited government involvement in the economy. This 
theme is also deeply tied to American identity. Business owners are clearly the backbone of 
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America for Romney. They are virtuously hardworking and intelligent. The theme also had some 
personal elements to it. Romney was someone who had spent much of his career in the private 
sector. He learned how to run businesses efficiently, and understood the dedication and hard 
work it took to manage a business. However, this was a dangerous theme in a number of 
respects. The most fundamental danger of the theme is its possible ad hominem pitfall. It is 
targeted specifically against Obama, and only implicitly tied to liberal or Democratic 
conceptions of government. It is narrower than one may want a theme to be. This does not doom 
the theme, but does make it appear eerily similar to a messaging objective. Furthermore, it does 
implicitly advocate for a somewhat narrow conception of governmental attitude toward business. 
It argues for a laissez faire type of government; not one that provides subsides to businesses in 
need. This was a dangerous angle for the theme due to the mood of the electorate. Surveys found 
that voters were more inclined to support a candidate that advocated for small business subsides 
and other forms of aid (Institute 2012). This theme implicitly suggests that the government 
should let businesses live and die by their decisions. This, along with the personal aspects of the 
theme, hurt Romney strategically in combatting a harmful image that will be discussed later. In 
all, this theme clearly had some elements of strength, but would prove to contain some aspects 
that would injure the Romney campaign in certain respects of messaging objectives and strategy.  
 The Romney campaign made several strategic calculations that proved to be important to 
choices of messaging objectives and thus thematic integration. Most fundamentally, the Romney 
campaign targeted voters that it believed would allow its candidate to be successful. The chief 
demographics of importance for Romney were Latinos and women. The campaign believed that 
these groups could be coopted if the correct messaging objectives were selected (Institute 2012, 
189). It seems that the Romney campaign chose mostly to focus on the economy to win the 
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support of these voters. The reasoning behind this escapes full analysis but it seems that 
explanations in the first chapter seem valid. Because the economy is a non-partisan issue, it is 
useful when targeting those who may vote for either party. Because of the universal appeal of an 
improved economy, and the somewhat disappointing state of the economy in 2012, the Romney 
campaign may have chosen to utilize it to gain votes from these voters.  
 More important than the demographic strategy for Romney was a focus on geography. 
The Romney campaign figured that it had to win in Ohio, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia 
in order to get an Electoral College victory. They also needed one more win in places like 
Nevada, New Hampshire, or Wisconsin (Institute 1012, 226). This strategy obviously meant a 
difficult task for the selection of messaging objectives. These were very diverse states with 
different populations. They would have to be brought to Romney through one messaging 
objective. Once again the Romney campaign would choose to focus on the economy. This seems 
logical based on the universal appeal of the messaging objective and the less-than-ideal state of 
the American economy already described.  
 With these strategic calculations, it is quite clear what the main messaging thrust of 
Romney’s campaign would be. Though there were other issues of foreign policy and social 
issues that the Romney campaign would utilize, a great deal was riding on its ability to convince 
voters that Romney had a plan that was better for the economy than Obama. To sell this 
messaging objective, the campaign started very early. Despite a hotly contested primary, the 
Romney campaign began attacking Obama on jobs and the economy even in primary debates. 
The economy was considered Romney’s “wheelhouse”. As soon as the nomination was assured, 
Romney began laying out a plan to turn the economy around and cut spending. This led to the 
release of a series of “Day One, Job One” advertisements  (Institute 2012, 36). This messaging 
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objective is clearly connected to Romney’s “We Built It” theme. He wanted to get government 
out of the way so that businesses could prosper. At first glance, this messaging objective seems 
to be strategically significant as well. Bettering the economy was something that the Romney 
campaign believed the target voters cared about. However, the way that Romney argued this 
messaging objective flew in the face of the mood of much of the electorate. As mentioned, large 
sections of voters preferred a candidate that would use the government to help out businesses and 
encourage growth actively to stimulate the middle class. The Romney theme and economic 
message seemed to advocate for a flourishing private sector that benefitted big business and 
allowed the market to behave freely. Voter surveys confirmed that Romney was not fully able to 
convince middle class people that his economic vision was friendlier to them than Obama’s 
(Institute 2012, 180). In all, the messaging objective of the economy was one that the Romney 
campaign successfully made more compelling with a broad theme. The issue though, was that 
the vision it created was antithetical to the desires of a majority of Romney’s targets.  
 The second messaging objective of importance here was one that was thrust upon the 
Romney campaign. Throughout the primary, an unopposed Obama was able to define Romney 
as an out-of-touch aristocrat that did not truly care about the middle class. His time at Bain 
Capital was marked by the destruction of businesses and American jobs (Institute 2012). The 
Romney campaign realized, through the aforementioned surveys, that convincing the electorate 
of empathy for the middle class was important to their strategy of capturing their target 
demographics. The “We Built It” theme was important in arguing this messaging objective for 
Romney. The campaign argued that casting a negative light on Romney’s experience at Bain was 
a war on capitalism (Institute 2012, 98). This was typical for Obama, as explained by the theme. 
The campaign argued that Romney of course cared about people of all classes and about 
Owens   
144 
American jobs. This seemed to be a somewhat strong response that was connected to Romney’s 
theme. Although the theme was not incredibly useful strategically, the campaign’s response was 
coherent. However, any potential progress was undone largely by a video of Romney speaking at 
a fundraising event that was leaked on September 18, 2012. He claimed that forty seven percent 
of Americans are dependent on the government and thus would not vote for him (Institute 2012, 
253). This was an external event that would prove to make this messaging objective of positive 
image much more difficult for the Romney campaign to espouse. The comments essentially 
discounted nearly half of the population from Romney’s calculations. Of course, nearly all 
campaigns make these types of mathematically driven judgments. However, with Romney’s 
continuing image as an out-of-touch millionaire, this leaked private comment reinforced his cold 
millionaire image. There was not much that the campaign could do at this point to fix the image 
problem. Thus, even though the Romney campaign had a messaging objective that tied strongly 
to a theme, events outside of the campaign’s control seemed to undo any potential they had on 
selling it effectively.  
 The Romney campaign overall seems to be an interesting case. It had a clear, albeit not 
incredibly strong, theme. It was able to tie this theme to its main messaging objectives regarding 
the economy and Romney’s image. However, in both cases there was a difficulty of palatability. 
Romney’s vision called for a government that was, in spirit, disconnected from the economy. It 
wished to let the market act freely, to destroy, create, and innovate in its natural way. Public 
opinion polls showed that Americans, particularly those that Romney had strategically targeted, 
favored a government that would actively support small businesses and the middle class. Both 
Romney’s economic and image messaging objectives seemed unable to convince voters that he 
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cared about bolstering the middle class. In all, the theme was clear; but it, and the messaging 
objectives it helped explain, were not strategically useful for the Romney campaign.   
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Chapter 6 
With so much deep analysis, a step back must be made to assess the points made in this 
work. First, the general pattern of campaign communication that has been argued for must be 
recounted for clarity. Then, it seems appropriate to make some assertion about the role and 
importance of the use of narrative, through its complicated process of inclusion, in campaign 
communication as it relates to electoral success. Lastly, this chapter will attempt to speculate as 
to the ways in which the Republican narrative may be utilized in campaign communication in the 
2016 presidential election.  
 The process of narrative inclusion in campaign messaging must first be revisited. In 
general, it seems that steps of increasing specificity must be made to create messages that 
connect to the Republican narrative. First, themes must be derived from the narrative. These say 
something about the candidate or his opponent: the values they hold dear, the broad direction of 
policy they advocate for, etc. In one way, themes are constrained by the personal disposition of 
the candidate. Reagan and his team were incredible at creating themes. By contrast, George 
H.W. Bush had limited skill at doing so. In another way, themes are constrained by political 
climate. If the economy is booming an incumbent can focus on his economic beliefs to a positive 
effect. Again, Reagan did this very well. In this vein, a challenger candidate can use his 
economic theme if the economy is not growing at a satisfactory rate. This was Romney’s 
approach in 2012. Both of these limiting factors manifest themselves in innumerable forms. 
However, whether their effects are positive or negative, it is clear that they impact the ways that 
theme, and by extension the narrative, may come to be in campaign communication.  
 Messaging objectives represent the next level of specificity in campaign communication. 
In this stage, campaigns select the messages in the realms of ideology, issues, and character. 
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Messaging objectives are arguments the campaign tries to make regarding what the candidate, or 
his opponent, will do in office. George H.W. Bush’s infamous “read my lips” pledge was the 
embodiment of a messaging objective of not increasing taxes. In some cases, messaging 
objectives can be made more compelling if they are connected to themes. In the “read my lips” 
example, the thematic connection was to that of limited government that respected the 
individual. Like themes, messaging objectives have numerous constraints. Most central of these 
constraints is strategy. With any strategy, certain messaging objectives will be selected to appeal 
to the target voters. 
 From these messaging objectives, the campaign will create bits of specific 
communication. This is the most specific element of campaign communication. Each of these 
messages, if done remotely correctly, will serve to espouse a messaging objective of the 
campaign. The forms for these bits of communication are numerous. The most common are 
commercials, press conferences, and prepared speeches. If the campaign is skilled, themes can be 
integrated in these bits of communication that develop messaging objectives in a strategically 
meaningful way.  
 With this complicated mechanism explained, it seems appropriate to assess the 
importance of campaign communication that is tied, through themes, to the Republican narrative. 
This assertion is difficult due to lack of hard statistical evidence on the subject. Because this 
conceptualization of narrative and its inclusion in campaign communication seems to be novel, 
no quantitative evidence exists to prove narrative’s utility. At present, it seems that a candidate 
skilled at the process described here can use narrative-based themes to make messaging 
objectives and specific communication more compelling. Looking at the cases of Reagan in 1984 
and Bush in 2000, it seems that their ability to use theme helped them, at least in some way, 
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electorally. Reagan won by one of the greatest electoral margins in recent memory. His ability to 
identify with an overwhelming majority of Americans through his themes regarding identity 
seems to have helped him in this accomplishment. Bush was able to stop a Democratic successor 
of an administration that was in power during a thriving economy. Bush’s ability to use his anti-
Washington theme to change the focus from the economy to moral leadership and tangential 
issues like education and faith-based initiatives may have resonated with Americans and been a 
factor in his win.  
This being said, there is no way that themes could be said to be decisive in determining 
electoral success. Though the themes may have made the messaging objectives more compelling 
for these candidates, there is much more at play. For Reagan, the economic boom that took place 
in his first term seems to have been much more influential in his big win than his skillful 
thematic usage. The political climate was thus extremely friendly, almost to a determinative 
degree, for Reagan. In 2000, political climate and strategy certainly explains a great deal of 
Bush’s success. Al Gore was trying to convince the American people commit to twelve years of 
uninterrupted Democratic executive control by representing an administration that had faced 
impeachment hearings. Bush also had a fierce strategic operation headed by Karl Rove. His 
organization’s ability to compile the necessary Electoral College votes by narrowing down the 
race to several counties was rather unprecedented at the time. The intensity of this strategic 
calculation is evidenced in Bush’s loss of the popular vote with a victory in the election. In each 
of these cases, strong thematic integration seems to have played only some role in electoral 
success. Reagan’s theme served as an explanation of the economic success of the time. Bush’s 
theme played into people’s frustration with the Clinton administration. These themes seem to 
simply be tools in making the messages broader and more emotionally appealing  
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The case of Bush in 1988 gives further evidence that theme is not an entirely 
determinative factor. It has been argued exhaustively that George H.W. Bush was unable to 
effectively integrate theme as a candidate. Yet, a fierce strategy, skillful selection of messaging 
objectives, and a mostly friendly political climate seem to have given him the victory in 1988. 
All of this suggests that other factors can override the ability to integrate theme and end in 
electoral victory. This illustrates that thematic integration is essentially a useful tool that makes 
messaging objectives more compelling.  
With the role of theme defined in this precarious way, it is interesting to speculate ways 
in which the Republican candidate will utilize theme in the 2016 general election. Being perhaps 
the most fundamental element of constraint on theme, political climate seems to be a logical start 
for guessing at thematic usage. It seems likely that the economy will continue to be strong by the 
tie of the election. This does not bode well for an emphasis on economic themes for a 
Republican. Since the economy has been growing under a Democratic president, the argument 
that a change to a Republican president, who supports the limited government conceptualized in 
the narrative, is needed for economic growth will likely not hold water. Thus, an economic 
theme should be downplayed because of its lack of utility.  
Adding some candidate speculation, the picture of possible thematic use becomes more 
interesting. If Hillary Clinton were to become the Democratic nominee, the electoral situation 
would become rather analogous to the one in 2000. The connection to her husband’s scandals, 
coupled with the controversy over the Benghazi attacks, can give a Republican candidate 
ammunition to select themes and messaging objectives related to moral leadership and issues 
unrelated to the economy. Hillary Clinton may be painted as a Washington insider who acts in 
shady ways. Joe Biden, another potential candidate, is vulnerable to similar criticism as a 
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member of an Obama Administration that has been accused of overstepping authority and 
utilizing executive orders controversially. Jeb Bush, a potential Republican candidate that would 
make the analogy even more complete, could take on the same role as his brother as an outsider 
who has never served in national politics. He could argue that his would be a transparent and 
morally upstanding government. Other potential candidates like Scott Walker and Ben Carson 
could also potentially play this outsider role and select themes and messaging objectives 
espousing limited government, transparency, and principled leadership.  
Bush could also take on an interesting theme regarding American identity that would help 
his approach to a very pertinent immigration issue. Since Jeb Bush has a wife who immigrated to 
the US, he could create interesting themes regarding American identity that are unique. His 
stance on immigration, which is somewhat divergent from that of the Republican Party, coupled 
with his personal backstory, could make for interesting selections of messaging objectives and 
theme. Marco Rubio also holds some potential in bringing an interesting stance on immigration 
as a candidate, being of Cuban descent. It is unclear how this will shake out, but the potential is 
certainly interesting with the growing importance of immigration issues.  
In terms of themes regarding social issues, 2016 certainly holds some potential for 
Republicans. Some states have passed laws making it harder to get abortions, and allowing or 
forbidding same sex marriage. A recent Supreme Court decision upheld private companies’ 
ability to withhold coverage to certain treatments based on religious objections. These 
developments have been both in favor and against the Religious Right. However, these 
developments have undoubtedly served to make these issues increasingly salient. With the 
increased prominence of these social issues, Republicans will have to take on some themes and 
messaging objectives that explain their stance on them in a strategically significant way. 
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Different Republican candidates will certainly look to accomplish this in various ways based on 
their positions and beliefs. Some may choose to emphasize themes and messaging objectives 
advocating for states’ rights to determine issues like abortion and same sex marriage. This may 
come across as either somewhat of a dodge or a true stance. A vehemently argued theme of 
states’ rights could make this position seem more believable and compelling. Other candidates 
would clearly take a clear Conservative stance on these issues at the federal level. They would 
create themes that emphasize the sanctity of life referred to in the narrative. Regardless of what 
precisely happens, social issues will likely be more important than ever in 2016.  
Overall, it is not entirely clear what role the narrative will play in the upcoming 
presidential election. If the last two Republican candidates are any indication of the role 
narrative-based themes will play, it seems there will not be much emphasis. However, things are 
different this time around. The economy will likely not be a point of emphasis for the GOP. 
When talking about less strident social issues or immigration, theme could be useful. It offers a 
greater degree of separation from the Democratic Party and more emotional appeals. In all 
likelihood, another Reagan will not appear. No Republican candidate will be able to heavily 
utilize theme at the level of effectiveness that the fortieth president did. However, as it was in 
2000 for Bush, theme will most likely be a useful tool to make messaging objectives that the 
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